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All western states today define themselves as nation-states, and all of these states have a 
political and economic structure in which an individual’s right to own private property is an 
underlying and pervasive feature. Drawing on examples from the historical trajectories of the 
US and Norway between ca 1760 and 1880, this dissertation explores the development of 
nation-states and the role of private property rights in this development. I demonstrate the 
fundamental role both of the idea of private property for the ideology of nationalism, and of 
the significance of a particular kind of property regime (widespread landowning) for the 
emergence and development of nationalism as historical phenomena.  
The evidence on which this dissertation relies has been extracted from historical documents 
consisting primarily of political pamphlets and speeches. The documents are chosen from what 
we can call “the national movement” e.g. dominant public debaters, policymakers and 
agitators. To compliment and contextualize my documentary analysis I have drawn on a range 
of secondary literature on social, historical and economic developments. The analysis has 
sought to unravel nationalism as an emerging historical phenomena in each of the cases 
investigated by focusing on authorial meaning in specific historical contexts. The core concept 
of nationalism has been arrived at by continuously comparing the developments in the US and 
Norway.   
The main points that this dissertation make are that it was the emergence of more widespread 
smallholding of land that was one of the most decisive preconditions for the emergence of 
nationalism in the US and Norway. Furthermore, this dissertation suggest that widespread 
ownership of land resulted in the emergence of a form of nationalism in which ownership of 
landed property was crucial because it became tied up with the idea of national popular 
sovereignty. Put in a simplified way: sovereignty was popular because property was popular 
(widespread). This connection was made mainly on the one hand from the real historical tie 
between ownership of land, juridical sovereignty and political powers, and on the other hand 
from the more conceptual similarity between property rights or ownership and sovereignty. 
I have identified two forms of nationalism based on the way that property was understood in 
the national ideology. The first form of the nation describes the agrarian phase of nationalism 
where it was real landed property that was seen to be crucial for the creation of national 
sovereignty. The second form of the nation describes a form of industrial nationalism. With 
the coming of industrial property and the expansion of wage labour, landed property lost its 
significance, and instead the right to the fruits of one’s labour was understood as the most 
important part of the property right. I have called this a shift from land to labour, or a 
transvaluation of property.  
This property rights perspective on nationalism in the US and Norway contributes to a new 
understanding of nationalism not only in these places but perhaps also in the western world in 
general. The development in the US and Norway can be seen in the wider context of the decline 
of feudalism and absolutism and the emergence of democratic, industrial societies in the 
western world. The landed, agrarian form of nationalism might in effect be a ‘missing link’ 
between pre- or proto-national forms of society (feudal, religious, absolutist, mercantilist, 
etc.), and the fully modern industrial form identified for example by Ernest Gellner. It is the 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation offers a historical sociological analysis of the emergence and development 
of nationalism in the US and Norway between 1762 and 1884. Both the US and Norway were 
agrarian societies at the beginning of this time period, and had a property structure that was 
marked by relatively widespread smallholdings of land. This fact became crucial for the 
development of the national ideology, as ideas of popular sovereignty and individual freedom 
became tied up with widespread individual ownership of landed property.  Through the 
analysis of the relationship between landed property rights and nationalism in these cases, and 
the development of this relationship with the coming of industrialization, I believe that I have 
arrived at a novel understanding of nationalism, one which reveals the fundamental role of 
private, landed property rights to the emergence, nature and development of nationalism; and 
which illuminates how the agrarian origins of nationalism became adapted to its industrial 
future.  
 
The research that I have done is historical and particular in its nature – that is to say that it 
deals with events and ideas in specific places of the distant past. But the purpose of this 
dissertation is to understand the world in which we live today. My dissertation might thus be 
placed in the tradition of thinkers such as Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber – it is 
essentially an attempt to understand the preconditions for, and the origins of, the modern world 
of nation-states with a broad historical view, and to thus illuminate structural historical 
processes in their making.  The first basic assumption to this approach is the banal but 
important historical insight that society is not static: the institutions, ideas and material 
relations of the present have evolved out of earlier forms. The present is thus historically laden: 
to understand it, we must understand from where it came. A second basic insight or 
assumptions that these approaches have in common is the recognition that changes in what we 
might call the material world – i.e. changes in forms of property, population swings, wars, 
access to resources, changes in ways of production and appropriation, etc.  – have a decisive 
effect on social forms and dominant ideas in society. To understand social change, we must 
take into account the material forces that shape the lives of people.  It is, of course, Karl Marx 
who most strongly accentuates changes in the material world as a driving force, as it were, in 
history; and Marx’s emphasis on changes in the mode of production – specifically changes in 
property regimes – for the formation of new ideas and social forms is the basis on which this 
dissertation is built. I have focused specifically on how the property regime in societies is 
related to the idea and ideology of nationalism. It is the institution and idea of private property, 
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and its role in the national ideology, that is the central aspect of this dissertation. I make a 
claim that the existence of a particular type of property regime (those to be found, for example, 
in the US and Norway in the early nineteenth century) was particularly favorable for the 
formation of nationalism. Before any further inquiry is done, then, it will be helpful to outline 
the property relations under which nationalism emerged in the US and Norway.  
 
The emergence of nationalism and private landed property  
a) The forms of property at the time of the emergence of nationalism: land  
Nationalism in the US and Norway emerged and formed during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century. It is important to remember, as Eric Hobsbawm pointed out long before the study of 
nationalism became fashionable, that this time period was an age of agriculture. It was a world 
where the vast majority of wealth came from agricultural production, and where agriculture 
constituted the liveli hood of more than 90% of the people of Europe and America. The major 
form of property was thus land, and therefore “what happened to land determined the life and 
death of human beings.”1 There were, in this time period, various ways in which landed 
property was organized: from the viewpoint of agrarian property relations, writes Hobsbawm, 
it makes sense to divide the western hemisphere in this time period into three large segments.2 
There were the European colonies which were, with the exception of the northern part of the 
British North American colonies, primarily slave driven. Eastern Europe (and parts of Spain 
and Italy) might be classified as a second segment where agriculture was done by serfs, 
politically and economically unfree. While the distinction in dignity and wealth was not as 
distinct as that between slave and master, the difference in power and wealth was still 
enormous between landlords/aristocrats on one side and cultivators of the soil on the other. 
The unfree cultivators constituted the bulk of the population in this segment, while a small 
majority owned the bulk of the land – and ownership of land gave titles, privileges and rank 
which formed the basis of a social reality of great distinctions. This was similar to the third 
segment, which covered Western Europe, but here the cultivators of the earth had relatively 
                                                     
 
1 Hobsbawm, Eric, The age of Revolution: Europe 1789-1848, Wiendfeld and Nicholson, London, 
(1962), p 149. 
2 Hobsbawm, 1962: p 13-18. 
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more economical freedom, although landlords were a pervasive feature, and ownership was 
mostly confined to a small class of aristocrats.3 
 
b) The propertied preconditions for the emergence of nationalism in the US and Norway 
Nationalism emerged for the first time in the unique first segment of agrarian relations that 
Hobsbawm describes – in colonial North America. This happened because agrarian relations 
in the North American colonies were marked by a high degree of land self-ownership, and an 
almost total absence of feudalistic land regimes, manorial systems and landed aristocrats. 
Individual exclusive ownership of landed property was unusually widespread in the North 
American colonies: land was relatively easy to acquire, and once obtained, one was relatively 
more free in one’s use of it compared to most other places. In colonial North America, 
individuals could find uncultivated, unappropriated land, invest labour in cultivating it, thus 
making the land his or her private property, for which he or she owed nothing to lords or 
aristocrats. 
 
Widespread private ownership had not, however, always and everywhere been a feature of 
colonial America. In the first colonies, Virginia and Plymouth, land was at first owned by 
colonial promoters, and the colonists worked the land collectively, for which they received 
food, shelter and clothing, while the surplus went to the owning company. This scheme was 
not successful in the long run, however. Individual ownership of land was introduced in the 
late 1620s, and all colonies established after 1629 immediately introduced private 
landholding.4 The granting of land rights was based on the idea that the British king had 
sovereignty over all the newfound land in the colonies, and that he could thus grant land to 
joint stock companies or proprietors. Property rights granted from the king gave the companies 
and proprietors the right to appoint judges, to tax and form governments – these were rights 
that were associated with sovereignty. Manorial systems emerged in some places, such as in 
the Hudson Valley and Maryland; and during the seventeenth century, companies and 
                                                     
 
3 The issue of land and class relations in western Europe is complex, for a slightly more in depth and 
detailed overview than that of Hobsbawm, see: Aston, T.H and Philipin C..H.E, The Brenner debate: 
agrarian class structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, (1985).  
4 Nettles, Curtis P, The roots of American Civilization: a history of American colonial life, Meredith 
Publishing Company, New York, (1963)[1938], p 222-229. 
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proprietors in Virginia devised a system that gave land to middling immigrants who could 
finance their own journey, and granted them more land for each servant, slave or other person 
brought with them. Some men could thus acquire large properties of land. This was known as 
the headright system. The headright system was gradually abandoned however, and by the late 
seventeenth century direct land sales to individuals had become the norm in all the colonies. 
The system of direct sales resulted in efficient and widespread allocation of land, so that by 
the end of the seventieth century almost all householders owned land. In Salem, 
Massachusetts, only four of the 238 first inhabitants were landless. Half of the men in New 
England owned land by the age of 30, and 95% of men owned land by the age of 36. In 1690, 
sixth-sevenths of all farmers in Connecticut owned land; in 1704, two-thirds of the households 
in Surry County, Virginia, owned land; and in Pennsylvania landownership was almost 
universal during the 1690s.5 
 
Individual landownership remained high during the eighteenth century. Nearly two-thirds of 
farmers in eastern New England, Long Island, and Tidewater, Virginia, owned land – only 
one-sixth of farm workers remained tenants all their lives. In Essex County, Massachusetts, 
84% of men between the age of thirty-seven and sixty owned land. Two-thirds of taxpayers in 
Deadham owned land both in 1735 and in 1771, and seven-tenths of the taxpayers in Concord 
owned land in 1749, while the number rose to four-fifths in 1771. Tenancy remained low, and 
seven-tenths of small village and town householders in Massachusetts owned land in 1771. 
Connecticut, New Hampshire and East New Jersey also had a high degree of self-ownership. 
In revolutionary era New Jersey, for example, two-thirds of taxed men owned land, but four-
fifths of the men over twenty-seven – which constituted almost all the households – owned 
land.6     
 
The situation of relatively wide land ownership in America in the eighteenth century was 
special, but similar conditions were also to be found in certain areas of the third agricultural 
segment that Hobsbawm describes. This area, as we remember, was marked by a higher degree 
of freedom for farmers compared to the slaves of the first segment and the serfs of the second 
                                                     
 
5 This paragraph follows closely the description in Kulikoff, Allan, From British Peasants to Colonial 
American Farmers, The University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill and London, (2000), p 106-
118. 
6 This paragraph follows closely the description in Kulikoff, 2000: p 127-131. 
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segment. The English/British society from which North America was settled, for example, 
displayed early on a consolidation of private individual property, though not as widespread as 
in the colonies, and Britain had powerful lords and aristocrats that owned huge tracts of land. 
Britain was thus quite different from the colonies. The Norwegian kingdom, however, was 
one area in the third segment that closely resembled the North American colonies in structures 
of landownership; in Norway landownership was widespread by the close of the eighteenth 
century, and practically no landed aristocracy or manors existed. 
 
Early on, in the eighth and ninth century, most farmers living in the Norwegian area probably 
owned their own land, although there are no certain data on this,7 and ownership of land 
conferred powers of sovereignty on the farmer: all landowners could meet at the legislative 
assembly and decide the laws and taxes that were to be imposed.8 As the medieval period 
progressed into the twelfth and thirteenth century, fewer farmers were owners of their land as 
the king and the church acquired rights to large areas of land – by 1300, the church, the king, 
and the aristocracy owned 63% of the land in Norway.9 However, this land never became 
centralized into manors, which made it possible for farmers to maintain a relatively 
independent position. 
 
In 1661, the Norwegian kingdom officially became an absolutist state as part of the Danish 
kingdom. Absolutism was instituted by the Danish king with help from the class of city 
burghers and merchants. This class supported the king in what was actually a coup d’état, 
depriving the aristocracy of their privileged political powers. Thus the city burghers came to 
have a larger influence in the running of the state, and, amongst other things, they initiated 
sales of Crown and church land. In Norway, in the first instance, the land was bought in large 
chunks by wealthy individuals, but was often later sold to Norwegian farmers. The sales of 
Crown land contributed to creating an ownership structure where one-third of farmers owned 
their own land in 1720. In the northeastern valleys of eastern Norway, the percentage of self-
ownership was as high as 60-70%, while the southwest had a self-ownership percentage 
between 15% and 30%. In the farm areas around Trondheim (Trøndelag), self-ownership 
                                                     
 
7 Siggurdson, Jon Vidar, Det Norrønne samfunnet: Vikingen, Kongen, Erkebiskopen og Bonden, Pax 
Forlag, Oslo, (2008), p 191-194. 
8 Krag, Claus, Norges historie fram til 1319, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo (2000), p.35-37. 
9 Krag, 2000: p 152. 
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varied in areas from 5 to 20%. Self-ownership gradually increased during the eighteenth 
century, largely because of further public sales of land to private persons: there was one wave 
of land sales during the 1720s and one during the 1750. By 1800, the percentage of self- 
ownership was as high as 80% in some areas in the eastern parts of Norway, while the 
percentage had risen to about 60% in the southwest, and to 50% in Trøndelag. For the country 
as a whole, almost 60% of the farmers owned their own land in 1801.10 
 
There are two important points about landownership in the US and Norway to be taken from 
this:  
1) That landownership was relatively widespread  
2) That many, if not most, of the people who owned land had acquired it as a purely 
economic right. 
The first point (wide landownership) is important on the one hand because widespread 
ownership made it more plausible to conceive of a large number of the people as free and 
independent individuals, and on the other hand because this idea of a large part of the people 
as free and independent was congruent with, and demanded even, popular sovereignty. The 
second point (land as an economic right) is important firstly because the economic nature of 
the modern property right – that is, that it was not granted or sanctioned primarily by privilege, 
or protected by extra economical powers – could more easily give the impression that landed 
property was possible to acquire for all, and that the property right was derived from the 
investment of one’s labour. Secondly, the economical (or non-privileged) nature of the 
property right is important because it posed questions of how to legitimize and protect the 
property right. In the national ideologies of the US and Norway, private property became 
secured in theory for all by the sovereignty of the people (who came to be associated with the 
landholders), and legitimized by the right to labour – this was the core of the national ideology 
at its emergence, and its novelty. It was thus as an agrarian phenomena in the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth century that nationalism emerged and lay the foundations for the modern 
nation-state. This is one of the main arguments that will be developed in this thesis.  
 
                                                     
 
10 This paragraph relies heavily on Moseng, Ole Georg, et al, Norsk Historie II: 1537-1814, 
Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, (2003), p 207-211, 221-222, and 265-270. 
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The nation-state, property, and bourgeoisie democracy: the answer to 
paradoxes 
a) Liberal paradox: Property and Democracy  
This dissertation seeks the origins of nationalism and its relationship to private property in the 
property assumptions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century agrarian societies of 
the US and Norway. But the questions that led me to these societies in this time period were 
informed by the period of industrialization and democratization. From a liberal standpoint, 
there is a paradox in the way in which the relationship between property and popular 
sovereignty changed from the nineteenth to the twentieth century within the nation-states of 
the west. Norway and the US exemplify this. The political constitutions of the US and Norway, 
in the agrarian phase under which they first became nation-states, makes them clear examples 
of states where private property and popular participation in government were seen to be in 
tension, and where the preservation of landed property was one of the most central goals of 
politics. These assumptions took the form of a landed property-based democracy where 
landless individuals were largely excluded from political power – here, landless people 
represented a danger to the stability of private property and had to be excluded from power. 
However, when the US and Norway became industrializing societies, the relationship between 
property and popular sovereignty became reversed: universal suffrage (at the time understood 
as male suffrage) and private property came to be seen as interdependent. This paradox was 
identified by Gøran Therborn as one between property and democracy: 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as both political practice and 
constitutional debate clearly demonstrate, prevailing bourgeois opinion held that 
democracy and capitalism (or private property) were incompatible … In modern 
times, however, since at least the outbreak of the Cold War, bourgeois ideologists 
have maintained that only capitalism is compatible with democracy.11 
I would like to invoke a quote from Walter Benjamin (from the 1930s) which inspired much 
of my initial thinking on this. Benjamin asserted in the age of fascism that: 
Fascism attempts to organize the newly created proletarian masses without affecting 
the property structure which the masses strive to eliminate. Fascism sees its salvation 
in giving these masses not their right, but instead a chance to express themselves.12   
                                                     
 
11 Therborn, Gøran, “The rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy”, in New Left Review, 1/103, 
May-June, (1977). 





Although this quote concerns nationalism in its interwar fascist form specifically, it made me 
wonder if there was a connection between nationalism in general and the perseverance of 
private property. Was it the case that nationalism gave the masses only an ideological 
semblance of power while keeping wealth concentrated in a few hands by private property 
holdings.   
 
b) Marxian paradox: The nation- state and “the rights of man” 
There is also a Marxian paradox connected to the existence of private property and the nation-
state. According to classical Marxist theory, the nation-state and private property should not 
have the enduring legitimacy that it has;13 on the contrary, class antagonism in capitalism 
should bring about a proletarian world revolution that would grant freedom to all and abolish 
nations and private property. But history has shown that the masses have not strived to 
eliminate the national property structure, as Benjamin thought – instead the masses have 
accepted, as it were, the offer to “express themselves” (in Benjamin’s term), through the 
nation, even without the spell of fascism. It has been through the nation-state with a private 
property regime and liberal democracy that the individual has seen his or her freedom and 
rights fulfilled and guarded. Hannah Arendt has observed that in the world of nation-states, 
“Man, it turns out, can lose all the so-called Rights of Man without losing his essential quality 
as a man, his human dignity. Only the loss of a polity itself expels him from humanity.”14 This 
points to something fundamental about the legitimacy of the nation-form and its formation 
throughout history: it has been established as practically the only real guarantor of rights and 
freedoms of the individual, and, at least in the western world, these rights have come to be 
seen as inseparable from the right to private property. But if it is true, as Harold Laski once 
put it (and as Benjamin hinted at), that there is an “antithesis between property rights and the 
fulfillment of the democratic idea,” because “political power is the handmaid of economic 
power” and that “a mere ballot box democracy is, as a consequence, utterly unreal in the 
presence of large inequalities of property,”15 then one can wonder why such states are so 
widely accepted. And indeed as Thomas Piketty has recently shown, contemporary, Western 
                                                     
 
13 Greenfeld, Liah, “Trancending the nations worth”, Daedalus ( Vol. 122. No. 3, 1993), offers an 
interesting discussion of this issue. 
14 Arendt, Hannah, The origins of totalitarianism, Meridian books, Cleveland and New York, (1958) 
p. 197. 
15 Quoted in, Townshend, Jules, C.B Macpherson and the problem of liberal democracy, Edinburgh 
University press, Edinburgh, (2000), p 8-9. 
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nation-states are marked by increasing inequalities in distribution of wealth based on 
ownership of private property.16  
 
It is true that there have been other alternatives to the liberal nation form, especially in the 
twentieth century with its fascist and communist states, and today still there exists totalitarian 
states both religious and secular in form. But there is some truth to Francis Fukuyama’s 
infamous “end of history” thesis, in that the bourgeois liberal nation-state with a private 
property regime is today the most prevalent political form on the globe.17 Is there something, 
then, about nationalism that encourages the existence of private property, or something in 
private property that makes nationalism stronger? What is the role of private property for the 
emergence and development of nationalism, and what is the role of private property in the 
ideology or the idea of the nation?  The landed relations of the US and Norway at the time of 
their national revolutions, and the role of private property in nationalist discourse there, 
provides a fruitful starting point for the exploration of these questions.   
 
c) The nationalist answer: Property, freedom and sovereignty  
An understanding of the proper relationship between nationalism and private property might 
offer an answer to the liberal and the Marxist paradoxes of property and sovereignty (or 
democracy) within western nation-states. When it comes to the potential connection between 
nationalism and private property rights, there is of course the classical Marxian position that 
nationalism is an invention of the bourgeoisie, and that it therefore upholds a private property 
regime. The connection between nationalism and property rights is thus purely an instrumental 
one, in favor of a certain class – the bourgeoisie. As Marx wrote about the emergent nation-
states of Europe in “the springtime of the peoples”: “The executive of the modern state is but 
a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole bourgeoisie.”18 These nation-states 
were created by bourgeois interest, said Marx, but the bourgeoisie did not actually have any 
national interests:  
                                                     
 
16 Piketty, Thomas, Capital in the twenty-first century, The Belknap Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
and London, England, (2014). 
17 Fukuyama, Francis, The end of history and the last man, The Free Press, New York, (1992). 
18Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the communist party, The New York Labour News, 
New York, (1908) [1848], p. 11. 
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The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie 
over the entire surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, 
establish connections everywhere.19 
The nation-state is thus just another way of protecting the property of the ruling bourgeoisie, 
and indeed, as mentioned, in the US and Norway, the new nation-states were at first ruled by 
men of property – this was their core principle. But nationalism in these cases was never 
advocated primarily by a bourgeoisie in the Marxian sense, and at the first emergence of 
nationalism, these societies were only to a limited extent market-oriented societies. And as we 
saw, these cases were marked by relatively wide landownership. Class interest is important, 
but it has to be the right class or classes one is looking at. In the American and Norwegian 
cases, members of the national movement represented various classes, but a common 
underlying interest was landed property. Hence, it seems sensible to start an exploration 
between nationalism and private property by looking at landed property. For this purpose, the 
connection between property rights in land and sovereignty provides a fruitful starting point. 
The link from property to sovereignty may first be established through the freedom that 
property may confer on an individual.20 Georg Wilhelm Friedrick Hegel formulated this in one 
way:  
A person must translate his freedom into an external sphere in order to exist … in his 
property a person exists for the first time as reason … Since property is the means 
whereby I give my will an embodiment it must have the character of thine or mine. 
This is the important doctrine of the necessity of private property21 
Property is here seen as means to realize one’s will, and as exclusive to the individual. This is 
conceptually related to sovereignty, which involves the possibility of an agent to exercise a 
will in a specific territory/space.22 Property, in the form of land, therefore makes the individual 
a ‘mini’ sovereign over the land which the property right covers because the individual, having 
property in the land, is free to decide how to use the land. The landed property becomes, we 
might say, the “sphere” in Hegel’s sense, in which the individual exercises his or her freedom 
because he or she is sovereign over the land. In this sense, ownership of landed property may 
have direct connection to nationalism and the concept of territorial sovereignty. Jacob Metzer 
and Stanley Engerman have noted this connection between property in land, sovereignty and 
                                                     
 
19 Marx, and Engels, 1908: p.12. 
20 I shall elaborate on the nature of property in chapter 2.  
21 Hegel, George Freidrich, Philosophy of right, § 46, (1821). Downloaded 28/10/2014. 
https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/hegel/works/pr/property.htm  
22 I will discuss sovereignty more thoroughly in chapter 2.  
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nationalism through the kind of property-based democracy that the American and Norwegian 
nation-states established at their emergence. They write:  
While the ownership of land as prerequisite for enfranchisement has long been 
abandoned in modern democratic states … this may reflect some kind of an 
accommodation between nationalism, whose basic attitude towards land as a place – 
a homeland belonging to the nationals – made the thinking often blur the distinction 
between sovereignty and ownership.23    
The idea of a connection between ownership and sovereignty is not, however, new – there has 
indeed for a long time in western thought been posed a connection between ownership and 
freedom through sovereignty. Arendt has written about property in land and its connection to 
power and freedom in the Greek world: “Man,” she writes, “could liberate himself from 
necessity only through power over other men, and he could be free only if he owned a place, 
a home in the world.”24 This may be oversimplified and is probably not applicable to dominant 
thought on property and freedom today, but it does point to the general connection between 
ownership of landed property and power/sovereignty.25 Indeed, Andrew Reeve similarly notes 
that there are three power relations connected to property rights in general: economical power, 
dominium over others and various forms of authority.26 Historically, all these aspects have 
been present in the ownership of landed property. Therefore landed property and political 
power (sovereignty) historically have gone hand in hand, from Greek and Roman democracy, 
to European feudalism, to the early, modern, western property-based national democracies. In 
short, there is both a historical and a conceptual connection between nationalism and private 
property rights through the concept of territorial sovereignty.  
 
From these connections, it seemed to me that there was a fundamental relationship between 
the emergence of nationalism, landed property rights, and the enduring presence of private 
property and the nation-state as custodians of individual freedom. It seemed to me that an 
answer to these questions would be found by exploring the origins and development of 
nationalism. Therefore it is nationalism that is my primary subject of investigation: its origins, 
its development, and its nature. In short, this dissertation follows the development of property 
and sovereignty through the emergence of nationalism from its agrarian phase, when landed 
                                                     
 
23Engerman, Stanley & Jackob Metzer (eds) Land rights, ethno-nationality, and sovereignty in history, 
Routledge, London, (2004) p. 10. 
24 Reeve, Andrew, Property, Macmillan, London, (1986),p. 81. 
25 I shall elaborate more on this in the next chapter.  
26 Reeve, 1986: p.80. 
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property was tied up to sovereignty and enfranchisement, into the industrial phase, when the 
link between landed property and enfranchisement became broken. 
 
Outline of the argument   
a) Nationalism, property and agrarian society 
What is nationalism? When did it emerge? And what are the social and material conditions for 
its emergence and existence. These are the larger questions that my research revolves around, 
and through which I seek to clarify the relationship between property and democracy.  
 
In the 1980s Ernest Gellner gave an answer to these questions that has since been definitive 
and influential for all subsequent studies of nationalism. Gellner held that nationalism was 
“primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be 
congruent.” 27 He believed that nationalism emerged with industrial society in Europe. “The 
age of transition to industrialism was bound, according to our model, also to be an age of 
nationalism,” wrote Gellner. Here, industrialism created nationalism because it brought to the 
world a “homogeneity imposed by objective, inescapable, imperative [which] eventually 
appears on the surface in the form of nationalism.”28 Although Gellner, tongue-in-cheek, held 
his argument to be Euclidian in its logic,29 many have since shown that nationalism did in fact 
emerge long before industrialization. Michael Mann, for instance, have pointed to the 
importance of military and economic developments connected to the rise of the modern state 
before industrialization,30 and Liah Greenfeld has focused on the importance of Protestant 
Christianity, but sees nationalism as having specifically English origins, sparked by 
resentement and new ideas of individual worth.31 These are just two examples, there are many 
more.32 While I agree that the origins of nationalism are to be found before industrialization, 
I also think it is undeniable that nationalism and industrial society not only have an elective 
                                                     
 
27 Gellner, Ernest, Nations and Nationalism, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford, (2006)[1983], p 1 
28 Gellner, 2006: p 38. 
29 Gellner, Ernest, “The coming of Nationalism and its interpretation: The myths of Nation and Class” 
in Gopal Balakrishnan (ed), Mapping the nation, Verso, London, (1999([1996], p 111. 
30 Mann, Michael, The sources of social power, Vol 2: The rise of classes and nation states 1760-
1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1993). 
31 Greenfeld, Liah, Nationalism: Five roads to modernity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge 
(1993). 
32 I shall have a more thorough discussion on the literature on nationalism in chapter 2. 
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affinity, but that nationalism became, to use the Marxian terms, the superstructure of the 
industrial mode of production. How, then, is it that nationalism, a pre-industrial phenomena, 
is so well suited to industrial society? The answer, this dissertation suggests, lies in the initial 
connection between nationalism and landed private property rights.  
 
My research locates the origins of nationalism in changes of property structures within 
agrarian societies, and points to how the principles of nationalism were at first understood in 
relation to, and emerged from, agrarian conditions of landed property, and how nationalism 
thus became the foundation for industrial society. In short: Gellner’s idea of nationalism as the 
political principle that demands the congruence of the cultural and the political unit emerged 
not from the needs of industrial society, and did not connect culture and power as such. Rather, 
nationalism was a transformation of notions of property and sovereignty within agrarian 
societies brought forth by changes in landed property regimes. Hence, the structural shift that 
according to Gellner makes nationalism possible, and which he saw as one between agrarian 
and industrial society, was in fact a change within agrarian society. The structural change was 
a change that saw the emergence of more widespread smallholdings of land, as opposed to 
large manorial landholding based on aristocratic privilege. When landholding thus became 
more widely distributed, it came to pose changes to the political power structure through which 
sovereignty and property as universal right were introduced. Gellner said that the age of 
nationalism was one of universal high culture, where every man is a Mamluk;33 I would argue 
that to understand nationalism properly, we must see it also as an age of universal property 
ownership. To invoke the Hegelian image of the master Slave dialectic, history, up until the 
age of nationalism, was one of slave (propertyless) versus master (owners). In the age of 
nationalism, all are masters, the dialectic is fulfilled – all are equally recognized as individuals 
with the right to property.34  
 
The Hegelian statement is only an exaggerated image of course, but it does point to something 
fundamental about the novelty of nationalism as historical phenomena: since the first 
                                                     
 
33 Gellner, 2006: p 18.  
34 Hegel`s dialectic is often understood metaphysically. But Susan Buck-Morrs has suggested and 
convincingly shown that Hegel had this image from real and contemporary issues of slaves and 
masters. Buck-Morss, Susan, “Hegel and Haiti”, Critical inquiry, Vol.26. No.4, (Summer,2000). The 
master-slave dialectic understood in literal terms has special relevance for understanding nationalism 
in the US and Norway, as we shall see. 
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civilizations, property ownership has been confined to the few, whereas the masses were 
confined to poverty.35 In ancient Greece and Rome, for example, it was citizens or aristocrats 
that had property over slaves and land; in the European feudal age, it was lords and kings that 
had it over serfs and land. The natural order of things was master and slave. This changes with 
the age of nationalism, under its aegis, as stated in the American Declaration of Independence, 
“all men” are granted “the right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.” Or, to invoke 
another image: at first, none had property, then some had property, and finally all have 
property.36 Again, this is only in theory, but this was the theory by which the members of the 
national movements in the US and Norway legitimized their cause. This became so due to the 
landed property relations in these cases: the property structures of my cases reinforced a style 
of thought where the image of master and slave, envisioned as propertied versus property-less, 
became a central image.37 One fundamental principle of nationalism was individual freedom 
through ownership as opposed to slavery.38 Nationalism, in my cases, was a way of 
understanding and organizing the world in which the freedom of the individual was the 
fundamental goal. Nationalists, in my cases, sought to realize their vision of freedom by 
creating a national sovereignty based on the property of every member of the nation. Thus was 
the propertied freedom of each individual seen to be safe. 
 
b) The freedom in property and its transvaluation 
The more general philosophical points made in the last two paragraphs should not be 
interpreted as a form of idealism in my approach. On the contrary, my approach, as indicated 
above, may be seen as Marxian materialist, and the materialism of my approach is based on 
changes in property regimes. Put crudely: it was the forms of property and the mode of 
                                                     
 
35 I am generalizing here as well. For an overview of the diversity of land law in the ancient world for 
example, see Ellickson, Robert, C and Thorland, Charles, “Ancient Land law, Mesopotamia, Egypt, 
Israel”, in Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, ( 01.01.1995).  
36 This is inspired by Gellner’s paraphrase of Hegel talking about the state. Gellner was talking in the 
abstract about historical stages and the development of the state. He wrote “once none had the state, 
then some had it, and finally all have it”, Gellner, 2006: p.5. 
37 I shall elaborate on this in the next chapter and in the conclusion, and it will be a reoccurring theme 
throughout my substantial chapters.  
38 The institution of chattel slavery remained, of course, a pervasive institution in the US all the way 
up until 1861 But this did not mean that it could not be claimed that America was a land of freedom. I 
discuss the relationship of slavery and propertied freedom throughout this dissertation.  
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production that made the idea of nationalism conceivable – it was not the idea of nationalism 
that conceived the mode of production and the property regime to which it corresponded.39 
 
There were two major changes in property regimes during the time period to which I confined 
my investigations. The first change was the emergence of more widespread smallholding 
mentioned above. It was this that set the preconditions for the emergence of nationalism. 
Hence, because nationalism emerged in agrarian societies, it was a strengthening of landed 
private property rights that was the driving motor of nationalist development in this initial 
phase: the idea of sovereignty of the people became inseparably bound up with the political 
rule of the landowning class, and freedom inseparably bound up with the ownership of landed 
property. The second change was one away from an agricultural economy which saw the rise 
of industrial property. With the coming of industrial society, there was what I have a called a 
transvaluation of property. This can also be stated as a shift from land to labor as a principle 
of political inclusion, and it was driven by a shift in the property structure that saw the 
emergence of a proletariat (larger classes of wage earners) and thus a relative decline in 
ownership of landed property. The term transvaluation, was used by Liah Greenfeld in her 
study of nationalism, and she in turn got the term from Nietzsche. A transvaluation basically 
means a radical reevaluation of values – to turn them on their head.40 What I refer to 
specifically when I speak of a transvaluation of property is how propertied freedom went from 
being understood primarily as landed or real property to meaning property in one’s labour. 
This was a transvaluation because after this change happened, the individual was seen as free 
if he or she owned his or her own labour, had property in his or her person. Before the 
transvaluation, labourers without landed or real property were seen as dependent or unfree, on 
similar footing to that of a slave. The transvaluation adjusted the sovereignty and property 
concepts to include a broader stratum of people in political power: since the essential future 
of property was now understood to be the labour of the individual (instead of land), all who 
labored were seen as free and could now partake in political power. In this way popular 
                                                     
 
39 Or as Marx and Engels put it in more abstract terms, talking about the relationship between 
consciousness and the material world: “life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by 
life.” Marx, Karl, and Frederick Engels, The German ideology, Lawrence and Wishart, London, 
(1970)[1846-47], p. 47. 
40 Greenfeld uses the concept in Greenfeld, 1993: p16. Nietzsche wrote about this concept: “there is a 
transvaluation of values, and the concepts "true" and "false" are forced to change places” Nietzsche, 
Frederick ,The Antichrist, Project Gutenberg EBook, (2006), p 8. 
http://archive.org/stream/theantichrist19322gut/19322.txt Downloaded 06.03.2015. 
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sovereignty became disconnected from landed property and connected instead to all the 
labouring individuals of the nation. This legitimized capitalist labour relations as all 
individuals were now seen as free by having property in one’s labour, be it the propertied 
capitalist or the industrial wage labourer.  
 
c) Key concepts in the analysis: transvaluation, amalgamation, the first and the second 
form of the nation 
In addition to the idea of transvaluation of property, I have constructed and applied three other 
conceptual devices in order to frame my analysis. I have applied my own invented concept of 
amalgamation of people, property and sovereignty. This is meant to capture the essence of the 
national ideology in my cases: the security of individual property became bound with the 
sovereignty of the people, so that only sovereignty derived from the people was seen as a 
legitimate protector of private property rights, and, on the other hand, so that a sovereign 
people could only exist if it was constituted of propertied individuals. It is for this reason that 
we can speak of the nation as a propertied community. I have furthermore applied and made 
up the terms the first form of the nation and the second form of the nation to describe two 
different ways in which the amalgamation of people, property and sovereignty worked and 
was understood. The first form of the nation alludes to an agrarian society and an agrarian 
ideology of nationalism. There was a relatively small state, and the state was dominated by 
landed interests along with some commercial interest. The main political expression of this 
form was a landed democracy ideologically based on the sovereignty of the people. The second 
form of the nation alludes to a society and an ideology of nationalism that is in the process of 
industrialization. There are relatively more people working in wage-based jobs, and politics is 
increasingly dominated by professional politicians leading constituencies dominated by 
workers and city professionals. The state becomes bigger in this form, and the main political 
expression of this form is universal male suffrage, although in America I have exemplified 
this through the abolition of slavery.  
 
The chapters  
My argument is made across seven chapters. Chapter 2 compliments this introduction with 
more thorough discussions about nationalism, property and sovereignty in historical 
perspective and in the context of modernity. Chapter 3 provides a justification for the 
comparison of my two cases as well as a discussion of the historical comparative method. In 
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this chapter I also discuss the evidence I have invoked and the way in which I have analyzed 
it. The main argument about the emergence and development of nationalism in the US and 
Norway is presented in four substantive chapters: two on the US and two on Norway. These 
are chapters 4, 5, 6 and 7. Chapter 4 lays down the historical and sociological preconditions 
for the emergence of the American national movement and revolution of 1776. The central 
events discussed are the Declaration of Independence (1776) and the Philadelphia federal 
constitutional convention (1787). Chapter 5 follows political and social development from 
1800 until 1865. There are two main topics of this chapter, the first form of the nation and the 
second form of the nation. The first form of the nation discusses Jeffersonian democracy and 
the idea of a nation of smallholding farmers. The major point to make here is how this property 
rights element of nationalism was understood primarily to mean real or landed property, and 
how individual and national freedom was seen to be maintained by the rule of a large class of 
propertied men. This chapter will also emphasize how slaves were understood as a form of 
property, and how the idea of national propertied freedom could strengthen the institution of 
chattel slavery. The second form of the nation discusses the coming of the civil war and its 
conclusion, and displays the transvaluation of property through the abolition of slavery.  
 
Chapter 6 chronicles and analyses the emergence of the Norwegian national movement that 
culminated in the revolution of 1814 - but also in this chapter there is first a survey of the 
sociological and historical preconditions for the emergence of the national movement. The 
central events covered here are Prince Christian Frederik’s entry to Norway and the Eidsvoll 
constitutional convention. Chapter 7 covers the time period between 1814-1884, and discusses 
the first form of the nation through the voting restrictions in the constitution, primarily through 
a discussion the peculiar Norwegian allodial rights (the odelsrett) at the Eidsvoll convention. 
Like in the first chapter on the US, the main point is to demonstrate the centrality of widespread 
ownership of land for the emergence of the idea of popular sovereignty.  The second form of 
the nation is discussed through debates for suffrage expansion and the coming of 
parliamentary democracy (1884), primarily by following the Venstre movement and its leader 
Johan Sverdrup.  In the final chapter (chapter 8), I conclude by comparing the national 
movements in the US and Norway. I first provide an overview of the main stage and trends in 
the emergence and development of national movements. I then discuss ideas of freedom and 
slavery and how they were understood in relation to the idea of private property and 
democracy. The discussion is framed by the transition from agrarian to industrial society, 
which serves to accentuate the agrarian origins of nationalism and to point to its industrial 
23 
 
future. There is also here a short comparison between nationalism and Marxism with a focus 
on the property assumptions made in these two world-views. This is to highlight the specific 
idea of freedom in nationalism, but also to show its modernity and its similarity to other 
modern ideologies of freedom. Finally, there will be a reflection on the wider implications of 





Chapter 2: A property rights perspective in the study 
of nationalism  
The purpose of this chapter is to provide a context for the main analysis of my thesis.  I will 
give a genealogy of the ideas of private property and popular sovereignty to show how these 
concepts are fundamental components of the ideology of nationalism. There will be a 
discussion of the historical preconditions for the emergence of modern private property and 
modern sovereignty, followed by a discussion of the nature of private property and why 
property is central to the understanding of nationalism. There will also be a discussion of the 
agrarian origins of nationalism and its relationship to private property, and a summary of the 
ideas of key thinkers on property and sovereignty in this period will be given. But to begin 
this chapter, a summary of existing theories of nationalism will be provided in order to place 
my own research within this tradition of research.  
 
The western origins of nationalism 
a) Theories of nationalism and the omission of property  
Since the 1970´s a huge body of literature has been produced on the subject of nationalism.41 
This literature can be roughly divided into two main groups based on how nationalism is 
viewed and understood: ethnosymbolists and modernists. These two views offer quite different 
and often conflicting ways of understanding nationalism, the ethnosymbolists tending to 
emphasis long term cultural processes and attachment of meaning,42 while modernists 
generally focus more on the constructed and purely modern (political, economic, etc.) nature 
of nationalism.43 This dissertation primarily advances a modernist understanding of 
                                                     
 
41 There is a good summary of the historiography of the research on nationalism in Hearn, Jonathan, 
Rethinking Nationalism: A critical introduction, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, (2006). 
42 For some such accounts see for example: Armstrong, John, Nations before Nationalism, University 
of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, (1982), Grosby, Steven, Biblical ideas of nationality: ancient 
and modern, Eisebrauns, Winona Lake, (2002). Adrian Hastings has put forth a medieval argument 
for the origins of nationalism in Hastings, Adrian, The construction of nationhood: ethnicity, religion 
and nationhood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1997). For an early modernist argument, 
see, Gorski, Philip S,”The mosaic moment: an early modernist critique of modernist theories of 
nationalism”, American Journal of sociology, (Vol 150, issue 5, March 2000), p. 1459-1460. 
43 The classic account on nationalism and modern society is Gellner, 2006. Some accounts focusing 
on nationalism and the state are Mann, Michael, The sources of social power, Vol 2: The rise of 
classes and nation states 1760-1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1993), Marx, Anthony, 
Faith in Nation: Exclusionary origins of nationalism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, (2003), and 
Breuilly, John, Nationalism and the state, Manchester University Press, Manchester, (1993). Karl 
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nationalism. Although, as will become evident, parts of the argument advanced here has a 
slight ethnosymbolist quality to it, and can be described with reference to ethnosymbolists 
John Armstrong and Anthony Smith´s understandings of nationalism. Two central concepts in 
these two scholars understanding of nationalism are the concepts of mythomoteurs and the 
ethnie. Armstrong uses the concept of mythomoteur to describe the myth that gives a nation 
its sense of purpose and which constitutes the symbolical core of the nation.44 Smith advances 
a similar understanding to this by applying the concept of ethnie.45 A key point with both these 
concepts is that the nation is seen to have a symbolical core constituted by a mythologized 
narrative about a peoples past. In the cases that I have looked at in this dissertation the mythical 
element took the form of narratives of ancient freedoms based on ownership of property. The 
idea of ancient freedoms had different sources in the two cases: in colonial America it was the 
tradition of Anglo-Saxon freedoms inherited from the British tradition of political thought that 
was invoked, in Norway, the ancient freedoms were based on historiographical traditions that 
suggested that there had existed a unique Nordic freedom in ancient times. For both cases 
these narratives became important for how the political national movement emerged. 
However, the way that these narratives were used is perhaps more similar to how modernists 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terrence Ranger describes the idea of invented tradition.46 The idea of 
invented tradition implies more of a conscious and direct construction of traditions and myths 
for the purpose of legitimizing political national claims. In my cases the historical narrative is 
not directly constructed, but it has a modern form and was used in a distinctly political 
ideological way as a mode of justifying certain material relations of property. Neither 
Armstrong, Smith or Hobsbawm and Ranger pay any attention to the role of private property 
rights in these narratives, nor of property regimes for the importance of the emergence if such 
narratives. But it seems to me that the property aspect is central to why such narratives emerge, 
as well as to how they are made up.   
 
                                                     
 
Deutsch has focused on communication, in Deutsch, Karl, Nationalism and social communication: an 
inquiry into the foundations of nationality, New York, (1953). Bennedict Anderson is also a modernist 
and famous for his focus on print capitalism and for understanding the nation as an “imagined 
community”, Anderson, Benedict, Imagined communities: Reflections on the origins and spread of 
nationalism, Verso, London, (2006)[1983].  
 
44 Armstrong, 1982. 
45 Anthony Smith is the most prominent figure here. See for example Smith, Anthony, National 
Identity, Penguin, London, (1991). 




In my approach to nationalism I focus on claims to property rights by what can be understood 
as political actors. Hence my approach to nationalism is, in a sense, political, and could be 
seen as similar to approaches taken by such modernists as Michael Mann, Miroslav Hroch and 
Eric Hobsbawm. Hobsbawm, in typical Marxian fashion, has stressed that nationalism is 
carried by the petit bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie,47 while Mann has specifically pointed to 
an alliance between modernizing traditional elites and the petit bourgeoisie.48 Hroch has 
pointed out the more complex and diverse class composition of the carriers of national 
sentiment,49 and similarly Mann again has pointed to the importance of a quite diverse middle 
class, and careerists and professionals in the new state bureocracies for the mid-nineteenth 
century consolidation of European nationalism.50 All three of these theorists do indirectly, or 
sometimes arbitrarily, touch upon the subject of property ownership through their class 
analysis, or in discussions on capitalism and the development of the state. However, the 
approach taken in this dissertation differs from, and expands upon, the reflections of Mann, 
Hobsbawm or Hroch because it focuses, 1) on property and nationalism as ideology, and, 2) 
on the importance of different kinds of property regimes for the emergence and formation of 
that ideology. In this dissertation I am not so much trying to identify which political actors are 
the carriers of nationalism as to show how nationalism as ideology is constituted largely 
through assertions and assumptions about property – which are informed by something close 
to objective, structural changes in property regimes. And again, there is very little literature 
that discusses nationalism and private property in the ideological and structural sense in which 
in am interested in these matters. 51 For this reason it will be necessary do a historical overview 
of the concept of private property and how it is related to the emergence and formation of 
nationalism.  
 
                                                     
 
47 Hobsbawm, Eric, Nations and nationalism since 1780: program, myth, reality, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, (1992). 
48 Mann, 1993. 
49 Hroch, Miroslav, Social preconditions of national revival in Europe: a comparative analysis of the 
social composition of patriotic groups in the smaller European nations, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge (1985). 
50 Mann, 1993. For a good, cleare and concise general overview of Mann and Hobsbawm, see Hearn, 
2006: p. 70-71 and 141-142. 
51 Two notable exceptions are Engerman, and Metzer, 2004 and Hont, Istvant “The permanent crisis 
of a divided mankind: “contemporary” crisis of the nation state in historical perspective”, Political 




b) The coming of modernity  
Students of nationalism have sometimes been accused of being too focused on the western 
world, particularly Europe.52 This is probably true – but if one wants to follow the genealogy 
of nationalism (and thus unravel the importance of private property for nationalism), then the 
western world is where one must look. The emergence of widespread private landed property 
and popular sovereignty emerged and could come to constitute nationalism only with the 
transformations that happened in the western world from the sixteenth century onwards. 
Nationalism is not possible without the material and cognitive preconditions that developed 
there, and which were, it must be stressed, unique in the history of humanity.  
 
Everybody knows of course that all societies and all historical epochs are unique in some 
sense. Nevertheless, it must be allowed, for analytical purposes, to impose models on social 
development so that we can speak of analogous historical developments: one can see the 
development of different places in relation to each other both spatially and temporally, and 
thus observe certain developments at certain points as novel or unique in relation to what has 
occurred before. For example, one might apply the Marxian model that operates with different 
modes of production, such as a slave economy, feudalism and capitalism; or one could use 
Ernest Gellner’s model, operating with hunter/gatherer societies, agrarian societies and 
industrial societies.53 The point about the west is that it was the first place where material 
relations provided the basis for a transition or a transformation to industrial society.54 Gellner 
writes about the uniqueness of this development: 
The event was unique: no imitative industrialization can be treated as an event of the 
same kind as the original industrialization, simply in virtue of the fact that all others 
                                                     
 
52 See, Chatterjee, Partha, The nation and its fragments: Colonial and postcolonial histories: 
Princeton university press, Princeton, (1993), and Drakulic, Slobodan, “Whence Nationalism” Nations 
and Nationalism, Vol. 14. No 2. P 221-239, (2008). 
53 For the Marxian typology see for example Marx and Engels, 1974, p 43-48. For Gellener`s typology 
see for example Gellner, Ernst, Plow, Sword and Book: the structure of human history, Paladin, 
London, (1988). 
54 It is of course a fundamental fact that this development could happen in the west only, or at least 
largely because of western exploitation of the large parts of the rest of the world in the early phases of 
this development. One interesting discussion of the interconnectedness of the process of 
modernization can be found in Wolf, Eric, Europe and the people without history, University of 
California Press, Berkley, (1982)[1982].  See also Wallerstein, Immanuel, The modern world system; 
capitalist agriculture and the origins of the European world economy, Academic press, New York, 
(1974) and Wallerstein, Immanuel, The Modern World system: Mercantilism and the consolidation of 
the European World-Economy, Academic press, New York, (1980). 
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were indeed imitative, were performed in the light of the now established knowledge 
that the thing could be done and had certain blatant conspicuous advantages55 
Gellner here points specifically to the uniqueness of industrialization. This industrialization 
was the product of unique developments that had transformed Western Europe at least since 
the fifteenth century.56 Changes in agrarian property regimes might have been particularly 
important.57 When I use Gellner’s quote here, I see industrialization as a symptom of the 
unique material and cognitive developments that happened in the west, and which preceded 
industrialization: there had been everywhere hunter-gatherer societies, and everywhere 
traditional agrarian societies. In most places there had been various forms of dynastic or 
religious rule and roughly similar ways of organizing appropriation and property. But nowhere 
else did preconditions for industrial societies develop (or “sprouted” in Marx’s term).58 There 
is general agreement that the changes that brought about the preconditions for industrial 
society started happening gradually in the west between the fifteenth and the eighteenth 
century, and that they comprise: 
Economic, political and cultural characteristics, uniting capitalism (what classical 
political economist liked to call commercial society), legal rational political authority 
(perhaps, but not necessarily, with a preference for its liberal democratic form), and 
technological progress – or ‘rationalization’, in its various aspects as manifest in 
markets, states, secularism and scientific knowledge.59 
                                                     
 
55 Gellner, 2006: p. 19. 
56 We could call the precondition for industrial society, as Weber did, “the spirit of capitalism”, 
Weber, Max, The protestant etic and the spirit of capitalism, Routledge, London, (2001)[1930]. But I 
must accentuate the importance in transformations of agrarian property regimes for this spirit to come 
about. Ellen Meiksins Wood, for example has pointed to this in, Wood, Ellen Meiksisns, The pristine 
culture of capitalism: A historical essay on old regimes and modern states, Verso, London and New 
York, (1991), p 2-11. Karl Polanyi also makes some reflections on changes in landed property 
regimes for the emergence of industrial society in Polanyi, Karl, The great transformation, Beacon 
Press, Boston, (1957) [1944], p 68-76. The classic statement on this is of course to be found in one of 
Marx’s many works. A simple and forceful statement can be found in Marx, Karl and Frederick 
Engels, Manifesto of the communist party, The New York Labour News, New York, (1908) [1848], 
although Marx did not properly recognize the agrarian landed developments of capitalism, as pointed 
out in Wood, 1991: p 2-11. 
57 See for example the classical Brenner debate in Aston and Philipin, 1985. I am also influenced by 
Ellen Meiksins Wood on this, see for example Wood, 1991. 
58 I am aware that this is a complex and contested issue. It could for example be pointed to 
industrialization of Indian textile industry in the seventeenth and eighteenth century, see Mukund, 
Kanakalatha, “Indian Textile Industry in 17th and 18th Centuries: Structure, Organisation and 
Responses” in Economic and political weekly, Vol 22. No. 38, (1992), p2057-2065, and Wolf, 1982: p 
287-288. It is nevertheless the case that it was in the west where capitalist development had the 
strongest impact on the whole of society at the earliest stage.  
59 Wood, Ellen Meiksins, Liberty and Property: A social history of western political though from the 
renaissance to the present (2012), p. 2. 
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This nexus of ideas and conditions constitute modernity, and it was as part of these 
developments that nationalism emerged and formed in symbiosis with private landed property.   
 
c) The modern cognition and its relation to popular sovereignty and private property 
I will spend most of this chapter expanding on the role of private property and popular 
sovereignty in national ideology, but I will mention here briefly why secularization and 
rational scientific knowledge were also fundamental to the emergence of nationalism. I 
mention this in brief because this is not the novelty of my argument, but a precondition for it. 
 
Gellner has described the fundamentals of the modern scientific paradigm that emerged in the 
western world and contrasted these with the pre-modern. The modern is defined, says Gellner, 
by “the vision of the world as homogeneous, subject to systematic, indiscriminate laws, and 
open to interminable exploration …” While the old worlds were:  
On the on hand, each of them, a cosmos: purposive, hierarchical ‘meaningful’; and on 
the other hand, not quite unified, consisting of subworlds, each with its own idiom and 
logic, not subsumable under a single overall orderliness.60 
This he contrasts to the modern world: 
The new world was on the one hand morally inert, and on the other, unitary … nothing 
is inherently connected with anything else. The actual connection of this world can 
only be established by first separating in thought everything that can be separated.61  
This modern way of seeing the world is crucial because it allows for the vision of society as 
atomistic (that it can be broken down to component parts, which may be connected in various 
and, in theory, infinite ways). Only with this vision is it possible to conceive of a world where 
‘the people’ may be vested with ultimate sovereignty (not god), and where sovereignty of the 
people is seen as a composite of an (in theory) infinite number of individuals with the right to 
property – which is the central organizing principle of society. This way of organizing society 
emerged in tandem with the development of more individualistic property regimes in the US 
and Norway.  
 
                                                     
 
60 Gellner, 2006: p 22-23 
61 Gellner, 2006: p 22-23 
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d) Imperium and dominium: property rights and sovereignty from imperial Rome to the 
age of absolutism  
The rise of modern state sovereignty and land as private property were two of the most 
important preconditions for the emergence of nationalism in the US and Norway. Wood has 
suggested that one of the most distinguished and decisive features of Western development 
since antiquity is a strong distinction between two sources of power: the state and private 
property. I will quote at some length from Wood to elaborate on this:  
All high civilizations have, of course, had states, and some have had elaborate systems 
of private property; but developments in what would be Western Europe, with roots 
in Greco-Roman antiquity and especially the Western Roman Empire, gave property, 
as a distinct locus of power, an unusual degree of autonomy from the state. Consider 
for instance, the contrast between the Roman Empire and the early Chinese imperial 
state. A strong state in China established its power by defeating great aristocratic 
families and preventing their appropriation of newly conquered property, which were 
to be administered by officials of the central state. At the same time peasants came 
under direct control of the state, which preserved peasant property as a source of 
revenue and military service, while ensuring the fragmentation of landholdings. 
Rome, by contrast, achieved imperial expansion without a strong state, governed 
instead by amateurs, an oligarchy of landed aristocrats, in a small city-state with 
minimal government. While peasants were part of the civic community, they remained 
subordinate to the propertied classes … The Roman Empire represents the first known 
example of a strong imperial state combined with strong private property. This 
powerful, if sometimes uneasy, partnership is expressed in the Roman concepts of 
imperium and dominium. The roman concept of dominium, when applied to private 
property, articulates with exceptional clarity, the idea of private, exclusive and 
individual ownership, with all the powers it entails, while the imperium defines the 
right of command attached to certain civil magistrates, and eventually the emperor 
himself.62 
In short, the uniqueness of Rome was that there existed a clear distinction between imperium 
and dominium, where dominium gave those possessing it strong exclusive rights and powers 
over things and people vis-à-vis the emperor. 
 
It is possible to trace the relationship between dominium and imperium in the west all the way 
up until the modern era. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century, the 
application of these concepts resulted in what Perry Anderson has called the parcellization of 
sovereignty in much of Western Europe. This was a situation where political power became 
fragmented and tied to a complicated chain of dependencies, rights and dues. A central state 
                                                     
 
62 Wood, 2012: p 6-7. 
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with any power of imperium on the scale of the Roman emperor did not, for a long time, exist 
in Europe, and political power was exercised by local landlords through dominium from 
ownership of landed property, which also gave the owner economic power over landless 
peasants. The parcellization of sovereignty thus invested property with public powers, and this 
gave property both political (imperium) and private economical (dominium) functions. 
Property also became less exclusive as many people could have overlapping rights to the same 
land.63 Thus the distinction between imperium and dominium also became blurred. This is what 
has been normally called feudalism, and it is precisely this parcellization of sovereignty and 
the infusion of political rights (“extra economic cohesion” in the terms of Anderson64) into 
landed property that defines feudalism.  
 
During the sixteenth and seventeenth century the distinction between imperium and dominium 
became stronger again as absolutist states emerged. A de-politization of property happened, 
making it strictly an economic right.65 At the same time, a centralization and territorialization 
of sovereignty happened. Thus, at the outset of the modern era we have, instead of imperium 
and dominium, the concepts of sovereignty and property. The most fundamental difference 
between imperium and dominium, on the one side, and sovereignty and property, on the other, 
is that the latter two were universalistic concepts. The nature of imperium and dominium, with 
its legacy continued from the Roman world into the medieval ages, had been particularistic 
and hierarchically organized. Even the imperium of the Roman emperor was not universal and 
abstract (so that it encompassed all domains within the empire). The imperium of the emperor 
was precisely that – it was concerned with political issues and the military power of the empire, 
but was also specifically connected to the institution or the person of the emperor, not to any 
abstract idea of ‘the state’ that constituted an all-encompassing sphere of its own. Hence, the 
dominium that landlords had was relatively autonomous from the imperium of the emperor, 
and there was an important distinction between public and private law. At the same time, 
dominium was not for all: Roman law distinguished between homo and civis, the latter term 
describing an unfree slave – a person that could have no dominium under the civil law. Others 
however, could have dominium over them. This notion was the same for slavery and the feudal 
                                                     
 
63 Anderson, Perry, Passages from antiquity to Feudalism, New Left Books, London (1974), p. 147-
197. Wood, Ellen Meiksins, Citizens to lords, a social history of western political though from 
antiquity to the late medieval ages, London, verso, (2008), p. 164-176. 
64 Anderson, 1974, p.147. 
65 Anderson, Perry, Lineages of the Absolutist State, Verso, London, (1974), p 15-42. 
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bonds of subordination,66 and dominium was a force in opposition to imperium. With the 
emergence of modern sovereignty in the age of absolutism, this started to change. The 
sovereignty of the monarch became, at least in theory, absolute, and it encompassed all spheres 
and aspects of society: sovereignty became the state, and everybody became subject to the 
same laws. As Blandine Krigel writes, it was seen to be: 
The antithesis of feudal power, in the sense that it was neither imperium nor dominium. 
It was not an imperium because it was not based on military power; and it was not 
dominium, because it did not institute a relation of subjection, in the manner of the 
relation between master and slave67  
This kind of sovereignty is different from imperium because it is primarily about 
administrative authority of the whole state: 
Sovereignty is first and foremost the absolute autonomy of the state … the sovereign 
state increasingly affirms the priority of domestic politic over foreign policy … the 
first duty of the state becomes good administration. The delivery of good justice across 
the whole ‘square field’ or ‘pre carre’.68 
This dismantles dominium because it disconnects property from political/public powers: 
“Arbitration of conflicts through law directly undermines the pre-eminence of the dominium; 
it leads to complete severance of the link between power and property.”69 However, this 
severance of the link between property and power was repaired again with the coming national, 
popular sovereignty. In fact, one of the most central features of national sovereignty was that 
it reconnected property to sovereignty in its own peculiar way, thus keeping sovereignty and 
property inseparably bound. 
 
Property and sovereignty in agrarian society  
a) Property as sovereignty  
What is private property? We might note at first, contrary to what one might assume, that 
property is not primarily a thing (although, of course, things are the subjects of property rights), 
                                                     
 
66 Krigel, Blandine, “The rule of the State and natural Law” in Hunter, Ian and David Saunders, 
Natural Law and Civil Sovereignty: Moral Right and State Authority in Early Modern Political 
Thought , Palgrave Macmillam, New York, (2002), 19. 
67 Krigel, in Hunter and Saunders, 2002: p 15. 
68 Krigel, In Hunter and Saunders, 2002: p 15. 
69 Krigel, in Hunter and Saunders, 2002: p 17. 
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but rather property is a right.70 We might distinguish between private and public property 
rights, and there are also other forms of property such as feudal property. It might, in fact, be 
said that all societies must have a property system because it is necessary to organize relations 
between humans and things, and relations between humans. But it was private property 
specifically that became essential to nationalism in our cases; and to have a right to private 
property is to have an individual, exclusive, enforceable claim to the use or benefit of 
something. There are two important implications of this: 1) private property is essentially a 
political claim and is thus different from possessions in that property is socially enforced by 
society or the state through laws, custom or convention; and 2) private property is a social 
relation, because private property implies the right of one person in relation to another (A owns 
B against C). For these reasons, the right to property always implies a power relation, because 
it represents an exclusionary relationship between individuals and therefore makes the 
individual sovereign. This has been pointed to by thinkers from Rousseau onwards – for Marx, 
for example, there was always an implicit relationship between property and power – but has 
perhaps been most clearly pointed out by the early twentieth century American Lawyer Morris 
Cohen, who asserted that “Property is sovereignty.” Cohen explained:  
The essence of private property is always the right to exclude others … if, then, 
somebody else wants to use the food, the house, the land or the plough that the law 
calls mine, he has to get my consent. To the extent that these things are necessary to 
the life of my neighbor, the law thus confers on me power, limited but real, to make 
him do what I want. If Laban has the sole disposal of his daughters and his cattle, 
Jacob must serve him if he desires to possess them. In a regime where land is the 
principal source of liveli hood, he who has the legal right over the land receives 
homage and service from those who wish to live on it … Property law does more. It 
determines what men shall acquire. Thus, protecting the property rights of a landlord 
means giving him the right to collect rent, protecting the property of a railroad or a 
public-service corporation means giving it the right to make certain charges. Hence 
the ownership of land and machinery, with the rights of drawing rent, interest, etc., 
determines the future distributions of the good that will come into being.71 
                                                     
 
70 I have derived my theories of property primarily from the following books; Macpherson, C.B, 
Property: mainstream and critical positions, Basil, Blackwell, Oxford, (1978), Macpherson C.B, The 
political theory of possessive individualism: Hobbes to Locke, Clarendon Press, Oxford, (1962).  
Hallowell, Irving, Culture and experience, University of Pennsylvania press, (1955), Reeve, Andrew, 
Property, Macmillan, London, (1986), Ellen Frankel Paul, Fred D Miller Jr and Jeffery Paul, Property 
Rights, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1994), Skinner, Quinten and Peter Garnsey, 
Thinking about property: From antiquity to the age of revolution, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, (2007). 
71 Cohen, Morris, “Property and Sovereignty”, in Macpherson, 1978: p. 159-160.  
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It is because the right to property confers these kinds of powers on individuals over those who 
do not have property that private property resembles sovereignty.  It was largely for this reason 
that it became, in the national ideology of my cases, connected to individual freedom and 
popular sovereignty during the agrarian phase of modern development. In an agrarian world, 
self-ownership over landed property meant independence, power and freedom: independence 
because it provided economic security, power because it gave control over resources, and 
freedom because there was no-one laying bonds on the individual and his use of the land or 
the surplus produced from it. These three aspects are interwoven, related to the fundamental 
power-structure of agrarian societies and based on the general connection between wealth and 
power.72 There are indeed forms of rule and domination that are not directly based on the 
accumulation of wealth, but economic interests and rule are almost always interrelated. Wealth 
is almost always the means by which more power may be acquired, either in the form of 
prestige or actual military force. Since land, in agrarian societies, is by far the largest source 
of wealth, there is a strong connection between ownership of it and power.  
 
There is also another way in which landed property is related to power and comes more directly 
to resemble sovereignty. In the introduction we saw how Metzer and Engerman suggested how 
land and sovereignty might have been blurred in the early modern world. Andrew Reeve has 
also pointed to this: 
Land provides the territorial dimension of the political unit. Modern states, at least, 
are defined in part by legal jurisdiction which they claim over a particular territory … 
land mediates, in this sense, between political power and individuals subject to it.73 
Furthermore, landed property is concrete, fixed and stable. Because of these reasons, the 
landowner has a particular interest in maintaining the state because landed property cannot be 
moved – the wealth in land is tied to a specific place, as opposed to the wealth of a merchant.74 
The fixity of landed wealth and its territorial dimension provides a direct link with political 
                                                     
 
72 This proposed connection between wealth and government is a fairly standard one. Arendt, for 
example claims that it goes back to antiquity: “The connection between wealth and government in any 
given country, and the insight that forms of government are interconnected with the distribution of 
wealth, the suspicion that political power may simply follow economic power … all this is of course 
not the invention of Marx, nor for that matter Harrington: “dominion is property, real or personal”; or 
of Rohan: the kings command the people and interests commands kings. If one wants to blame any 
single author for the so called materialist view of history, one must go as far back as Aristotle.” 
Arendt, Hanna, On revolution, Penguin Books, London (1990)[1963], p. 22. 
73 Reeve, 1986: p 82. 
74 This is a point made at least as early as Adam Smith, Reeve says, Reeve, 1986: p 82. 
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sovereignty in agrarian societies: the way in which most European medieval states grew from 
the landed property of kings is a case in point.75 In addition to the sovereignty/power 
connection, Reeve notes also that landed property has a connection to freedom because all 
action has a spatial dimension; land may thus provide the spatial dimension for action – this 
is similar to the Hegelian point made in the introduction. Added to this is the exclusionary 
element (pointed out by Cohen above) of private landed property, giving an individual 
freedom over an area by excluding others from its use. For these reasons, landed property 
came to be seen as indispensable to individual freedom and the constitution of sovereignty. 
The national identity of Americans and Norwegians was to be free men,76 and thus propertied 
men (they were indeed primarily men). It might be useful to invoke Isaiah Berlin’s two forms 
of liberty here to say what this freedom meant.77 The members of the national movement in 
my cases were concerned both with negative and with positive freedom. The right to property, 
because it is an exclusive right, immediately brings in the concept of negative freedom, but it 
is important to understand that this was seen as a precondition for positive freedom. It was 
seen as crucial in the national ideology that no one could, without consent, interfere in the 
exclusive sphere of the individual granted by the right to property. But when this right was 
secured, the right to property was seen as conferring on individuals a positive freedom to act 
in the world, to realize one’s will.  We might say that the freedom derived from property was 
an ontological freedom, it was essential, it was what made someone a full and whole 
individual. To have property was, as it were, an essential property of being. If one did not have 
property, then one was not fully a human being – one was not,78 because one had no material 
means to realize oneself and to be independent. I do not wish to exaggerate this aspect or 
                                                     
 
75 For two good analyses of the development of the modern state, see: Poggi, Gianfranco, The 
development of the modern state: a sociological introduction, Hutchinson, London, (1978), and 
Rokkan, Stein, Stat, Nasjon, Klasse: essays I politisk sosiologi, Universitetsforlaget, Oslo, (1987), p 
268-381. 
76 This view assumes that national identity as such is not really important, essential or fixed, rather 
what matters is the ideological imperatives in nationalism, and the incentives and meanings it creates. 
This is view of nationalism has been elaborated and asserted by Sinisa Malesevic, in Malesevic, 
Sinisa, “The Chimera of National identity”, Nations and Nationalism, Vol. 17, No. 2, (2011). 
77 Berlin, Isaiah, “Two concepts of liberty”, in Hardy, Henry, Liberty, Oxford, Oxford university 
press, (2002). 
78 We might relate this to the idea of “social death”. Not to have property was to be sub-human, a 
slave, to be socially dead. Patterson, Orlando, Slavery and Social death: a comparative study, Harvard 
University press, Cambridge, (1982). This is also the basis for C.B. Macpherson’s theory of 
possessive individualism. MacPherson writes: “the individual in possessive market society is human 
in his capacity as proprietor of his own person; his humanity does depend on his freedom from any 
but self-interested contractual relations with others.” Macpherson, 1962: p 271-272.   This idea will 
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elevate this to a mystical, metaphysical level, but I do want to accentuate that the right to 
property became fundamental in the understanding of what it meant to be a national citizen, 
which was seen to be, above anything else, a free, propertied man. But it must be stressed that 
this vision was in large part produced by the fact of widespread ownership of land in the US 
and Norway – this was a reality in which it made sense to speak of property as a fundamental 
right of all men.  
 
b) Dominant political discourse on property and sovereignty 1600-1800. 
The national way of understanding property and sovereignty was deeply imbedded in a 
relatively new body of political thinking that had emerged since the sixteenth century.  During 
the sixteenth century, as we have seen, the political face of Europe started to change from 
feudal fragmentation to more powerful, centralized, territorial monarchies. This was 
particularly evident in Western Europe, France and England being the prime examples. The 
emergence of such states gradually changed the structures of power within these societies and 
between states, and a corresponding body of political thinking emerged as a way of theorizing 
this. This thinking represented a general shift away from theological and scholastic thinking, 
to a more secular mode, and the Renaissance and the Reformation were important events that 
paved the way for this shift to a more human-centered and this-worldly thinking.79  
 
The point here is not to postulate a radical rupture from all earlier thinking, which is always 
problematic as historical processes are diverse and complex. The point is rather to accentuate 
that dominant political thinking from the sixteenth century onwards, and especially from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth century onwards, was the product of a political and social 
landscape where Christian universalism and religious authority, as well as feudal land 
arrangements and forms of power, started to be undermined. This meant that new forms of 
authority and power emerged, as well as new views of property and sovereignty, and it was 
the preoccupation of emergent political thought with these issues that made it novel. Some of 
the central issues were social contract theory; various notions of a state of nature informing 
                                                     
 
79 By human-centered and this-worldly I mean thinking that, in Wood’s words, “adopts a precept of 
reason accessible to every rational person and binding on every human being without reference to 
faith.” Wood, 2012: p.124. In general, for a discussion on the emergence of the new mode of thinking 
and the conditions it emerged from, as well as reflections on the problematic in distinguishing this 
thinking from that before, see Wood, 2012: p 3-8 and p 17-26. 
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the emergence of government; the existence of natural, objective and secular universal rights; 
laws governing relations between individuals, between individuals and states, and between 
states; and the rule of law and its connection to political liberty. There are a range of influential 
thinkers that fall within this tradition, and it is outside the scope of this dissertation to give a 
systematic account of all of them. Instead, I will present a few key thinkers that can be seen as 
representative, and whose influence is particularly evident in national ideas of property and 
sovereignty.  
 
- Jean-Jacques Rousseau 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) is one thinker whose influence on national ideology can 
be clearly seen. Indeed, Rousseau’s ideas – especially his theory of general will – are often 
seen to have had a decisive influence on the extremist and totalitarian nationalist horrors of 
the twentieth century.80 However, the Rousseau found in eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century nationalist theory is a thinker preoccupied with individual and national freedom from 
dependence. The general will had a central place also in this thinking, because it was through 
the general will that an individual realized his or hers freedom. For Rousseau the “will, when 
declared, is an act of sovereignty and has legal authority.”81  And it was based on the idea of 
free individuals: “we have to consider,” he wrote, “the private persons of whom it consists,” 
because the individuals had “natural rights they should enjoy as men.”82 Individual freedom 
was thus achieved by partaking in the process of national legislation which expresses the 
general will. This means that sovereignty is based in the collective of the people, understood 
as composed of free individuals. In regards to property, Rousseau’s assertion in Discourse on 
the origin of Inequality that the introduction of private property is the origin of inequality is 
well known. This does not mean, however, that Rousseau was for the abolition of private 
property. Property was legitimate for Rousseau if it was based on the mixing of individual 
labour with land. The existence of private property is, for Rousseau, an inevitable outcome of 
the transition from the state of nature to organized society, and the point for Rousseau is not 
to abolish it, but, through the general will, to organize it in the most egalitarian way possible. 
In fact, landed property seems to have had special significance for Rousseau. This was because 
                                                     
 
80 The following account of Rousseau is based on Boucher, David, “Rousseau”, in Boucher, David 
and Paul Kelly, Political thinkers, Oxford University press, Oxford, (2003), p.235-253. 
81 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, The Social contract, Oxford University press, Oxford, (1994)[1762], p. 64. 
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only a nation that was self-sufficient in regards to food could be truly independent; an active 
agricultural production was thus seen as essential, and Rousseau suggested in his 
Constitutional project for Corsica to make landed property the basis of the rights and the status 
of the citizens.   
 
- Charles Louis de Secondat Baron De La Brede et de Montesquieu  
Charles Louis de Secondat Baron De La Brede et de Montesquieu (1689-1755), better known 
simply as Montesquieu, was another thinker that directly influenced the members of the 
American and Norwegian national movements.83 Montesquieu is best known as an apostle for 
the division of powers, a theory which became central to the national ideology. For 
Montesquieu, this idea was a part of his broader critique of despotism and his advocacy for 
political liberty based on the rule of law, and in his most famous work, The Spirit of the Laws, 
Montesquieu sets out to find the legitimate basis of law. Through the exploration of the 
legitimacy of laws, Montesquieu comes to deal with the issue of modern sovereignty, 
understood as the supreme right to make binding laws. One of the conclusions of The Spirit of 
the Laws is that legitimate laws (and therefore sovereignty) is different for each country, and 
that the legitimate form of government thus depends on the specific circumstances of each 
country. This means, in effect, that supreme legislative power must be in the hands of those 
who are familiar with the local circumstances, and that sovereignty cannot be based a priori 
in the will of a single body – sovereignty must, in one way or the other, be checked by those 
over whom it is exercised. This could, according to Montesquieu, be done in different ways, 
and he distinguishes between three types of government: despotic, monarchic and republican. 
Republican could further be divided in two subcategories: democratic and aristocratic. The 
republican government is one where the people, as a whole or a part of it, are vested with 
sovereignty. A monarchy is when a king rules according to fixed laws, and despotism is when 
one person rules at random, according to his will alone. Political liberty can exist in varying 
degrees in various forms of government. Despotism was seen as the absolute absence of such 
liberty, but the absolute realization of it was not a fully unhampered democracy – it is here 
that his theory of separation of powers comes in. The key to secure political liberty was to 
restrict and balance powers. As Montesquieu explained regarding political liberty:   
                                                     
 
83 My account of Montesquieu is based on Yoshie, Kawade, “Montesquieu”, in Boucher and Kelly, 
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Political liberty does not consist in doing what one wants. In a state, that is, societies 
where there are laws, liberty can consist only in the power to do what one should want 
to do and no way being constrained to do what one ought to do. One must put oneself 
in mind of what independence is and what liberty is. Liberty is a right to do whatever 
the laws permit, and if one citizen could do what they forbid he would no longer have 
liberty, because the others would have the same power.84  
It was crucial for the securing of liberty to also have a balance and restriction of power. The 
individual’s right to property was closely connected with political liberty and the public good 
for Montesquieu. He wrote:  
It is a fallacy to say that the good of the individual should yield to that of the public 
good… it is always in the public good for each one to preserve invariably the property 
given to him by civil law … civil law is the palladium of property.85 
Yoshie Kawade writes about Montesquieu and his views on property that: “we might safely 
describe security of property as one of his cardinal principles of justice.”86 
 
- David Hume  
David Hume’s (1711-1776) reflections on property and government correspond closely to the 
thoughts held by the members of the national movement in the US and Norway.87 Hume made 
a distinction between natural and artificial virtues. It is the idea of artificial virtues that is the 
most important for Hume’s ideas of property and government. An artificial virtue is created 
out of what Hume calls the public interest, which consists in maintaining institutions and laws 
from which all benefit. The protection of property is central to this and to the idea of justice 
and morals. A man’s property, writes Hume, “is some object related to him. This relation is 
not natural, but moral, and founded on justice.”88 Property is furthermore, for Hume, seen as 
an exclusive relation that “forbids any other, the free use and possession of it.”89 Hume 
suggests the origin of property is to be found in the impetus that humans have to satisfy their 
needs – in order to fulfill our needs, we take possession of various things. Ownership (thus the 
property right) arises from the mutual recognition of all to enjoy the right of possession. It is 
this that gives rise to the idea of public interest – all have the same interest in the protection of 
property. However, Hume says that humans have a tendency to think more of the immediate 
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private needs rather than long-term ones, and because of this, the public good might be 
neglected. This is why we need government: government is instituted to sanction violations 
on the right of property, and to foster virtues that are favorable to the protection of property.  
 
- Adam Smith  
For Adam Smith (1723-1790), the existence of property and government was historically 
imbedded and closely connected to the concept of justice.90 Douglas Long quotes Smith and 
elaborates on his idea of justice: “The first and chief design of every system of government,” 
Smith held, “is to maintain justice – justice in the sense of the peaceful maintenance of the 
citizens’ perfect rights to property.”91  Smith distinguished between four historical ages in 
which property and government had been differently constituted and where propertied justice 
had been variously achieved. The four stages were the age of hunters, the age of shepherds, 
the age of agriculture, and finally the age of commerce. About property, Smith wrote in Wealth 
of Nations that:  
The property which every man has in his own labour, as it is the original foundation 
of all other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable. The patrimony of a poor 
man lies in the strength of his hands; and to hinder him from employing this strength 
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper, without injury to his neighbor, is a 
plain violation of this most sacred property.92 
Property was a right all individuals held that was derived from their labor, according to Smith. 
The four historical ages secured this right in varying degrees. Smith held that at the shepherd 
stage, large inequalities of property began occurring, and these became even more manifest 
and evident in the agricultural age. In this age, Smith writes, using feudal Europe as his 
example, “the greater part of the citizens had no land; and without it the manners and customs 
of those times rendered it difficult for a freeman to maintain his independency.”93 Wealth here 
was dependent on land, and land was secured to the few by rights of primogeniture and 
privileges, and there was no government to secure justice of distribution. This, however, may 
change with the age of commerce – the age in which Smith understood himself to be living. 
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In the age of commerce, it was possible for individuals to secure wealth through other forms 
of property than land simply by investing their labour, and the rules governing the rights of 
property tended to be more favorable to justice. Smith wrote about the possibility of an 
individual to acquire wealth through his labour:  
In the present times, though a poor man has no land of his own, if he has a little stock, 
he may either farm the lands of another, or he may carry on some little retail trade; 
and if he has no stock, he may find employment either as country labourer or as an 
artificer.94 
For Smith, the coming of commercial society can represent a positive event that has greater 
chance of producing justice in the distribution of wealth because individuals could more easily 
acquire wealth by investment of labour.  
 
- Other thinkers and some local sources  
The four thinkers presented above represent key ideas about property and sovereignty that 
became central to the national movements. There were, of course, many other thinkers that 
were referred to by the members of the national movements, or whose ideas where invoked 
indirectly by them. As with the four thinkers presented above, it might seem arbitrary who to 
mention, but it is worth pointing out Hugo Grotius (1583-1645), Samuel Pufendorf (1632-
1694), and Emer Vattel’s (1714-1767) works that all made assertions about general and natural 
laws and principles that applied to sovereign states or nations.95 This was central to the 
members of the national movements in both cases.  There were also more local thinkers for 
each case referred to only in that case. When it comes to local thinkers for the American case, 
it is worth pointing to the tradition of thought that was produced around the civil war (1642-
51) period and the Glorious revolution (1688) in England. Bernard Bailyn writes about the 
thinkers from this tradition and their influence on the American revolutionaries, suggesting 
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they brought together all strands of thought from which the American revolutionaries were 
influenced and “shaped it into a coherent whole.”96 Amongst these thinkers were John Milton, 
James Harrington, Henry Neville, and Algernon Sydney. These men were seen as “heroes of 
liberty”97 for their opposition against absolutist domination and subjugation, and their 
emphasis on British liberties and rights became important to understanding liberty in the 
colonies. Mediated through a generation of thinkers of the early eighteenth century, these ideas 
came to inform the American colonists’ ideas of property and sovereignty in a specific British 
frame.  In the Norwegian case, two local authors stand out as particularly influential: Tyge 
Rothe (1731-1791) and Johan Fredrich Willhelm Schlegel (1765-1836). Rothe was important 
because he wrote about land issues and pointed to what he saw as the ancient freedom of the 
Scandinavian farmers based on their special entail rights. Rothe had read Montesquieu and 
Rousseau, and with his special emphases on Scandinavian land rights he put a local mark on 
ideas of property and sovereignty. The second influential local thinker, Schlegel, was professor 
at the University of Copenhagen where he became the tutor of many of the people who later 
were to become central members of the Norwegian national movement. Schlegel developed a 
systematic natural rights theory of society and government which was based on primarily on 
Kant, Locke and Rousseau. Central elements of his philosophy were rights of property, free 
speech and expression of religion, division of powers – and, not least, the notion of the social 
contract and that ultimate sovereignty was vested in the people. 98  
 
All the thinkers mentioned here were influential to the members of the national movement in 
my cases, but there is one thinker who, more than anyone else, exemplifies and foreshadows 
the ideas of property and sovereignty that became central to the national ideology; that thinker 
is John Locke. 
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c) John Locke as prophet of nationalism:  property as labour and independence 
(freedom). 
John Locke’s theory of property exemplifies the most fundamental property assumptions that 
came to be dominant in the American and Norwegian national ideologies. Locke wrote in the 
context of the modernizing agrarian English society, one of the eras in which land as private 
property became much more common.99 It is probably for this reason that his ideas about 
property became so well suited to the American and Norwegian context, where widespread 
individual ownership was pervasive and largely disconnected from extra economic powers. 
Locke’s labour theory of property, and his conception of exclusive right, in theory equal for 
all, suits the landed situation in the US and Norway very well. This is not to say that Locke is 
the father of nationalism in these cases. I want to emphasize that the match between Lockean 
ideas and national ideology in the US and Norway does not exist because the members the 
national movements simply sought to realize an ideal Lockean society ex nihilo; rather it was 
because the conditions under which the members of the national movements were living were 
constituted so that Lockean ideas were particularly applicable. Lockean ideas were also 
modified by local circumstances. They work as an abstract ideal of property and sovereignty 
in the national ideology. The most important points about nationalism and property that may 
be derived from Locke are the following:  
1) Property is freedom (one cannot be free if one does not have the right to property)  
2) Property is based on labour 
3) Property is exclusive 
4) Property is the right of all individuals  
These aspects can be summed up in § 27 of the “Second Treatise of Government” (1690). 
Locke writes here: 
Though the earth, and all inferior creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has 
a property in his own person: this no body has any right to but himself. The labour of 
his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly his. Whatsoever then 
he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it 
his property. It being by him removed from the common state nature hath placed it in, 
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it hath by this labour something annexed to it, that excludes the common right of other 
men: for this labour being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he 
can have a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is enough, and as 
good, left in common for others.100   
Here all the elements of modern private property are present. First, it is a right of all individuals 
(“every man has a property in his own person”), it is exclusive, (“excludes the common right 
of other men”), and it is based on the infusion of labour (“the labour of his body, and the work 
of his hands, we may say, are properly his”). For Locke, when these rights are secured to 
individuals, they live in a state of freedom. “We must consider,” wrote Locke: 
What state all men are naturally in, and that is, a state of perfect freedom to order their 
actions, and dispose of their possessions and persons, as they think fit, within the 
bounds of the law of nature, without asking leave, or depending upon the will of any 
other man.101 
Thus, for Locke, to have the right to property is to be free. He elaborates on this under his 
chapter “Slavery”: 
Natural liberty of man is to be free from any superior power on earth, and not to be 
under the will or legislative authority of man, but to have only the law of nature for 
his rule. The liberty of man, in society, is to be under no other legislative power, but 
that established, by consent, in the common-wealth; nor under the dominion of any 
will, or restraint of any law, but what that legislative shall enact, according to the trust 
put in it.102 
This freedom is connected to a fundamental right to subsistence, as Locke writes: 
This freedom from absolute, arbitrary power, is so necessary to, and closely joined 
with a man’s preservation, that he cannot part with it, but by what forfeits his 
preservation and life together: for a man, not having the power of his own 
life, cannot, by compact, or his own consent, enslave himself to any one, nor put 
himself under the absolute, arbitrary power of another, to take away his life, when he 
pleases.103  
Not having freedom to property and subsistence would be “the perfect condition of slavery.” 
In other words, we might say that to have property is to have freedom or liberty (or sovereignty 
as Cohen put it). In this way, the right to property becomes connected to political rule, which 
cannot be legitimate if it does not protect the natural rights (of which the right to property is 
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the most fundamental) of individuals through their consent. And, on the other hand, 
sovereignty is based in the property of each individual.104  
 
Locke’s property assumptions are integrated into a broader political and social view of 
legitimacy.  As C.B. Macpherson has argued, Locke’s achievement in regards to property was 
to “base the property right on natural right and natural law, and then to remove all the natural 
law limits from the property right.”105 By doing this, Locke laid the “moral foundation for 
bourgeois appropriation.”106 This requires a certain form of political organization that is based 
on what Macpherson calls possessive individualism. The essence of possessive individualism, 
and thus of Locke, is found in the development of a vision of society that is first and foremost 
constituted of sole proprietors engaging in market relations where the imperative is unlimited 
appropriation and where freedom is a function of possession; here, the individual is seen as 
free only if he or she has exclusive right to property in his person. Macpherson writes that in 
this world-view:  
The human essence is freedom from any relations other than those a man enters with 
a view to his own interests. The individual’s freedom is rightfully limited only by the 
requirements of others freedom. The individual is proprietor of his own person, for 
which he owes nothing to society. He is free to alienate his labour, but not his person. 
Society is a series of relations between proprietors. Political society is a contractual 
device for the protection of proprietors and orderly regulation of their relations.107  
Nationalism as ideology adopted these possessive individualist notions in two stages:  
1) The first form of the nation, where primarily the first assertions identified by 
Macpherson were adopted, while the latter assertions were rejected because 
alienation of labour was seen as a form of slavery (that is to be unfree/dependent);  
2) The second form of the nation, where the latter possessive individualist assertions 
were adopted so that those who alienated their labour were seen as free because 
they had property in their person or their labour.  
                                                     
 
104This is not to suggest that Locke was a democrat. For a good exploration of this theme, see Wood, 
Ellen Meiksins, “Locke against Democracy: Consent, representation and suffrage in The two 
Treatises”, History of political thought, Vol. 13. Nr.4, (1992).  
105 Townshend, Jules, C.B. Macpherson and the problem of liberal democracy, Edinburgh, Edinburgh 
University Press, (2000), p. 63. 
106 Townshend, 2000: p. 63. 
107 Machpherson, 1962: p. III- IV.  
46 
 
The type of political rule that these assumptions became associated with in the national 
ideologies of the US and Norway was that of popular sovereignty, understood as sovereignty 
derived from all the individuals of a society. This is connected to the assumption quoted above 
that “political society is a contractual device for the protection of proprietors and orderly 
regulation of their relations,” and was achieved by the national movements of my cases in the 
first form of the nation by adopting the doctrine of popular sovereignty, understood as a 
democracy of the men of landed property, and in the second form of the nation, understood as 
a universal male democracy.   
 
d) Nationalism and sovereignty   
Sovereignty, Giorgio Agamben has argued, is “the originary structure in which law refers to 
life and includes it in itself by suspending it.”108 In other words, sovereignty is the force to 
impose laws on social life – the ultimate law which in the end decides over life and death.  
This principle, Agamben claims, goes all the way back to Greek and Roman thought and can 
be followed up until modern times. We saw above how, by the sixteenth century, a concept of 
modern state-sovereignty had developed with the emergence of absolutist states in Europe, 
exemplified, for example, by the thinking of Bodin and Hobbes. This kind of sovereignty was 
associated with the ultimate power to make laws within a territory, and thus to exercise a will, 
to bind the people to it. There is a paradox involved in this kind of sovereignty; as Karl 
Schmitt109 first pointed out, and as Agamben also recognizes, the lawmaking implied is the 
possibility to stand outside the law. Sovereignty, in this sense, is to decide exceptions, to 
decide when the law may be suspended. Hence, the sovereign is at once outside and inside the 
juridical order.  
 
There is an additional paradox to the nature of popular sovereignty. “It is said,” wrote French 
enlightenment thinker Josep De Maistre (1753-1821), “that the people are sovereign; but over 
whom? - over themselves, apparently. The people are thus subject.”110 The people can suspend 
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the laws that they themselves have agreed to be subject to.  We might say that like Odysseys 
letting himself be bound to the mast of his ship sailing past the Sirens, so too do the people 
bind themselves by laws they make; under popular sovereignty, rule of law becomes identical 
to rule by the people (the sovereignty of the people), and the laws which are made by the 
people also restrain the people. The power that lies innate in sovereignty is thus at once 
asserted and restrained in the creation of law. Thus, the people are sovereign and subject as 
lawmakers. This is the very core of national sovereignty and its relationship to property. In the 
national ideology, the laws that may impose on property are made by proprietors which 
express the will of the people, in order to protect the right to property of all the people. The 
key point about nationalism and popular sovereignty is that individuals can be a part of popular 
sovereignty because they have the right to property – it is this that makes them sovereign, 
because property resembles sovereignty. The sovereignty that each proprietor has individually 
comes to constitute the sovereignty of the people. It is because of this that the people have 
power of suspending and making law, and thus the power to secure their property. In the 
Lockean conception of property, the territory over which sovereignty is exercised is made up 
by the individual property of the members of a society. Duncan Ivison writes: “a state is said 
to be made up by the pre-political property holdings of individuals broadly construed, who 
contract to form civil society and to submit to the regulation of positive law.”111 In short, 
individuals give up parts of the sovereignty they have as individuals in order to constitute a 
territorial sovereignty. There is also a temporal/historical dimension to national popular 
sovereignty.112 In the US and Norway, national sovereignty was theorized and contrasted 
against feudal and even ancient forms of sovereignty. It was with the realization of national 
sovereignty that just rule was finally instituted, according to the members of the national 
movements. An ideal point in the past, where law and sovereignty were ideally constituted, 
was pointed out, and contemporary national sovereignty was seen as a reemergence of this 
ideal state from subversive feudalism and, in the end, absolutism. Property was essential here, 
as it was seen to be the basis of sovereignty. In what was seen as the feudal age, for example, 
sovereignty was seen as unjust because it was exercised by landlords as a private dominium 
over peasants, denying them the right to property. The same argument later became applied to 
absolutism, or any rule that was not representative.  
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It might be helpful to sum up the main points from this chapter and the previous one at this 
point. We have noted the absence of property rights in the study of nationalism, and we have 
seen how property and sovereignty developed from the Greco-Roman world to the age of 
absolutism to become the modern concepts necessary to nationalism. We have also seen how 
Locke’s theory of property exemplifies the basic property assumptions of national ideology, 
and this became well-suited to the landed situation of the US and Norway. This was because 
landed property was widespread and primarily an economic right in these cases. Ideas which 
we might call Lockean thus made sense here, but this is not to say that nationalism was just a 
realization of Lockean ideals: rather, Lockean ideals emerged due to the property relations in 
these cases.   
 
The main point that has been made about nationalism is that nationalism in the US and Norway 
was at first an agrarian phenomena: it emerged and formed in relation to concepts, conditions 
and changes of an agrarian world. Most decisive was the emergence of relatively widespread 
private property in land, and nationalism in its first form was essentially about protecting and 
preserving the already-existing property regime. Ownership of landed property became 
associated with individual freedom, and with popular sovereignty. This was due, on the one 
hand, to certain characteristics of landed property and the property right in general, which 
makes land/property conceptually similar to territorial sovereignty and connects it to 
individual freedom.  On the other hand, it must be seen in relation to economic and political 
power in agrarian societies, which is tied closely to land. For these reasons, nationalism 
became a contractual device instituted to insure the property rights of the people. This was 
done at first through ‘sovereignty of the people’ being understood as a property-based 
democracy. It is significant that landownership was widespread, and that most people had land 
not as a privilege, but as an economic right. This made the idea of property as a universal right 
for all more easily conceivable, and this furthermore made it reasonable to understand the rule 
of landed property as the rule of the people. The two became interconnected. As we shall see 
in the following chapters, when the US and Norway started becoming industrial societies, 
landed property lost its significance in the national ideology, and instead the right to property 
came to be understood as the right to the fruits of one’s labour. Landed property was still seen 
as an important form of property, but individual freedom and sovereignty could now be created 







Chapter 3: Method and methodology  
This chapter explains the methodology used in the dissertation. First there will be a discussion 
of the comparative historical method and of the US and Norway as the subjects of comparison.  
There will then be a discussion of documentary analysis, followed by a presentation of the 
main evidence that I have invoked in this dissertation.  
 
History and comparison as mode of explanation   
a) The historical comparative method  
The processes, ideas and events covered in this dissertation (the first emergences of 
nationalism and nation-states in the US and Norway) happened in the distant past. Hence, this 
dissertation is a work of historical sociology. Some have doubted the use of history for 
sociology,113 nevertheless I see it as crucial in understanding nationalism. The historian 
Anthony Marx explains the benefits of a historical approach to the understanding of 
nationalism by invoking the picture of the twelfth-century Basilica of San Clemente in Rome. 
This basilica is built on the ruins of a fourth-century church, which itself is built on the ruins 
of an even older Roman building. This is symbolical of how on a larger scale the present 
society is built upon that of the past. Standing at certain places in the ruin of the structure, it is 
possible to see all the three layers. But what one sees depends on where one stands:  
At the top, looking down from the perspective of the modern, all below is obscured in 
darkness. Instead if you stand on the lowest historical level looking up, all levels are 
illuminated from above. The trick is to allow the light from the present to clarify the 
ancient levels but... not to be blinded by it ... in a way that obscures where the long 
dead lived and how they understood themselves.114 
Thus, if we explore nationalism from whence it came and what it is built upon, we may be 
able to see what has been necessary for it to function and what its constituents are. Such a 
perspective will be revealing when we explore the role of private property for the emergence 
and development of nationalism, as we will be able to track potential connections as they form 
and develop over time and space. The historian J.L. Gaddis has pointed to this benefit. The 
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historian, Gaddis writes, is able to – indeed, must - “select, to be in several places at once, to 
see processes at work that are visible to us now but were not then.”115 By moving back and 
forth in time and space we can discover developing relationships and processes changing over 
time, and see how they became connected, entangled and transformed. The historical method 
is thus particularly useful when we are interested in social change. Theda Skocpol and Margret 
Somers have noted that much of the appeal in adopting a historical method is “the general 
usefulness of looking at historical trajectories in order to study social change.”116 There is a 
long tradition within the discipline of sociology for such a method of applying a historical 
analysis for this purpose. I invoked the names of Marx, Weber and Durkheim in the 
introduction of this dissertation. These founding fathers of sociology all based important parts 
of their research on historical analysis – we can think of Weber´s The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism, or Marx´s sweeping historical analysis in The Manifesto of the 
Communist Party. Even before these early sociologists, many of the thinkers of the 
enlightenment had already applied similar methods of research, theorizing about both the past 
and the present based on their understanding history. Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws and 
Adam Smith´s Wealth of Nations are good examples here. These works are all – to continue 
Anthony Marx´s metaphor – standing at the bottom of the Basilica of San Clemente and 
looking up. But they sometimes also move to the top and look down, and sometimes stand at 
some point in the middle. Often such works also move from place to place, comparing 
developments and structures in different places. This dissertation also does this – comparison 
is a central element of this dissertation.  
 
We can note that there are different ways of doing historical comparison and different things 
one can find out. Charles Tilly has summarized four main ways of doing comparative historical 
research. The first method is individualizing comparison. This aims to contrast different 
phenomena in order to uncover their peculiarities. As an example of this he cites Reinhardt 
Bendix’s work Kings or People. The second method he calls universalizing comparison – here, 
the aim is to establish a rule that every instance of a phenomena follows. Theories that seek to 
establish the conditions for economic growth fall under this label. Thirdly there is what Tilly 
calls variation finding comparisons. These try to establish a principle of variation in the 
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character or intensity of a phenomenon by looking at differences between cases. Jeffry Page´s 
Agrarian Revolution is an example of this. The fourth type of comparison Tilly calls 
encompassing comparison. This method “places different instances at various locations within 
the same system, on the way to explaining their characteristics as a function of their varying 
relationships to the system as a whole.”117 Similar to Tilly´s four variations, Skocpol and 
Somers talk about three major ways of doing historical comparative analysis. These are 
parallel demonstration of theory (seeking to demonstrate the validity of a theory by showing 
that the same processes happened at different places), contrast of context (bringing out the 
uniqueness of developments at different places), and macro-analytical comparison (seeking to 
demonstrate macro-historical causal links). To the first category belongs, for example, S.N. 
Eisenstad´s The Political Systems of Empires and Page´s Agrarian Revolutions. In the second 
group, Skocpol and Somers include James Lang´s Conquest and Commerce and Clifford 
Geertz’s Islam Observed. In the third category is included, for example, Barrington Moore´s 
Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy and Skocpol´s States and Social Revolutions. 
The research that I have done is akin to Tilly´s universalizing comparison or Skocpol and 
Somers´s parallel demonstration of theory, combined with Skocpol and Somers´s macro-
analytical comparison. The point of my research is to say something general about the 
development and nature of nationalism and nation-states in the US and Norway – to 
demonstrate that the connection between property and nationalism was a common feature of 
nationalism here, that there was a transcending logic to how this developed. Miroslav Hroch 
summed up this method of comparison, applying the term synchronic historical comparison, 
which means establishing similar historical processes that happened roughly during the same 
time period in different places:    
If we can establish that the objects of comparison went through roughly the same 
stages of development, we can compare these analogous events, even if from the 
standpoint of absolute chronology they occurred at different times …118 
This is what I have done in this dissertation. I have looked at the emergence and development 
of nationalism in the US and Norway. These cases went through similar developments of 
national revival, national revolution, and what I described as the first and second form of the 
nation, as well as with the shift from land to labour, or what I called a transvaluation of 
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property (these categories were explained in the introduction). I have compared these various 
stages of nationalism in the two cases against each other in order to come up with conceptual 
and theoretical positions on the nature of nationalism – the aim of the comparison of our cases 
is to explicate general trends of nationalism and causal/structural mechanisms of its emergence 
and development. 
 
a) The point of departure for comparative analysis: the material relations and the 
common context 
The point of departure for my comparison between the US and Norway was the similar 
distribution of landed property in these cases at their respective revolutionary moments (see 
chapter 1 for a survey of the landed relations of the cases). The reason for taking this similarity 
in property relations as a starting point of comparison is derived from the materialist 
underpinnings of my research (more about this below). According to classical Marxian 
materialist assumptions, similar relations of property should result in largely similar 
developments of ideology and the state. The US and Norway represented the actual existence 
of a form of relatively widespread private property at an early stage, and before the emergence 
of a political national movement or the creation of a nation-state. As the initial question of my 
research was to explore the role of private property in national ideology, such material 
relations seemed a fruitful starting-point. And indeed, these nations did establish very early on 
private property regimes and democracies based on widespread landholding. Both did this in 
opposition to imperial states. What happened in the US and Norway was similar, and many 
Norwegian scholars, as well as Norwegians at the time of the national revolution, have pointed 
to this similarity. The historian Sigmund Skard wrote about the Norwegian revolution of 1814 
and its similarity to America: 
The historical situation has been felt as parallel: two small nations arose heroically up 
against great powers. There was a commonality in their spirit which went deeper than 
their differences.119 
Francis Sejersted – another Norwegian historian – has also noted the similarity between the 
two societies at the outset of the nineteenth century, and points specifically to the idea that 
both societies were very much akin to a Lockean ideal society – that is to say societies 
constituted in large part of individual proprietors of land participating freely in relations with 
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each other and in government.120 This, of course, sounds very idealistic, and it is. But this 
fundamental similarity, the “commonality in spirit” constituted by the relative widespread 
ownership of land and similar liberal constitutions, can serve as a fruitful point of departure 
for comparison.  
 
There is also a point in accentuating the differences between the US and Norway. One was 
situated in the new world, the other in the old world – there was a giant ocean in between them. 
One marked the start of the age of revolution, the other was close to its end. In the US there 
existed four million chattel slaves (understood in most respects to be a form of property) at the 
time of the revolution; in Norway nothing of the kind had existed for almost one-thousand 
years. In America there was wide availability of new land; in Norway land was relatively 
scarce. The US became a republic; Norway remained a constitutional monarchy. These 
differences might actually strengthen the fundamental comparability of these cases. Despite 
enormous difference in space, and almost a quarter of a century of difference in time between 
their national revolutions – and despite the difference in social structure created by the 
institution of slavery and availability of land in America – what happened was similar. Even 
despite the different state forms of a republic and a monarchy, there was a fundamental and 
pervasive similarity in the new states that became established and the philosophy to which 
they adhered. This might indicate that similar property regimes in land indeed strongly 
influenced the ideology. Furthermore, this also points the common intellectual milieu that the 
nationalists in the US and Norway were part of (see chapter 2 for a survey of the main thinkers 
and ideas here). The developments of these cases were not isolated, and although my cases 
were peculiar in certain ways, they were part of something broader. Nationalism in these cases 
did not emerge in a vacuum. In fact the national revolutions of the US and Norway mark the 
beginning (the US) and the end (Norway) of a series of nationalist revolutions in the western 
hemisphere. The US and Norway were part of what Jonathan Hearn has called “the North 
Atlantic Interaction sphere.”121 Starting with the American Revolution, expressions of 
nationalism in the form of liberation movements promoting liberal constitutions emerged in a 
spatial sphere covering North America and Western Europe, as well large parts of Latin 
America in the years between 1776 and 1814. The French revolution of 1789 is perhaps the 
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most commonly used example of this. In addition, we might include the Haitian revolution of 
1791 (and its constitution of 1801), the Venezuelan constitution of 1811, the Mexican rising 
of 1810, and the Spanish constitution of 1812. One might also mention the Napoleonic code 
(1804) with its strong emphasis on the right to property.  And especially in the German states, 
nationalism emerged as a reaction to the rule of Napoleon. All these occurrences and many 
more may be seen to constitute the age of revolution or the age of nationalism, of which the 
emergence of nationalism in my cases was a part.122 The geographical position and general 
characteristics of their ideologies places my cases in this context, within the tradition of what 
Hans Kohn called western nationalism123 – an individualistic, liberal, democratic and 
essentially capitalist124 world view. After Kohn, others have developed similar typologies 
without the historical and geographical specificities of Kohn’s distinction between western 
and eastern nationalism, but which nevertheless are extensions and modifications of these 
categories. We might thus also label the nationalism of our cases civic nationalism as opposed 
to ethnic, individualistic as opposed to authoritarian/collectivistic. What is important to 
recognize is the nationalism that emerged in the US and Norway was one specific breed, as it 
were, of the larger category of nationalism, which was nevertheless brought forth by specific 
historical and social conditions – specifically, the widespread ownership of land.  
 
Analysis  
a) Ideas and material preconditions   
The purpose of this dissertation, as I stated at the outset, is to investigate the origins and nature 
of nationalism and to formulate the role of private property in nationalism, as well as to look 
at the significance of the pre-existing property regime for the emergence and development of 
nationalism. Within the historical comparative frame, this will be done by an interpretative 
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textual analysis of key historical documents. But as I have suggested earlier, I think that the 
forms and relations of property had a decisive influence on the emergence and nature of 
nationalism. A note must therefore be made on this. Such a suggestion is based on the Marxian 
assumption that social action is heavily influenced by the society in which it is produced, and 
it will be in place here to make a few remarks on this. As Marx famously put it:  
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make 
it under self- selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given 
and transmitted from the past.125 
This is the basis of historical materialism, that the material relations will, to a large extent, 
influence ideas and the forms they take. Ellen Meiksins Wood writes: 
Human beings enter into relations with each other and with nature to guarantee their 
own survival and social reproduction. To understand the social practices and cultural 
products of any time and place, we need to know something about those conditions of 
survival and social reproduction, something about the specific ways in which people 
gain access to the material conditions of life, about how some people gain access to 
the labour of others, about relations between people who produce and those who 
appropriate what others produce, about the forms of property that emerge from these 
social relations, and about how these relations are expressed in political domination, 
as well as in resistance and struggle.126    
Nationalism must be understood on the background of the basic conditions of survival, and 
the forms of domination and appropriation in the society in which it emerges. This is the basis 
of my investigation of the relationship between nationalism and private property. This basis 
is, of course, fairly standard – as Quintin Skinner has noted, “we are all Marxists to this extent 
– that our own society places unrecognized constraints upon our imaginations.”127 But even if 
we are all Marxists in this sense, it is nevertheless worth stressing the materialist point here, 
because this dissertation suggests an important and vital link between a specific part of the 
“constraints”, i.e. the property regime, and the idea of nationalism. I do not simply see property 
relations as a “constraint” to the imagination, but as an element that actively influences it. This 
will be an underlying assumption on which my textual analysis shall be based.  
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b) Nationalism as an emerging idea  
In regards to textual analysis, Skinner has written that when we seek to understand the ideas 
of any author, the essential question should be what the author: 
In writing at the time he did write, for the audience he intended to address, could in 
practice have been intending to communicate … It follows that the essential aim, in 
any attempt to understand the utterances themselves, must be to recover this complex 
intention on the part of the author. 
And thus:  
Once the appropriate focus of the study is seen in this way to be essentially linguistic 
and the appropriate methodology is seen in consequence to be concerned in this way 
with the recovery of intentions, the study of all the facts about the social context of 
the given text can then take its place as a part of this linguistic enterprise.128 
The approach taken to investigate nationalism in this dissertation follows Skinner´s ideas to a 
large extent – it is ideas and discourse that I seek to understand, because nationalism is first 
and foremost an idea. On this point I agree with the idealist Liah Greenfeld who writes that, 
“The only foundation of nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without which no 
nationalism is possible, is an idea; nationalism is a particular perspective or style of 
thought.”129 Nationalism must be understood in the frame of that strictly human activity of 
symbolical meaning-making, that people contribute subjective symbolical value to the world 
and act according to this in relation to others. This is essentially a Weberian understanding of 
the task of sociology. Sociology, wrote Max Weber, was:  
A science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social action and 
thereby with casual explanation of its course and consequences. We shall speak of 
Action insofar as the acting individual attaches a subjective meaning to his behavior 
… action is social insofar as its subjective meaning takes account of the behavior of 
others and is thereby oriented in its course.130  
Nationalism, for the purpose of this dissertation, can be understood broadly as a set of 
subjective meanings that individuals apply as basis for their actions in society.131 Furthermore, 
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when concerned, as I am here, with the origins and nature of nationalism, nationalism must 
also be seen as a historical, unfolding concept to be found in a range of actions, thoughts and 
discourse formed at specific times, as well as manifest in institutions and traditions. To explain 
this further, we can invoke Weber´s understanding of capitalism in The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism. Here, Weber understood capitalism as a “complex of elements 
associated in historical reality which we unite into a conceptual whole.”132 And such a 
historical concept: 
Must be gradually put together out of the individual parts which are taken from 
historical reality to make it up. Thus the final and definitive concept cannot stand at 
the beginning of the investigation, but must come at the end.133 
Applied to nationalism in this dissertation, this means that I look at various parts (specifically 
property and sovereignty, and concepts derived from or connected to these) that make up 
nationalism over time, and trying to see certain trends or defining principles. Greenfeld has 
applied this very method to her study of nationalism. She says that we should see nationalism 
as:  
“An emergent phenomenon”, that is, a phenomenon whose nature – as well as the 
possibilities of its development and the possibilities of the developments of which is 
composed – is determined not by the character of any of its elements, but by a certain 
organizing principle which makes these elements into a unity and imparts them a 
special significance.134  
And furthermore: 
In the case of emergent social phenomena, which are structurally parallel to the 
phenomena of life, we can answer the question of what brings elements together, and 
why, and discover the unifying principle, if we choose to do so.135 
In the course of this investigation, I have come to hold private property and its connection to 
popular sovereignty and individual freedom as the organizing principle of nationalism, or the 
“definitive concept” in Weber´s term. I reached this conclusion by analyzing the writings of 
certain key individuals – whom I have called the members of the national movement – and by 
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applying property and sovereignty as guiding principles in the analysis. I relied on these 
concepts to function as a compass, as a way of orientation in my exploration.136  
 
The process of selection of sources  
a) The national movement 
The national movement will be understood in historical, chronological terms as a changing 
heterogeneous and loose group of individuals who first expresses the initial (and at that point 
novel) national sentiments in a defined political and geographical era, and which then develops 
over time, making national sentiment more and more pervasive, until it is the fundamental 
sentiment of political action with the masses.137 This again presents us with the problem of 
specificity, seeing as the national movement is so broadly defined. It will always be a bit 
arbitrary who we include here. But as I was interested in the relationship between nationalism 
and private property, and used as a sensitizing question or problem the relationship between 
property and democracy, it was natural to look at individuals engaged in or with politics, and 
specifically those at the center of the political debate. The national revolutionary moments in 
both cases present one with a number of relevant individuals in this regard. To further justify 
this, it will be useful to consider the national revolutions in relation to Miroslav Hroch’s model 
of the national movement.  
 
Hroch sees the development of the national movement in three phases. Phase A is the phase 
of scholarly interest, the awakening of national consciousness for the first time, where national 
sentiment is confined to a tiny elite of intellectuals and has little or no social and political 
importance. Phase B is when the national movement becomes politically potent. Phase C is 
the transformation of the national movement into a mass popular movement.  All stages are 
equally important to the development of the national movement, but we might say that the 
transition from phase A to B is of special significance. Without a successful transition from A 
to B, the national movement as a political movement or as a pervasive social phenomena will 
simply never exist. It is therefore that I start by looking at the national revolutionary moments 
of my cases as they represent the important transition from phase A to phase B.  It is this that 
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marks the start of the national movement proper, at least as a political movement. Phase A and 
B are also of special importance as it is during these phases that the basic assumptions of 
nationalism are cemented: the assumptions established here became the foundations for further 
national development into phase C.138 
 
In the following I give a list of individuals and writings that I have focused on during the 
different phases of the national movement for each case. These have been important in the 
making of my argument, but I must emphasize that my argument also rests on supplementary 
secondary literature that I do not mention here, but which will naturally be referenced in the 
main text. The primary documents used for the Norwegian case were all written in 
Danish/Norwegian, and the quotes included from these documents are my own translations 
into English.  
 
b) Phase A and B in the American case 
For the American case, in the revolutionary period (representing the transition from phase A 
to phase B), Thomas Jefferson (1743-1826) stands out as a particularly relevant individual. 
Lawyer, plantation owner, author of the Declaration of Independence and president for two 
terms, Jefferson played a decisive role in creating political discourse and reality. Another 
prominent individual in the revolutionary period is John Dickinson (1732-1808), dubbed the 
penman of the revolution and also a lawyer. Dickinson wrote several influential texts in the 
lead-up to the revolution, yet he refused to sign the Declaration of Independence because he 
believed in reconciliation with Britain (more on why he and others believed in this in chapter 
4). Dickinson’s writings serve to nuance the image of the national ideology, while at the same 
time providing some of the most striking examples of it. The latter point may also be made of 
the third individual that I have focused on during this period: Thomas Paine (1737-1809). A 
radical intellectual and immigrant from England, he expressed an idealistic and 
uncompromising democratic national vision. Paine is perhaps most known for his pamphlet 
Common Sense, one of the most widely-read pamphlets of the revolutionary era. In addition 
to these three men, I invoke also the records of the federal convention (1787). There were 55 
men present here when it started in May 1787, and I have selected on the one hand what I see 
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as a representative sample, and on the other hand what demonstrates my point in the clearest 
way. I have also relied on two commentaries on the constitution, one from intellectual and 
lexicographer Noah Webster (1758-1843), and the other from William Manning (1747-1814), 
a smallholding farmer from Massachusetts. These two might represent the “high” and the 
“low” (in terms of class or social standing) in their comments on the constitution. Finally, I 
have used The Federalist (1787), a defense of the new constitution co-written by Alexander 
Hamilton (1755-1809), John Jay (1745-1829), and James Madison (1751-1836). I appeal to 
Hamilton’s writings the most, and I also use some of his other writings such as “Report on 
manufactures” (1791). This is primarily because Hamilton’s vision exemplifies the inherent 
possibilities in the first form of the nation to transform itself based on the Lockean idea of 
property.   
 
c) Phase A and B in the Norwegian case  
The emergence of the Norwegian national movement was different from that of the American 
one in duration; it took longer from the first expressions of national sentiment until the 
revolution occurred. In other words the transition from phase A to B took longer, so much so 
that few of the individuals of phase A were alive with the initiation of phase B, and those who 
were alive were very old. For phase A, I have invoked the writings of school-master Gerhard 
Schøning (1722-1780), priest Jens Zetlitz (1761-1821) and priest Nordahl Brun (1745-1816). 
Schøning wrote an influential and characteristic history of the Norwegian kingdom in three 
volumes where he emphasized the ancient freedom of the Norwegians, while Zetlitz and Brun 
wrote prose and pamphlets glorifying the Norwegian smallholding farmer. These became 
central elements of the national movement during phase B. In the Norwegian phase B of the 
national movement, lawyer and state official Christian Magnus Falsen (1782-1830) stands out 
as clearly and markedly as Jefferson in America. Falsen is often pointed to as the father of the 
Norwegian constitution, and had a central role in its making. He also wrote extensively on 
issues of national freedom, and was actively involved in national politics both before and after 
the revolution of 1814. Falsen was good friends with Prince Christian Frederick (1786-1848) 
of the Oldenborg dynasty – perhaps the most important individual in the animation of the 
Norwegian national movement. It was this prince who literally started the movement for 
national independence when he called together the Norwegian elite in February 1814, and he 
was actively involved in the creation of the new Norwegian state in the dramatic months 
between January and August 1814. His diary from those days provides interesting insight into 
the politics and thinking of the time. I have also relied on the first scholarly comment on the 
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constitution by lawyer Henrick Steenbuck (1815), and on poet and self-proclaimed friend of 
the people Henrk Wergeland’s (1808-1845) history of the constitution, as well as some of his 
poetry. Although a bit apart in time and context, these two individuals might be seen to 
represent one more “learned” and a more “popular perspective” on nationalism in Norway. 
Furthermore, as with the American case, I invoke the records of the Norwegian constitutional 
convention to which there were 112 representatives. I have also used what I see as 
representative, but I have chosen specific quotes that support my argument.  
 
These are the individuals that I have focused on during phase A and B of the national 
movement, which covers my conceptual points of the amalgamation of people, property and 
sovereignty and the first form of the nation. The occurrence of phase C in both my cases offers, 
like phase B, an intense moment of political engagement from which I have selected relevant 
individuals to focus on. In the American case, I have focused on the civil war (1861-1865), its 
lead up and its aftermath. In Norway, I have focused on the coming of parliamentary 
democracy (1884). These events might seem different and arbitrary to compare, but they 
represent a similar general trend: that of the unification of central state power and parallel 
development of universalizing democracy. These developments again represent the 
transvaluation of property and the transition to the second form of the nation.  
 
d) The coming of phase C in America  
Lawyer and statesman Abraham Lincoln (1809-1865) is an obvious choice as an individual to 
focus on for phase C in America. An active Republican debater on the issue of slavery and 
federal sovereignty since the 1850s, president of the union during the civil war, and 
responsible for the Emancipation Proclamation (1863), he stands out as one of the most 
prominent examples of the transvaluation of property. Another important figure that 
represents the transvaluation is Lincoln’s fellow Republican and his Secretary of State William 
Seward (1801-1872). Seward was a radical antislavery man, and is famous for his 
“irrepressible conflict” speech (which I rely on) that explained the civil war in terms of the 
two different systems of labour in the US, and connected it to the nature of the federative 
sovereignty. I have also looked at the opponents of the transvaluation, those who defended the 
nation in its first form. For this I have chosen the pro-slavery ideologues because by 
contrasting it to the Republican transvalued notion of property, it brings out the uniqueness of 
nationalism and its property assumptions.  Amongst the slavery men, I have invoked lawyer 
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and self-appointed sociologist George Fitzhugh (1806-1881), who wrote two books on the 
defense of slavery – Sociology for the south, or, the failure of free society (1854), and 
Cannibals all!, or slaves without masters (1857). I have also invoked the memoirs of Jefferson 
Davis, president of the confederacy (1808-1889), his vice president Alexander Stephens’ 
infamous “Corner stone speech,” and lawyer, and governor of South Carolina, James 
Hammond’s (1807-1864) “Cotton is King” speech.  
 
e) The coming of phase C in Norway  
In Norway, as in the US, the coming of the second form of the nation may be very much 
exemplified by one man, Lawyer Johan Sverdrup (1816-1892). Sverdrup became the 
undisputed leader of the broad social movement that started forming in the 1850s, and which 
in 1884 pressed through the reform and constitutional change that led to parliamentary 
democracy. Hence, he was an active debater on issues of parliamentary democracy and 
suffrage reform, both in the parliament and out amongst people from the 1850s. After 1884, 
he became prime minister for two periods. In addition to Sverdrup, I have invoked those who 
might be seen as his precursors. These were members of the farmers opposition in the 
parliament from the 1830s onwards. I have looked at farmer Hans Barlien’s (1772-1842) 
comment on the political system from 1836 and the infamous pamphlet dubbed “Ola boka” 
(the book of Ola, the common man), written by farmer John Nergaard (1795-1885). Both these 
contain democratic ideas which bear similarity to the later ideas of Sverdrup. I have also 
looked at the opponents of the transvaluation of property, first and foremost through lawyer 
and professor Anton Martin Schweigaard (1808-1870). He was one of the most distinguished 
public figures in Norway in his time, and was a parliamentary debater from 1850 to his death 
in 1870. He was a firm conservative defending property qualifications for the vote and 
opposing parliamentary democracy.    
 
Two notes on history and comparison  
It is obvious that in focusing on the individuals that I have selected, I am writing the history 
of the victors, as it were. In a sense I conform to what Walter Benjamin called the continuum 
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of history139 – that is to say that I accept the traditional narrative given of the events I am 
covering, which might suppress alternative and liberatory visions. I am very much aware of 
the existence of alternative visions and projects. But my project has been to explore the 
dominating and victorious vision, and to put this in a new light. It is therefore that I have, so 
to speak, called upon the usual suspects in my investigation. But I believe that I have brought 
to them something new with my property rights perspective, and with my comparison of the 
US and Norway.  
 
I have approached history from the perspective of sociology: this means that the primary 
concern of my research has not been the close scrutiny of fundamental historical truth, but 
synthesizing and bringing together facts from a large time period and from different fields. 
Skocpol wrote about her work on revolutions: “Some books present fresh evidence; others 
make arguments that urge the reader to see old problems in a new way. This work is decidedly 
of the latter sort.”140 This is also true of this dissertation. Historians might claim that we could 
be in danger here of reproducing falsities, especially if we really heavily on secondary- and 
third-hand literature.  But we still have the means to be critical. As Michal Mann has written 
in defense of historical sociology:  
We must present the facts as we see them, engage with contrary facts produced by 
others and demonstrate to the satisfactions of third parties that our perception 
generates more explanatory and predictive power.141 
 
 
A note also on the individuals compared: it was suggested to me at the outset to choose 
individuals with similar socio-economic situation for each case, so that the individuals invoked 
in the American case would match those in the Norwegian case. However my method of 
selection has been, as explained above, guided by the principle of relevance to national 
political events of my cases. Yet, as it turned out, there are many sociological similarities 
between the individuals compared. For phase A and B, a majority were lawyers in both cases, 
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and many owned landed private property. Many were also connected to state and or political 
institutions. During phase C, many of the individuals invoked belonged to the new middle 
class of officials, clerks and artisans. Thus, in a sense, the individuals compared are also 
compared due to their sociological standing in society, but this springs from the initial point 
of comparison: the similar property relations of the cases which meant roughly similar social 
structure and similar composition of the national movement. I have not sought to show that 
nationalism was propagated by certain classes, only that the specific historical background of 
the members of the movement informed their thinking. The underlying point has been that the 
property structures of my cases were similar, and that the national ideology was thus thought 




Chapter 4: The inception of nationalism and its entry 
into the world: the dialectics of property, people and 
sovereignty in revolutionary America  
Outline of the argument  
This chapter first lays down the specific historical and sociological context and background 
for the emergence of a national movement in America. Then the role of private property in the 
national ideology will be explicated through examples from the writings of key members of 
the national movement. The main conceptual points display what I have called an 
amalgamation of property, people and sovereignty – how these three concepts were 
fundamental to the logic of the national ideology. The most important point is to show how 
the idea of private property became connected to popular sovereignty and was derived, on the 
one hand, from ancient historical rights, and, on the other hand, from the special American 
property structure where land was relatively widespread.  
The argument has as its basic structure a historical narrative, which covers primarily the period 
from 1760-1790. The historical narrative is complimented with a more sociological conceptual 
analysis. The first part of the analysis deals with the historical period from about 1762 to 1776. 
We might call this period the prelude to nationalism. I have invoked primarily the writings of 
Thomas Jefferson, John Dickinson and Thomas Paine to demonstrate the importance of private 
property to the concept of freedom, and to show how this went from being understood as a 
British right to an American right.  
The second part of the analysis revolves around the Federal Constitutional Convention (1787) 
and its aftermath. The focus here is on how individual right to property became connected to 
the idea of rule by the people. We might call this the amalgamation of nationalism. I have 
relied primarily here on the records of the constitutional convention, The Federalist Papers 
(1788), and Noah Webster’s “An examination into the leading principles of the Federal 
Constitution” (1791). I have also invoked evidence from Jefferson, who was not present at the 
Federal convention, nor was he actively involved in the debates in its immediate aftermath. 
But he, along with smallholding farmer William Manning and the radical Thomas Paine, serve 
as a counter-balance to the predominant federalist evidence that I have used. I do not think 
that the Federalist/Anti-federalist distinction matters when it comes to their notions of property 
and nationality. It is this similarity that I try to emphasize by a seemingly fluid intermixing of 
their arguments.  
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“Destined to let freedom grow” 
The character and origins of American society has, ever since Columbus “discovered” the 
continent in 1492, captured the minds of thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic. For the 
historical sociologist, perhaps the most fascinating thing about American society is what Liah 
Greenfeld has pointed out, that:  
In America, to begin with, there was almost no social reality, other than the one the 
settlers brought with them in their own minds. (One could say that here were no 
structural constraints apart from the constraints of the symbolic structure).142 
What is important here is that, when the settlers first came to America, there was not an 
existing social structure.143 For my argument, the most important factor is the absence of an 
established feudal property structure in the colonies. Already by the 1830s, Alexis de 
Tocqueville, in his Democracy in America (1835), said that one of the fundamental bases for 
American democracy was the equality in condition that existed in America. “The ground, once 
cleared, was by no means fertile enough to make both a landlord and a tenant rich,” wrote 
Tocqueville, and “the land was naturally broken up into little slots.” Because of this, the 
American colonies seemed destined, according to Tocqueville, to “let freedom grow, not the 
aristocratic freedom of the motherland, but a middle-class and democratic freedom of which 
the world´s history had not previously provided a complete example.”144 Similarly Louis Hartz 
has written that, “The outstanding thing about the American effort of 1776 was bound to be, 
not the freedom to which it lead, but the established feudal structure it did not need to 
destroy.”145  Nothing in history is ever destined of course, but, more than anything else 
perhaps, it was the availability of land and wide ownerships of it by British settlers that formed 
American nationalism, which was, above anything else, concerned with propertied freedom.  
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The sociological origins of the spirit of nationalism  
a) The property regime of the British Empire 
There were, at the eve of the American Revolution, thirteen British colonies on the northern 
Atlantic coast of the American continent, with just over three million inhabitants in total. It 
was a population that was growing fast, mainly because of immigration (but also helped by 
high birth rates), so that by the turn of the nineteenth century, there were more than five million 
inhabitants in the thirteen colonies. These inhabitants were subjects in an empire whose 
general political and economic development, at least since the signing of Magna Carta, had a 
peculiar trajectory, going in a very different direction than that of most western states. By the 
seventeenth century, Britain’s unique trajectory is particularly striking. Where the monarchs 
of many European states had by the late seventeenth century centralized and increased their 
power, resulting in the creation of absolutist states, the British Crown had by the same time 
lost many of its powers, becoming in practice subject to the parliament – or, rather, to the 
power of the landed aristocracy.  
 
Perhaps the most fascinating and unique thing about the British state after the Glorious 
Revolution (1688) is that which Meiksins Wood has accentuated: the British propertied class 
taxed itself in order to increase the power of the state which they themselves were in control 
of, thus transferring to the state the wealth that they had appropriated from the propertyless.146  
One essential point is that there was amongst the elite a common definition and agreement 
over property. Woods writes in reference to the eighteenth century British debates about 
property:  
It seems perverse to define political discourse in eighteenth century England in the 
terms of a dispute amongst propertied classes whose agreements on the existing 
property regime far outweighed their disagreements; or to magnify ill tempered 
disputes among gentlemen into conflicts of revolutionary moment.147  
The shared property assumptions were capitalist, with property being understood as a private, 
individual, exclusive right. It was common in British law by the early eighteenth century to 
define property as an absolute exclusive right. 148 It was said about the proprietor that: “An 
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absolute proprietor hath an absolute Power to dispose of his Estate as he pleases, subject only 
to the Laws of the Land.”149 By 1729, Giles Jacob’s law dictionary says about property that:  
Every Man (if he hath not forfeited it) hath a Property and Right allowed him by the 
Law, to defend his Life, Liberty, and Estate; and if either be violated, it gives an Action 
to redress the Injury, and punish the Wrongdoer.150 
Americans inherited such definitions of property. A private property regime became 
practically uncontested in revolutionary America. In the words of John R. Nelson: 
A private property system and its political, economic, and social implications 
pervaded the thought and actions of the early national leaders (in America). Their 
concept of freedom and independence were inextricably bound up with individual 
ownership of productive property ... slavery or contract might be challenged by a 
“radical”, but never the systems as a whole.151 
This kind of private property system became the foundation for the national ideology in 
America.  
 
b) Different property structures  
The property assumptions of Britain and the colonies were the same, but the actual relations 
of property were different. In Britain, at the time of the American Revolution, the ratio between 
freemen (that is to say self-owners) was the reverse of what it was in the American colonies: 
whereas 70% of the land in America was owned by freeholding families, in England only 30% 
owned their own land. The whole situation of landownership was very different; England was 
densely populated, made up of a plethora of small villages where landlords owned most of the 
land. From the sixteenth century onwards, enclosing landlords created private property at the 
expense of commons, and substituted traditional rights to revenue with short-term lease. Thus 
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there was created a form of agrarian capitalism based upon tenancy for the many and 
ownership by the few.152  
 
Many Colonial Americans looked with pity on the social conditions of Britain, and contrasted 
their own situation with it. Benjamin Franklin’s thoughts on this are telling: 
I have lately made a tour through Ireland and Scotland. In those countries, a small part 
of the society are landlords, great noblemen, and gentlemen, extremely opulent, living 
in the highest affluence and magnificence. The bulk of the people are tenants, 
extremely poor, living in the most sordid wretchedness, in dirty hovels of mud and 
straw, and clothed only in rags.153 
But in America the situation was different, wrote Franklin: “I thought often of the happiness 
of New England, where every man is a freeholder, has a vote in public affairs.”154 That every 
man in New England was a freeholder was of course an exaggeration, but there were more 
than in Britain, and their situation was more free. This difference was reflected through law. 
In Britain, writes Edward White, “It seems fair to say that by 1750 English law of trusts and 
estates served to protect the interests of wealthy landed families.”155 English law was also 
colonial law.156 But it soon became apparent that there was a mismatch between the 
assumptions and prerogatives of these laws and the American reality.  If English law made it 
relatively difficult for the majority of people to own and transfer land, it was made relatively 
easier in the colonies. Colonial property law was still mostly English property law (and by the 
property of being so, it provided powerful protection of landed property interests), but it was 
moderated, softened and made more democratic in the sense that it was easier for most people 
to obtain it: entail and primogeniture was less common and regarded with skepticism by many; 
in courts it was easier to challenge titles to land; and there was a system of land acquisition – 
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the recording system – more in tune with the American reality of vast amounts of uncultivated 
land.157 There were no general treatise produced on American law until 1826, when James 
Kent’s Commentaries on American Law was published.158 Concerning property rights 
specifically however, we can refer to “the father of the constitution,” James Madison, who 
produced his now famous Essay on Property (1792). In the essay, property is defined, as in 
English law, as an exclusive right to the individual: “property,” writes Madison, “is that 
dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in 
exclusion of every other individual.”159 Madison had a wide conception of property. In a larger 
sense, he wrote:  
It embraces everything to which a man may attach value and have a right; and which 
leaves to everyone else the like advantage. In the former sense, a man´s land or 
merchandize, or money, is called his property. In the latter sense, a man has property 
in his opinion and his free communication of them … He has property very dear to 
him in the safety and the liberty of his person … In a word, as a man is said to have a 
right to property, he may be equally said to have a property in his rights.160  
We can also look to public documents and statutes to get an idea of how property was 
understood. The North West Ordinance (1787), for instance, stated that the inhabitants of the 
territories it covered had the right to private property.   
No man shall be deprived of his liberty of property but by the judgement of his peers, 
or the law of the land, and should the public exigencies make it necessary, for the 
common preservation, to take any persons property, or to demand his particular 
services, full compensation shall be made for the same.161 
This passage demonstrates the way in which property was relatively democratic in America: 
all men have the right to it, and nobody can be deprived from it other than by judgment of his 
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c) Population, economy and social hierarchy in the colonies 
The relative ease with which one could acquire property in the colonies was an important 
factor in attracting immigrants to them. The southern colonies received the most immigrants 
and had the highest population growth amongst the colonies, and in the 1770s, 47% of the 
population lived in the southern states. The most distinguishing feature of these states was the 
existence and pervasiveness of chattel slavery – in fact, African slaves were the largest group 
of people coming to the colonies as a whole during the eighteenth century. Hence, slaves 
constituted a significant amount of the total population in the colonies; at the eve of the 
revolution, one out of every five people living in the colonies were slaves – that is human 
beings defined by law and custom as property, a commodity to be bought and sold. Slavery 
was largely accepted in the colonies before the revolution, and so was the notion and fact that 
society was a hierarchical and paternalistic one. At the top of the social hierarchy was a small 
group of people (around 5% of the population) that consisted mainly of merchants and large 
planters. Just below this small group of people was a slightly larger group of men that were 
educated and had professions where one did not have to work with one’s hands, such as 
lawyers, schoolmasters and doctors. It was these two groups that provided the majority of the 
members to the national movement. Below this group was a large group of farmers, which was 
the occupation of one out of every four free males. The majority (70% as referred to above) of 
these farmers owned their own land; hence, to own land was a relatively reasonable and 
realistic expectation for a large number of the rural population. This, along with the fact that 
titles and privileges were not prevalent, made social mobility relatively high. Social mobility 
and economic advancement was, of course, more real for some than for others. Especially in 
the urban areas, there was an increasing concentration of capital and wealth in few hands and 
increasing groups of laborers who had little chance of economic and social advancement. 
There were also regional differences of wealth; in the south the average wealth per free wealth 
holder was 394 pounds, whereas in New England it was 161 pounds. This was largely because 
the slaves in the south had almost no wealth at all. Wealth was increasing considerably in the 
colonies during the eighteenth century as the economy was growing steadily, making the 
colonies an important component of the British imperial economy, not least through the trans-
Atlantic trade in which the southern colonies were a particular central component through the 
slave trade and the export of staple crops.162  
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d) The central imperial and local colonial structure of government  
The central rulers of the British Empire could, to a large degree, control wealth and trade in 
the colonies through decrees, acts, laws and imperial institutions. At the same time, the 
colonies had a large degree of autonomy and self-rule in local matters through more or less 
democratically-elected assemblies, where the ownership of property was normally a 
precondition for enfranchisement and whose main function was to vote for taxes. But in the 
last instance, the colonies and the people living therein were subjects to the British Crown and 
Parliament, and most of the colonies had, in addition to the elective assemblies, governors that 
were appointed by the king. These were representatives of the Crown through a string of 
organizations: The Lord commissioners for Trade and Plantations, the Parliamentary 
Committee of Plantation Affairs, and ultimately the Privy Council which exercised the 
ultimate authority over colonial matters. Through this system of government, wealth and 
political power were intertwined, and were in this sense not so far removed from feudal 
practices. As Gordon Wood has put it, “Translating the personal, social and economic power 
of the gentry into political authority was essentially what eighteenth century (colonial) politics 
was about.”163 Through patronage as a medium of political and economic power, ultimately 
power seemed always linked back to the monarchy, to a “long chain of dependency whose end 
disappeared into the distant an murky corridors of Whitehall.”164 The corridors of Whitehall 
represented a unitary, all-encompassing imperial sovereignty of the British state, and it was 
against this sovereignty that nationalism in America emerged. This had to do first and foremost 
with the widespread ownership of landed property in the colonies – which made the idea of 
popular sovereignty conceivable and sensible –and the marriage of this reality to certain 
aspects of older and contemporary political thinking in which landed property had special 
significance in relation to freedom.   
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Prelude to nationalism  
a) The right to property of British subjects   
The political-theoretical context in which colonial Americans were imbedded posed a central 
link between property and freedom.165 It was particularly land that was seen to be important, 
and this must be understood in the agrarian context of relative widespread landownership in 
which the colonists lived. Partly, the right to property was based on the assertion that the labor 
one engaged in, and the fruits that it produced, was exclusive to the individual – it was his 
property – what was properly his or her own.166 To have property in this way was a necessary 
condition for individual freedom to exist. John Dickinson wrote in the late 1760s in response 
to measures from the British Parliament:  
Let these truths be indelibly impressed on our minds – that we cannot be happy, 
without being free – that we cannot be free, without being secure in our property – 
that we cannot be secure in our property , if, without our consent, others may, as by 
right, take it away.167   
John Dickinson (born 1732 in Delaware) has been dubbed the penman of the revolution. 
Dickinson was a plantation owner and lawyer who became a contributor to the emergent 
national ideology in the late 1760s with the implementation of the Townshend Acts. In 
1767/68 he anonymously published an attack on the act signed “A farmer”, which became 
know as “Letters from a farmer in Pennsylvania.” The same year Dickinson wrote “The 
Liberty Song” which was also an assertion of American property rights. Later Dickinson 
became a delegate both to the Continental Congress and the Federal Convention. Dickinson, 
however, refused to sign the Declaration of Independence, believing in the longest on a 
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reconciliation with Britain.168 This was because he held the widespread view that the property 
rights of the colonists were inseparable from their belonging to Britain. He wrote in his Letters 
from a farmer that although the British government was sometimes unjust, Britain, and the 
British constitution, was also the origin and protector of the liberty of the colonists: 
What have these colonies to ask, while they continue free? Or what have they 
to dread, but insidious attempts to subvert their freedom? Their prosperity does not 
depend on ministerial favors doled to particular provinces. They form one political 
body, of which each colony is a member. Their happiness is founded on their 
constitution; and is to be promoted, by preserving that constitution in unabated vigor, 
throughout every part. A spot, a peak of decay, however small the limb on which it 
appears, and however remote it may seem from the vitals, should be alarming. We 
have all the rights requisite for our prosperity. The legal authority of Great Britain 
may indeed lay hard restrictions upon us; but like the spear of Telephus it will cure as 
well as wound.169 
The colonies formed “one political body” with Britain, and “their happiness [was] founded on 
their constitution.” Dickinson wrote to his fellow colonists that the point was to respect both 
oneself and the Crown, and know what was theirs and what belonged to the Crown:  
You will support the character of freemen, without losing that of faithful subjects—a 
good character in any government—one of the best under a British government. You 
will prove, that Americans have that true magnanimity of soul, that can resent 
injuries, without falling into rage; and that tho’ your devotion to Great Britain is the 
most affectionate, yet you can make PROPER DISTINCTIONS, and know what you 
owe to yourselves, as well as to her.170 
This distinction between what belonged to the individual and what belonged to the Crown 
should of course, wrote Dickinson, also be respected by the Crown. Nobody deserved to be 
deprived of what “can be properly called our own,” because this was the most fundamental 
right of any free man: 
As long as the products of our labor, and the rewards of our care, can properly be 
called our own, so long it will be worth our while to be industrious and frugal. But if 
when we plow—sow—reap—gather—and thresh—we find, that we plow—sow—
reap—gather—and thresh for others, whose PLEASURE is to be the SOLE 
LIMITATION how much they shall take, and how much they shall leave, WHY 
should we repeat the unprofitable toil? Horses and oxen are content with that portion 
of the fruits of their work, which their owners assign them, in order to keep them 
strong enough to raise successive crops; but even these beasts will not submit to draw 
for their masters, until they are subdued by whips and goads. Let us take care of 
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our rights, and we therein take care of our prosperity. ”SLAVERY IS EVER 
PRECEDED BY SLEEP.171 
This quote demonstrates again the centrality of property ownership to the colonists’ concept 
of freedom: property was what made men free, and not “slaves” or like “beasts subdued by 
whips and goads.” We can also clearly see here the agrarian frame of reference in which 
Dickinson writes, referring to plowing, sowing and reaping. Property had the potential of 
creating independence for the individual because, by utilizing and shaping the earth through 
one’s labor and having exclusive (property) right to it, one created the means to act freely in 
the world. Property was thus understood as a natural and unrestricted right as long as it did not 
interfere on another’s right to do the same. In a letter that Thomas Jefferson wrote to a friend 
thirty years after the American Revolution, he also expressed the importance of private 
property if an individual was to be free:  
A right to property is founded on our natural wants, in the means in which we are 
endowed to satisfy those wants, and the right to what we require by these means 
without violating the similar rights of other sensible beings.172 
Owning landed property could satisfy the wants and needs of an individual, this made him or 
her free. For this reason, there was also posed a link between it and political power 
(sovereignty). French immigrant and intellectual, John St. Hector St. Crevecoeur expressed 
this clearly in his Letters from an American Farmer (1782):    
The instant I enter on own land, the bright idea of property, of exclusive right, of 
independence exalt my mind. Precious soil … What should we American farmers be 
without the distinct possession of that soil? It feeds, it clothes us …This formerly rude 
soil has been converted by my father into a pleasant farm, and in return it has 
established all our rights; on it is founded our rank, our freedom, our power as 
citizens.173 
Again we see the agrarian frame in which property was understood – that it is possession of 
the soil that makes an American, and gives him his rights and powers.   
 
Before 1776, colonial Americans in general saw the right to property and their “power as 
citizens” as protected by the British Crown. After 1776, this changed. Due in large part to new 
British policies in the colonies from the early 1760s, many Americans became convinced by 
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1776 that, as John Adams put it in 1765, “There seems to be a direct and formal design on 
foot, to enslave all America.”174 Slavery was the opposite of having the right to property, and 
Adams was led to argue Americans were being enslaved by the British government’s 
interference with the colonists’ right to property through its taxation. Many agreed with him. 
Dickinson put this expressly: “We are taxed without our own consent, expressed by ourselves 
or our representatives. We are therefore – slaves.”175 And he continued: 
If they have any right to tax us—then, whether our own money shall continue in our 
own pockets or not, depends no longer on us, but on them. “There is nothing which” 
we “can call our own; or, to use the words of Mr. Locke—WHAT PROPERTY 
HAVE” WE “IN THAT, WHICH ANOTHER MAY, BY RIGHT, TAKE, WHEN 
HE PLEASES, TO HIMSELF?176 
Subjection to British parliamentary laws more and more became seen as distorting the freedom 
of the colonists. Adams asked in 1775 about accepting British parliamentary legislature: 
Would not such an unlimited subjection of three millions of people to that parliament, 
at three thousand miles distance, be real slavery? There are but two sorts of men in the 
world, freemen and slaves. The very definition of a freeman is one who is bound by 
no law to which he has not consented. Americans would have no way of giving or 
withholding their consent to the acts of this parliament, therefore they would not be 
freemen.177 
To sustain their position as “freemen” with the right to property, the members of the American 
national movement found a new source of sovereignty – the American landed property 
structure and the people that were part of it. This idea was both latent and present in America 
in the decades leading up to the revolution. But before 1776, nationalism was only a 
potentiality, a spirit not yet materialized and that had not yet found its way into the world. 
However, from the 1760s onwards, conflicts with the center of the empire, ultimately caused 
by the property structure in the American colonies,178 created an opening for the spirit to enter. 
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It is to the realization of political ideology of the amalgamation of people, property and 
sovereignty that we now turn. 
 
b) Enter the spirit: The triggering factors   
Imperial politics from the 1760s onwards brought some complex issues about sovereignty to 
the surface.  As Jack P. Green once put it, at the end of the Seven Years War (known as the 
French and Indian war in America), “the only certainty about constitutional arrangements 
within the large extended polity that constituted the early modern British Empire was their 
uncertainty.”179 When suddenly and glaringly brought to the surface, these issues created 
feelings of deep dissatisfaction in the colonies. The end of the Seven Years War was a major 
event causing issues over sovereignty to be displayed. Britain’s victory in this war eliminated 
the French threat in the north, creating a state of political security for the colonists not seen 
before. This also opened up vast amounts of new land for potential settlement, but the British 
government responded to this by creating the Proclamation Line, which basically restricted 
the colonists from settling the new land. These were probably some of the immediate factors 
contributing to independence. Indeed, the Proclamation Line can be seen as the first of many 
parliamentary restrictions on the colonists’ real or perceived rights. There came many more 
restrictions, for the Seven Years War, as all wars, coasted money. British politicians only 
thought it fair that the colonists contributed to the payment of this war – after all, the war had 
been fought largely to protect them. Thus, in 1764, the Sugar Act and the Currency Act were 
passed, the former levying new duties on textiles, wines, coffee and sugar shipped to the 
colonies, the latter forbidding the colonists from using their own paper money for payment of 
debts. Then came the Stamp Act in 1765, creating revenue on stamps required on most printed 
commodities. The Quartering Act of the same year stated that the colonists were to house and 
feed British troops stationed there. In 1767 the Townshend Act was initiated, increasing duties 
on a range of imported commodities, creating a Board of Customs Commissioners in Boston 
and more vice-admiralty courts. These measures were greeted with provocation by the 
colonists, and the presence of British troops made the situation more tense. On 5 March 1770, 
the tension resulted in the “Boston Massacre,” where five civilians were killed when a British 
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soldier fired into a crowd after being assaulted. After this, the British Parliament repealed 
many of its previous acts. But when the Tea Act of 1773 was enacted, unrest broke out again 
with the infamous Boston Tea Party. After this, parliament passed the Coercive Acts (or the 
Intolerable Acts) in 1774, which stated the parliament’s absolute and final legislative authority 
over the colonies. It also closed the Port of Boston and replaced the Massachusetts Assembly 
with a body appointed by the colonial governor. It were these measures against the colonists 
that created an opening through which the spirit of nationalism could enter. And it was the 
American property structure of relatively widespread landownership that provided a worldly 
form for the spirit – without it, the spirit would have remained an apparition only. Widespread 
landownership and the protection of the right to hold land in such a situation spawned an 
ideology where popular sovereignty and landed property became interconnected.  
 
Nationality unleashed  
a) Sage of nationalism: Thomas Jefferson 
The members of the national movement started asserting their right to property against the 
British Crown and Parliament based on their perceived historical rights to land.  Thomas 
Jefferson, the slave-owning freeman of Virginia, provides us with a most clear and systematic 
expression of the historical vision. Jefferson hangs as a looming spectre over revolutionary 
America. As principal author of the Declaration of Independence, he inevitably becomes a 
key figure when exploring revolutionary discourse. Jefferson was born in Virginia in 1743, 
and it was in this colony that he also settled as a young adult as a plantation owner and 
slaveholder. But Jefferson also practiced as a lawyer and was a local representative of the 
House of Burgess in the early 1770s. Jefferson’s contributions to a national ideology started 
after the passing of the Intolerable Acts with his writing of “A summary view of the rights of 
British America” (1774), which is a clear example of the historical and propertied nature of 
the national ideology. Then, one year later, when the Continental Congress was constituted, 
Jefferson became a representative from Virginia, and it was in this role that he drafted the 
Declaration of Independence (1776). After the revolution Jefferson occupied various political 
positions, including Minister to France (1785-89) and Secretary of State (1790-93), but most 
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importantly, perhaps, as President from 1801-1809, during which he practiced his own vision 
of nationalism.180   
 
History became a way to define the proper relationship between property and society for 
Jefferson. George S. Alexander has suggested that this vision might be summed up in 
Jefferson’s famous statement that “the earth belongs to the living”; Alexander writes: “That 
the earth belongs to the living, then, represents an attempt to create public meaning of property 
in the new republic in terms of time.”181 In Jefferson’s vision, individuals are free by his 
property not only from present arbitrary inference, but also from feudal and aristocratic 
bondage which could be inherited from the past. An important feature of the national 
understanding of freedom was that the individual was situated with his exclusive right to 
property in empty, homogenous time.182 With this understanding, Jefferson could, like some 
ancient sage, conjure up a historical vision of progress, with the promise of a lost hope fulfilled 
again – the freedom of the individual. Thus he started “A Summary View of the Rights of 
British America” – a tract written before the first continental congress in 1774 which set down 
a list of grievances against the British king and parliament – by invoking the first settlers, 
America’s ancient ancestors: “Our ancestors, before their emigration to America, were the free 
inhabitants of the British dominions in Europe ...”,183 from which he continues:  
America was conquered, and her settlements made, and firmly established, at the 
expence of individuals, and not of the British public. Their own blood was spilt in 
acquiring lands for their settlement, their own fortunes expended in making that 
settlement effectual; for themselves they fought, for themselves they conquered, and 
for themselves alone they have right to hold.184    
Nevertheless, the colonial ancestors, according to Jefferson, choose to adopt British laws: 
Under which they had hitherto lived in the mother country, and to continue their union 
with her by submitting themselves to the same common sovereign, who was thereby 
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made the central link connecting the several parts of the empire thus newly 
multiplied.185 
This did not mean, however, that the British Parliament had any right to interfere with the 
property of the colonists. Jefferson writes: 
Shall these governments be dissolved [the colonial governments], their property 
annihilated, and their people reduced to a state of nature, at the imperious breath of a 
body of men, whom they never saw, in whom they never confided, and over whom 
they have no powers of punishment or removal, let their crimes against the American 
public be ever so great? ... Were this to be admitted, instead of being a free people, as 
we have hitherto supposed, and mean to continue ourselves, we should suddenly be 
found ... slaves.186  
The colonists were not slaves however; they were freemen because of the nature of their 
landholdings, which they had inherited from their ancestors; 
Our Saxon ancestors held their lands, as they did their personal property, in absolute 
dominion, disencumbered with any superior, answering nearly to the nature of those 
possessions which the feudalists term allodial. William, the Norman, first introduced 
that system generally ... America was not conquered by William the Norman, nor its 
lands surrendered to him, or any of his successors. Possessions there are undoubtedly 
of the allodial nature. Our ancestors, however, who migrated hither, were farmers, not 
lawyers. The fictitious principle that all lands belong originally to the king, they were 
early persuaded to believe real.187   
The colonial ancestors may not have been lawyers, only freeholders. Jefferson, however, was 
both a lawyer and a freeholder – he could not be fooled by the “fictitious principle.” Indeed, 
he knew and held that “our properties within our own territories shall [not] be taxed or 
regulated by any power on earth but our own.”188 Americans constituted a distinct people of 
free, landed individuals, and according to Jefferson, they thus had the right to form their own 
government in order to preserve their property, as it is declared in the Declaration of 
Independence:  
It becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have 
connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the 
separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle 
them.189 
Brian Steele has suggested that only after independence, in retrospect, can “A Summary View” 
be seen as a part of a national history of legitimization. Furthermore, Steele suggests that 
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Jefferson was more radical than anyone else in his assertions, because he claimed that 
historically, not only had the parliament never held any rights over the colonies, but neither 
had the king.190 I do not think this is as important as is the fact that Jefferson claims the 
colonists’ rights on account of an American history in “A Summary View” – and that property 
is integral to his argument. It is in fact this that is being done in The Declaration of 
Independence as well: the claims of universal natural rights made therein may be seen as an 
expression of the American national character that, as Steel himself put it, “legitimizes the 
statehood of the entity that will have the charge ... of securing those rights.”191 It was property 
that was the most fundamental of these rights and the main reason for declaring independence. 
It was around landed property that the national history and the new nation-state were built. In 
a draft to an act that became part of the Sessions Act of May 1779, Jefferson stated this quite 
directly: before the separation with the British Empire, Jefferson wrote, the colonists had “all 
the rights of natural born subjects in the other [parts of the empire], & so might lawfully take 
& hold real property.” However, 
When by the tyrannies of that [the British] prince, & the open hostilities committed 
by his armies & subjects inhabitants of the other parts of his dominions on the good 
people of the sd United States they are obliged to wage war in defense of their rights 
& finally to separate themselves from the rest of the British empire.192  
 
b) The common sense of Thomas Paine  
By the summer of 1776, the American property rights and freedoms were understood by most 
members of the national movement as self-sustained, self-evident rights that were no longer 
dependent on Britain.193 This was now, we could say, Common sense, which was the title of 
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Thomas Paine’s extremely popular pamphlet, concluding already in January 1776 that, “Tis 
time to part!”194 with Britain. Paine was a recent English immigrant to America – he had gotten 
there only in 1774 after Benjamin Franklin had given him a letter of recommendation. Paine’s 
life in England had been turbulent. He lived in London in the winter of 1757-58 where he 
became acquainted with Newtonian rationalism, something that probably greatly influenced 
his politics of natural law. Paine later held positions as a teacher and revenue officer, but in 
1774 he was fired from the latter job, his belongings sold and his wife divorced him. It was 
then that a friend introduced him to Franklin and he came to America.195 That Paine, an 
Englishman, started so forcefully to advocate for the rights of the Americans, might, for one, 
be another indicator of the Englishness of the rights that the colonists were advocating.196 But 
these rights were increasingly understood, at least in America, as universal rights. In Common 
Sense, Paine explained that separation with Britain was on the grounds of natural universal 
rights: 
The cause of America is in a great measure the cause of all mankind. Many 
circumstances have, and will arise, which are not local, but universal, and through 
which the principles of all lovers of mankind are affected, and in the event of which 
their affections are interested. The laying a country desolate with fire and sword, 
declaring war against the natural rights of all mankind, and extirpating the defenders 
thereof from the face of the earth, is the concern of every man to whom nature hath 
given the power of feeling.197 
Freedom was now seen to be antithetical to the British constitution, and it was the monarchical 
and aristocratic elements of it that made it unfit for proper freedom, and which had made it 
necessary to part, wrote Paine. It was the character of the people that made nations free.  Only 
if they themselves governed and made laws could independency exist. Paine wrote:  
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Independency means no more, than, whether we [the people] shall make our own laws, 
or whether the king, the greatest enemy this continent hath, or can have, shall tell us 
“THERE SHALL BE NO LAWS BUT SUCH AS I LIKE.”198 
The king’s sovereignty is here refuted in favor of that of “the people”. To base sovereignty on 
the people, however, meant in actuality to base sovereignty on the right to landed property. 
The idea of popular sovereignty was interconnected with the assertion of the centrality of 
individual property ownership in establishing freedom for the individual. These two ideas were 
married at least since the writing of the Declaration of Independence. Below I shall 
demonstrate this through looking at debates during and around the Federal Constitutional 
Convention.  
 
Nationalism and the federal constitution: amalgamating people, property and 
sovereignty 
a) Origins of the constitution  
In the midst of the Revolutionary War, in 1781, the thirteen colonies signed the Articles of 
Confederation, which established a loose union between the states. This was to ensure the rule 
of the people. But government by the people proved difficult to organize: the Revolutionary 
War had left the various colonies and the Continental Congress with huge debts that proved 
difficult to pay, especially since the Articles of Confederation did not vest the central 
government with the power of taxation. Serious financial issues created much unrest and 
debate amongst various factions, groups and classes. An infamous example of this was the 
1786/1787 insurrection in Massachusetts, known as Shay’s Rebellion, against federal taxes in 
which local farmers arose in armed revolt against the central authorities. John Jay’s complaint 
here about “the insecurity of property”199 may sum up the general concern at the time in the 
national movement and the primary principle of nationalism. By the fall of 1787, as Edmund 
Randolph (1753-1813) of Virginia put it, it had became clear to many, if not most, “that the 
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confederation fulfilled none of the objects for which it was framed”200 – e.g. the protection of 
the property rights and freedoms of Americans. Thus, the colonists started work on a new 
constitution that created a stronger federal government, which was ratified in 1789.  
 
The constitution, propagated by people who came to be known as Federalists, was ratified 
under much debate, and it was not so obvious to everyone that a stronger government in the 
manner in which the new constitution suggested was the safest bulwark against “the insecurity 
of property.” George Mason made a reflection on this in a letter to his son sent from the Federal 
Convention, which might sum up the general ambiguous position on the subject. Mason 
reflected:   
The revolt from Great Britain and the formations of our new governments at that time, 
were nothing compared to the great business now before us; there was then a certain 
degree of enthusiasm, which inspired and supported the mind; but to view, through 
the calm, sedate medium of reason the influence which the establishment now 
proposed may have upon the happiness or misery of millions yet unborn, is an object 
of such magnitude, as absorbs, and in a manner suspends the operations of the human 
understanding. . . .201 
At time of the Federal Convention, the “enthusiasm” from the revolution had transformed in 
many minds into a form of discouragement in front of the serious and difficult task that lay 
ahead, into “such magnitude … that suspends the operations of the human understanding.” 
How were liberty and property actually to be secured? As George Washington put it in a letter 
to a friend, the people were practically screaming for an answer: 
The pressure of the public voice was so loud, I could not resist the call to a convention 
of the States which is to determine whether we are to have a Government of 
respectability under which life — liberty, and property will be secured to us, or are to 
submit to one which may be the result of chance or the moment, springing perhaps 
from anarchy and Confusion…202 
“The whole Community” was anxious with this question. “And there can be no doubt but that 
the result will in some way or other have a powerful effect on our destiny,” wrote James 
Madison to Thomas Jefferson, who at the time, was in France serving as Minister for the 
Confederation.203  
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b) Popular landownership, popular sovereignty  
The debates over the constitution were in the broadest about centralization of sovereignty. 
Adopting a national constitution would mean a reduction of the sovereignty of the individual 
states as had been established with the Articles of Confederation, and the critics of the 
constitution (the anti-federalists) claimed that this would put the rights and liberties of the 
people in danger. 204 The debates over the issue of centralization of sovereignty actually show, 
however, the cementation of a broader, overreaching view of the connection between property 
and popular sovereignty. This idea transcended the differences between the Federalists and the 
Anti-federalists – there was a common underlying vision. It should be no surprise that this was 
the case, and that this vision was similar to, for example, Jefferson’s ideas about property and 
sovereignty: the people who drafted the constitution were an elite of land and plantation 
owners like Jefferson – and wealthy merchants. Thirty-four were lawyers like Jefferson.205 
The Anti-federalist tended to be less wealthy, but also these men were primarily men of landed 
property, generally small farmers.206 It must be significant also that all these men had the 
common reference that was the myth and reality of America, where landownership was 
relatively widespread and where new land was available. Because of this, the freedom derived 
from landholding became coupled with popular sovereignty. The mixing of popular 
sovereignty with individual landholding was a direct result of the relative widespread 
ownership of landed property in the US. Sovereignty was popular because property was 
popular. Noah Webster207 pointed this out quite directly:  
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A general and tolerably equal distribution of landed property is the whole basis of 
national freedom: The system of the great Montesquieu will ever be erroneous, till the 
words property or lands in fee simple are substituted for virtue, throughout his Spirit 
of Laws.208 
And Webster continued:  
Virtue, patriotism or love of country never was and never will be, till men’s natures 
are changed, a fixed, permanent principle and support of government. But in an 
agricultural country a general possession of land in fee simple may be rendered 
perpetual.209 
Charles Pinckney (1757-1824) of South Carolina, delegate to the constitutional convention, 
made a similar statement at the convention:  
The people of the U. States are perhaps the most singular of any we are acquainted 
with. Among them there are fewer distinctions of fortune & less of rank, than among 
the inhabitants of any other nation. Every freeman has a right to the same protection 
& security; and a very moderate share of property entitles them to the possession of 
all the honors and privileges the public can bestow: hence arises a greater equality, 
than is to be found among the people of any other country, and an equality which is 
more likely to continue — I say this equality is likely to continue, because in a new 
Country, possessing immense tracts of uncultivated lands, where every temptation is 
offered to emigration & where industry must be rewarded with competency, there will 
be few poor, and few dependent … the whole community will enjoy in the fullest 
sense that kind of political liberty which consists in the power the members of the 
State reserve to themselves, of arriving at the public offices, or at least, of having votes 
in the nomination of those who fill them.210 
It was for this reason that the people (because they had property) could be the sovereign. And 
it was for this reason that the people could also be the protector of the right to property: “He 
that is wise” reflected Thomas Paine, will see that “the safest asylum … is, the love of the 
people. All property is safe under their protection.”211 In a later pamphlet, Agrarian Justice 
(1797), Paine also gives the people, led on by revolutionary principles, a key role in securing 
landed property, and in handing out justice to those who do not have property.212  
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c) Propertied  individuals as sovereign people  
During the federal convention, George Mason observed that: 
A new set of ideas seems to have crept in since the articles of confederation were 
established. Conventions of the people, or with power derived expressly from the 
people, were not then thought of.213 
The sovereignty of the people had indeed become a pervasive principle in America by the time 
the constitution was written. Noah Webster wrote in his “An examination into the leading 
principles of the federal constitution” (1787), that, “the source of power is in the people of this 
country, and cannot for ages, and probably never will be, removed.” However, Webster also 
asked rhetorically in the same text; “in what ... does real power consist?” and answered thus, 
“ the answer is short and plain – in property.”214 The two principles to which Madison and 
Webster refer show that the sovereignty of the people was based on the sovereignty of every 
individual, and that the sovereignty of the individual was based on his or her right to (landed) 
property. There was no contradiction between Webster’s two assertions (power in the people, 
and real power in property); and the “new set of ideas” that Mason felt had “crept in” were not 
that new. Popular sovereignty was constituted by consenting propertied individuals – it was 
derived from the freedom and powers that the colonists, as we saw, attributed to ownership of 
property. Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist no. 81, “it is inherent in the nature of 
sovereignty, not to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.”215 But, said 
George Washington, “to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide 
for the interest and safety of all”216 it was essential that “individuals entering into society, must 
give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.” Hamilton and Washington were talking of 
consolidating a federal union here, but in doing so they demonstrates the general principle of 
American nationalism. John Jay (1745-1829) also pointed to this. Jay was born to a wealthy 
merchant family in New York, and became a legal practitioner in 1768. In 1774 he was elected 
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as a member of the First Continental Congress. He was not a member of the Federal 
Convention, but became a strong advocate of the federal constitution, co-writing the Federalist 
Papers with James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.217 In Federalist no 2, he wrote about 
government:  
Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of government; and it is 
equally undeniable, that whenever and however it is instituted, the people must cede 
to it some of their natural rights, in order to vest it with requisite powers.218  
This was an argument for the centralization of powers in the federal government from the 
states. But the principle is the same: the interest that the individual has in property (his or hers 
freedom) becomes transferred to society as a whole. The thoughts of Gouverneur Morris 
(1752-1816) of Pennsylvania, a delegate to the Federal Convention, is telling of this on an 
individual level. As the Convention records state, Morris reflected on representation to the 
federal government and:   
He thought property ought to be taken into the estimate as well as the number of 
inhabitants. Life and liberty were generally said to be of more value, than property. 
An accurate view of the matter would nevertheless prove that property was the main 
object of Society. The savage State was more favorable to liberty than the Civilized; 
and sufficiently so to life. It was preferred by all men who had not acquired a taste for 
property; it was only renounced for the sake of property which could only be secured 
by the restraints of regular Government.219  
There was created a propertied community as individuals alienated some of their liberty (based 
on their ownership of land) in order to maintain their right to property. Thomas Paine seems 
to have agreed with Morris. He explained in Common Sense that: “Society in every state is a 
blessing, but government, even in its best state is but a necessary evil.” However, to protect 
his property, man: 
Finds it necessary to surrender up a part of his property to furnish means for the 
protection of the rest; and this he is induced to do by the same prudence which in every 
other case advises him, out of two evils to choose the least. Wherefore, security being 
the true design and end of government, it unanswerably follows that whatever form 
thereof appears most likely to ensure it to us, with the least expence and greatest 
benefit, is preferable to all others.220 
Government was supposed to be instituted to protect the rights of property for all, and based 
on the right to property of all. In Agrarian Justice, Paine said that private property was the 
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product of civilization, but that in reality all men had the earth in common, and thus all men 
had a property right to it. Private property was therefore in one sense unjust. One could not, 
however, abolish private property – that would be unjust to the present owners –, but with a 
government of the people, one could make it just, and secure some property for all.221 
Federalist Alexander Hamilton was also clear on the point in deciding to enter into 
government: it was “the additional security which its adoption will afford to republican 
government, to liberty, and to property.”222 Or, as Webster put it:  
an equality of property, with necessity of alienation, constantly operating to destroy 
combinations of powerful families, is the very soul of a republic –  while this continues, 
the people will inevitably possess both power and freedom.223  
 
d) The rule of law 
The way in which the people protected property was through legislative power – the rule of 
law. As we saw, Thomas Paine already in 1776 stated this as fundamental to “independency.” 
Jefferson agreed, and wrote in a letter to a friend nearly forty years after the revolution: 
Everyone, by his property, or his satisfactory situation, is interested in the support of 
law and order. And such men may safely and advantageously reserve to themselves a 
wholesome control over their public affairs.224 
And again we can see how the rule of law, or popular sovereignty, is dependent on widespread 
ownership of land. “Here” [in America] said Jefferson, “Everyone may have land and labor 
for himself.”225 This was a new form of government, very different form the “aristocratic” type 
found before (“A government adopted to such men would be one thing; but a very different 
one that for the men of these states”226). It was because property was widespread in America 
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that the people could be sovereign, assume power of government, as lawmakers. Similar to 
Jefferson, smallholding farmer William Manning wrote that it was “asserted by the many that 
government is founded on property,” and that the protection of this right was “the sole end of 
government.”227 To achieve such a government, one had:  
To be governed by known laws in which the whole nation had a voice in making by 
full and fair representation, and in which all the officers in every department are (or 
ought to be) servants and not masters.228   
Manning was born in rural Massachusetts in 1747 and stayed there as a farmer all his life. In 
1775 he participated in some of the first acts of violence during the American Revolution, 
which he later saw as an important moment in his political awakening. “I saw almost the first 
blood that was shed,” Manning reflected, “and scores of men dead, dying and wounded in the 
cause of Liberty.”229 This, he claimed, awoke his political interest. During the 1790s he 
became a member of the Democratic-Republican party, and he drafted political pamphlets. 
None of his writings were published during his lifetime however, and only in 1922 was his 
main work, Key of Liberty, published.230 That Manning the small holder, and Jefferson the 
slave holding plantation owner held similar ideas about property and sovereignty might once 
again accentuate the common national vision in this time period – to be found also amongst 
the Federalists. We might end this topic by once more going back to Federalist Noah Webster’s 
text quoted at the beginning of this section. Webster wrote that it was the majority of the people 
that were to make laws in a free society. Through a strong executive based on widespread 
ownership of land, one was to ensure a society “where laws govern, and not men … The laws 
are the sole guardians of right …”231 When power was based on widespread ownership of land 
as Webster had asserted, then one had popular sovereignty, the rule of law.  
 
Conclusion  
Webster’s reference to law points to the fact that rule of law, made by the people, was an 
essential feature about American nationalism and its relation to property. If a wide class of 
propertied men made the laws to which they themselves were bound, then property was secure. 
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This was national, popular sovereignty.  It is this that constitutes the connection between the 
sovereignty of the people and the power of property. The ideas found here were informed by 
the peculiar American property structure, where ownership of land was relatively widespread. 
This provided the foundation to construct a narrative of American land rights and freedoms, 
which was also influenced by a tradition of English or British rights. When the British 
Parliament started interfering on the property rights of American colonists, then British rights 
were asserted as American rights, based on the property relations of the colonies. It was 
through this that the conceptual amalgamation between property, sovereignty and people was 
made and became the core of American nationalism and which is why we may call the 
American nation a Propertied community. Since the amalgamation of people, property and 
sovereignty was bound together by law, it became a central issue of who specifically should 
be vested with legislative power. The answer to this question was contested, and changed over 
time. This was interwoven with different ways of understanding the right to property, and as 
the nineteenth century progressed this came to affect also the issue of slavery and the idea of 








Chapter 5: American nationality fulfilled; or the second 
coming of nationalism – expanding the propertied 
community   
Outline of the argument  
This chapter explores and explains more deeply the logic of the national ideology as it was 
after a nation-state had been created. I look at various ways in which the property rights of the 
individual were fulfilled as the nation went from agrarian to industrial. I apply the term the 
first form of the nation and the second form of the nation, which will be discussed in turn.  
The discussion of the first form of the nation somewhat overlaps with the timeframe of the 
previous chapter (i.e. the constitutional convention and the federalist debates), but the 
discussion stretches until Jefferson’s first presidency. The main topic of this section is the 
ideology of national propertied democracy, and it shows how the amalgamation of property, 
people and sovereignty was constituted in a way where sovereignty of the people and property 
were seen to be secure through a propertied democracy based on landed or real property. The 
evidence that I invoke is derived mostly from Thomas Jefferson. I also invoke Alexander 
Hamilton to show how the idea of property was flexible from the outset, and I invoke the 
disagreement between Hamilton and Jefferson about the nature of the national sovereignty. 
By doing this I point to the origins of the second form of the nation (and its creation through 
the civil war) as already present in the first years of the nation’s existence.   
When moving to discuss the second form of the nation, some contextual background of social 
and economic development of the first half of the nineteenth century will first be given. This 
is because the second form of the nation is inseparable from these changes, which brought 
forth a more industrialized and market-based society. This section explicates how the 
amalgamation of property, people and sovereignty became constituted in a way where the 
right to property became more abstract and separated from real property. This will be 
connected to the strengthening of national sovereignty and the idea of property as a right to 
the fruits of one’s labour, and explored primarily through the abolition of slavery.   
This section will introduce William Seward’s “irrepressible conflict” speech in order to set the 
scene for the conflict about slavery. I then look at the pro-slavery ideology in the antebellum 
and civil war eras, and the Republican ideology as it were by the early 1860s with focus on 
the notion of property. I focus primarily on the Republican ideology because this came to be 
the most popular and forceful expression of the nation in its second form, and it was 
95 
 
republicanism that came to reiterate and create a successful continuum into the 1860s of the 
original national idea. The south, of course, also claimed to do this, as did abolitionists. But, 
as it were, it was the Republicans who succeeded. My main primary sources to the Republican 
ideology are Abraham Lincoln and William Seward. For the slavery ideology I have invoked 
the president of the Confederacy, Jefferson Davis, and slavery ideologues such as Georg 
Fitzhugh, John C. Calhoun and James H. Hammond. 
 
Slavery and the first form of the nation 
a) The problem of slavery in the age of revolution  
“In summary … slavery has always embodied a fundamental contradiction arising from the 
ultimately impossible attempt to define and treat men as objects.”232 Thus did David Brion 
Davis sum up the core of the problem of slavery in the age of revolution. Americans were 
always aware of this. Samuel Johnson asked in 1775: “How is it that we hear the loudest yelps 
for liberty amongst the drivers of negros?”233 Many agreed with Johnson, seeing an obvious 
contradiction between slavery and the universal rights of liberty proclaimed in the Declaration 
of Independence a year later. One American proclaimed in 1794: 
If anything can sound as a solecism in the ears of all mankind, it will be this story – 
That in the United States of America, societies are formed for the promotion of 
freedom. Will not the inquiry instantly be made “ are the United States of America 
not free? Possessed of the best country, the wisest government, and the most vitreous 
inhabitants, on the best face of the earth; are they still enslaved?” No – America is not 
enslaved; she is free … but this replay must be mixed with one base ingredient. The 
slavery of Negros is still suffered to exist.”234   
However, as Benjamin Franklin wrote, “slavery is such an atrocious debasement of human 
nature, that its very expiration, if not performed with solicitous care, may sometimes open a 
source of serious evils.”235 Slavery did indeed pose a problem for the founders and subsequent 
generations; a problem about how to treat “men as objects.”  
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The status of the slave remained ambiguous all the way up until the civil war. But the very 
national revolutionary ideology of liberty helped sustain and reinforce the idea of the slave as 
fundamentally an object – as property. I quote at some length from Winthrop D. Jordan’s 
classic study of American attitudes towards slavery. He writes about the revolutionary 
ideology:  
Even in full force the revolutionary ideology was of limited benefit to the American 
Negro. For one thing, ideas about freedom and equal rights were intimately linked 
with the concept of private material property. As Locke had said, men possessed a 
“property” in both themselves and their possessions … American revolutionaries saw 
no reason to readjust this view of private property as a basic natural right; more 
important, they rarely thought of the right of private property as distinct from, much 
less antagonistic to, other natural liberties. Arbitrary deprive a man of his possessions, 
and you have a slave. It was no indication of hypocrisy that Americans cried “liberty” 
when parliament proposed measures of taxation. The issue of private property was 
central to the revolutionary agitation, and for the colonists this issue was not financial 
or economic. It was in keeping with the character of the revolution that some of its 
earliest martyrs were delinquent taxpayers. It was equally characteristic that one of the 
most common antislavery arguments was that enslaved Negros were being wrongly 
deprived of the fruits of their labor. The absence of any clear distinction between what 
are now called “human” and “property” rights formed a massive roadblock across the 
route to abolition of slavery. It was obvious that compulsory manumission would 
violate the right of masters to their own property. Insofar as slaves were property, their 
masters possessed an inherent right to dispose of them as they wished. A revolution 
carried forward in the name of this right was a in this sense a serious and enduring 
impediment to compulsory abolition.236     
In this way, slavery and slave labour came to be seen by many as fundamental for the 
preservation of freedom. Indeed, in the first form of the nation, slave labour was compatible 
with the fundamental ideas of property and freedom. 
 
b) The continuum of slavery and freedom; the slave as property under the constitution   
Slavery as freedom may appear as a contradiction: not necessarily so. Francois Furstenberg 
has suggested seeing the positions of slavery and freedom conceptually on a continuum as 
being interconnected: “freedom and slavery stood, not in dialectical contradiction to, but in 
tension with, each other.”237 As we saw in the previous chapter, when the colonists declared 
themselves free from what they saw as the tyranny of the British in 1776, it was as subjects or 
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slaves of tyranny claiming to be free. It was a political act of asserting rights and acquiring the 
means to be free. As we saw, property was essential to this; not to have the right to property 
was to be a slave. Property must thus be essential to understanding the continuum of slavery 
and freedom, because it was the medium making men free. What matters here is that although 
the colonists saw themselves as slaves of despotism under British rule, they never saw 
themselves as property as such; they were potential free men. Slaves, however, were 
understood by many on the continuum of slavery and freedom as real property – as the medium 
making a man free. 
 
Slaves had, since before the revolution, been seen primarily as property, not as persons or free 
individuals.  During the Continental Congress debates about taxation, Thomas Lynch (born 
1749) from South Carolina said (in a statement that might be seen to foreshadow the civil war) 
that if slaves were not to be seen as a man’s real property, then there could very well be “an 
end to the confederation … our slaves being our property why should they be taxed more than 
the land, sheep, cattle, horses, etc?” 238 It was clear that slaves were fundamentally seen as 
property, at least by the proponents of slavery: slaves, said William Paterson (born 1745) of 
New Jersey, were actually understood by the slave holders “in no light but as property. They 
are not free agents, have no personal liberty, no faculty of acquiring property, and like other 
property, entirely at the will of the Master.”239 It was also recognized by many that the federal 
constitution represented a protection of slave property. As George Tucker, attorney and 
politician, put it in 1806, the constitution was framed with “a cautious eye” to the subject of 
slavery “and was meant to embrace the case of free citizens, or aliens only, and not by a side 
wind to overturn the right of property.”240 Scholars in modern times have made the same 
observation. Pascal Larkin wrote in 1930:  
 
The constitution not only assumed that property in human beings is lawful, but it 
helped to convert the presumption that property is the reward of industry into a 
prejudice against state inference with property, however acquired.”241  
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Or in the words of a more recent scholar:  
Surely, the author of the fifth amendment, James Madison, of Virginia, who himself 
owned many slaves, did not intent to deprive southerners of their slaves through this 
clause …  if slaves were ‘property’ then masters could not ‘be deprived of their 
property’ without due process …  From the perspective of 1789, the only possible 
interpretation of the three fifth amendment was to assume that slaves were property.242 
The three-fifth clause referred to in the quote was a clause that stated slaves were to count for 
three-fifths of a person when it came to representation in the House of Representatives, in 
which the states were represented by population size. This clause thus gave proportionally 
more power to the slave-owning class.243 Hence, indirectly, the constitution helped maintain 
the position of the slave on the continuum of slavery and freedom as the medium making men 
free. This was representative of the predominant property assumptions of the first form of the 
nation, and politically it took the form of a propertied democracy.  
 
The first form of the nation: A nation of freeholders 
a) Jefferson’s nation of small farmers  
The first form of the American nation became a propertied democracy, that is to say, it was a 
democracy where enfranchisement was confined primarily to those owning a certain amount 
of landed or real property, and where the right to property was secured through the rule of law 
made by these people. This had its origin already in the colonial era when a forty pound 
freehold was the most widely used property qualification for participation in local government. 
This was connected to taxation and could in some states be fulfilled by owning personal 
property. As paper money became increasingly more common around and after the revolution, 
acres of land (100) became a common deciding factor.244 At the time the national constitution 
was written, the property qualifications made 90% of adult white males eligible to vote in New 
Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, North and South Carolina, New Hampshire, and most towns in 
                                                     
 
242 Finkelman, 2012: p. 120 
243 For one discussion on this see, Wills, Gary, “Negro President”: Jefferson and the slave Power, 
Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston and New York, (2003), especially p 1-15 and 50-62. 
244 Collier, Christopher, “The American people as Christian White Men of property: Suffrage and 
Elections in Early national America”, in Rogers, Donald W, Voting and the spirit of American 
democracy; essays on the history of voting and voting rights in America, University of Illinois Press, 
Urbana and Chicago ( 1992), p. 23. 
99 
 
Massachusetts. In Virginia, 70-90%, Maryland 70% and New York 60%.245 This can again 
serve to point out the propertied preconditions for popular sovereignty.  
 
Thomas Jefferson is the person par excellence that exemplifies the idea of a nation of free 
farmers, and a national sovereignty seen to be derived from the landed property of its members. 
Indeed Jefferson took the idea of rule by men of landed property so seriously, and saw it as so 
fundamental to a healthy republic, that he even suggested once to give the amount of land 
required for individual independence to all those in Virginia not possessing it.246 Jefferson 
believed that: 
We have an immensity of land courting the industry of the husbandman. Is it best then 
that all our citizens should be employed in its improvement, or that one half should be 
called off from that to exercise manufactures and handicraft arts for the other? Those 
who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God, if ever he had a chosen people, 
whose breasts he has made his peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue. It 
is the focus in which he keeps alive that sacred fire, which otherwise might escape 
from the face of the earth.”247  
To maintain the “sacred fire” of freedom, America was to be a governed by “those who labour 
in the earth” because: 
The mobs of great cities add just so much to the support of pure government, as sores 
do to the strength of the human body. It is the manners and spirit of a people which 
preserve a republic in vigour. A degeneracy in these is a cancer which soon eats to the 
heart of its laws and constitution.248 
When Jefferson became president, his “empire of liberty” was to be one ruled by propertied 
men, and it was one that would persist and expand into the future. Jefferson first used the term 
“empire of liberty” during the Revolutionary War in a letter to one of the generals, talking 
about expansion of the confederacy. Here Jefferson envisioned the future “empire of liberty” 
an “extensive and fertile country.”249 This expansion of the US into fertile land was integrated 
into Jefferson’s political vision.  
 
                                                     
 
245 Collier, in Rogers, 1992: p. 26. 
246 Wood, Gordon1993: p 179. 
247 Jefferson, Thomas, Notes on the State of Virginia, Harper and Row publishers, New York, 
(1964)[1785], p. 157. 
248 Jefferson, 1964: p. 158. 
249 Thomas Jefferson to George Rogers Clark, December 25th, 1780, in Boyd, Julian (ed), The papers 
of Thomas Jefferson: volume 4, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, (1951), p. 237. 
100 
 
One important principle of Jefferson´s political vision was “the encouragement of agriculture, 
and of commerce as its handmaid.”250 Agriculture was central to a free republic; commerce 
and manufacture were only to be the “handmaid” of agriculture. With the Louisiana Purchase 
in 1803, Jefferson acquired a territory in which to realize this vision of an agrarian, “extensive 
and fertile empire of liberty.” Louisiana, he said, was “an ample provision for our posterity, 
and a wide-spread field for the blessings of freedom and equal laws.”251 With this territory, his 
vision from Notes of the State of Virginia could be realized:  
Let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work bench, or twirling a distaff. 
Carpenters masons, smiths, are wanting in husbandry; but, for the general operations 
of manufacture, let our workshops remain in Europe.252 
Since landed property was the kind of property that conferred freedom and virtue on 
individuals in Jefferson’s vision, wage laborers could not be properly free or vitreous.  
American liberty was therefore best secured by men of landed property. Jefferson elaborated 
on this paragraph from Notes in a letter that he wrote during his presidency, explaining that 
the situation in America, at the present, was unique and especially favorable to good 
government: 
I had under my eye when writing [Notes], the manufactures of the great cities in the 
old countries, at the present time, with whom the want of food and clothing necessary 
to sustain life, has begotten a depravity of morals, a dependence and corruption, which 
renders them an undesirable accession to a country whose morals are sound. My 
expressions look forward to the time when our own great cities would get into the 
same state. But they have been quoted as if meant for the present time here. As yet 
our manufactures are as much at their ease, as independent and moral as our 
agricultural habits, and they will continue so as long as there are vacant lands for them 
to resort to; because whenever it shall be attempted by the other classes to reduce them 
to the minimum of subsistence, they will quit their trades and go to laboring the 
earth.253 
We see here the consistency of Jefferson’s vision from the 1780s to the early 1800s; the belief 
in America as unique and inherit with the possibility of freedom and independence due to its 
property relations – that Americans always had the possibility to “quit their trades and go to 
laboring in the earth.” 
 
                                                     
 
250 Thomas Jefferson, March 4th, 1801, in Oberg, Barbara, B (ed), The papers of Thomas Jefferson: 
volume 33, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, (2006), p. 151. 
251 Thomas Jefferson, October 17th, 1803, in Oberg, Barbara, B (ed), The papers of Thomas Jefferson: 
volume 41, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, (2014), p. 535. 
252 Jefferson, 1964: p. 157.  
253 Thomas Jefferson, January, 4th, 1805, in Leicester Ford, 1904-5: p 87, Vol. 4. 
101 
 
b) Locke and labour in America  
Jefferson’s contemporary Crevecoeur is another famous proclaimer of the uniqueness of 
America and the importance of smallholding farms. He proclaimed in his famous Letters from 
an American Farmer, written towards the end of the Revolutionary War, that,” We have no 
princes, for whom we toil, starve and bleed: we are the most perfect society now existing in 
the world. Here man is free as he ought to be.”254 And the American was free because he had 
gone “from being the slave of some despotic prince, to become a free man, invested with 
lands.” Indeed, wrote Crevecoeur: The American is a new man … From involuntary idleness, 
servile dependence, penury, and useless labour, he has passed to toils of a very different nature, 
rewarded by ample subsistence.255 These are all strong assertions of the importance of landed 
property and again demonstrate the propertied basis for popular sovereignty, but as much as 
these passages point to the importance of landed property, there are also other important points 
to note. The words labour, dependence and slavery are frequently invoked. As we saw, 
Jefferson wrote about independence when he elaborated on his passage in Notes, that 
labourers, if reduced to “minimum subsistence,” could “quit their trades and go to laboring in 
the earth.” It is central that Jefferson here writes “labouring in the earth” and not own land. 
The same point we see with Crevecoeur when he wrote that the American, as opposed to the 
“slave of some despotic prince,” was “passed to toils” which rewarded him with “ ample 
subsistence.” This points us to one underlying assumption of property and freedom in the 
national ideology – a point that had been expressed by John Locke had in his Two Treatise on 
Government: 
Every man has a property in his own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. 
The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, is properly his. 
Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and had mixed 
his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his 
property.256 
Landed property had special significance in the American national ideology, but it was derived 
in part from the more general idea that “every man has property in his own person” and that 
putting labour in to the earth he “makes it his property.” Owning landed property was by many 
seen to be a particularly secure way of insuring the right that to ones labour. This had to do 
with the landed agrarian context in which American nationalism emerged, and the American 
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context of widespread individual landownership was important in cementing the idea of 
private exclusive ownership. But widespread ownership of land and the relative ease by which 
one could acquire property by investing one’s labour in unused land also contributed to 
understanding the right to property as based on investment labour. In the future, land came to 
lose its importance in favor of abstract wealth, which was secured to the individual by his 
labour. This was a transvaluation of property, or a shift from land to labour.  
 
c) A glimpse of the future; Hamilton’s vision  
One can find in Alexander Hamilton’s writings in the early national period an embryo of the 
future national form in which property in the form of capital/wealth came to be equated with 
the worth of landed property as a means to create independence. Hamilton was born in the 
British West Indies in 1757. He was well read and, as a teenager in the early 1770s, he 
published an essay in a local paper which was so well received that money was gathered from 
the community to send him to school in New Jersey. When the Revolutionary War started he 
became involved in action, and promoted to lieutenant. Just before the end of the war, he 
married to wealth and land in New York, and when the Constitutional Convention gathered, 
Hamilton served as a delegate from New York County. After the convention he became one 
of the strongest advocates for the new constitution. In this regard, he participated in writing 
The Federalist Papers (1788). Under Washington’s presidency, Hamilton became Secretary 
of the Treasury, and at this time he wrote “Report on manufactures” (1791), another document 
which displays his contribution to the national ideology.257 In the report, Hamilton asserts the 
equal worth of wealth or capital to landed property: “it seems to be overlooked,” Hamilton 
wrote, that:  
Land is itself a stock or capital, advanced or lent by its owner to the occupier or tenant, 
and that the rent he receives is only the ordinary profit of a certain stock in land, not 
managed by the proprietor himself, but by another to whom he lends or lets it, and 
who, on his part, advances a second capital to stock and improve the land, upon which 
he also receives the usual profit. The rent of the landlord and the profit of the farmer 
are, therefore, nothing more than the ordinary profits of two capitals belonging to two 
different persons, and united in the cultivation of a farm.258 
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The important thing about landed property was not that it was landed or real as such, but that 
it was essentially “a stock of capital”: 
Both together make the ordinary profits of two capitals employed in a manufactory: 
as in the other case the rent of the landlord and the revenue of the farmer compose the 
ordinary profits of two capitals employed in the cultivation of a farm.259 
To Hamilton, the “preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds of 
industry and property” was not meaningful.  It was through different appliances of an 
individual’s skills or labour in the accumulation of capital that individual freedom was 
realized:  
It is a just observation that minds of the strongest and most active powers for their 
proper objects fall below mediocrity, and labor without effect if confined to 
uncongenial pursuits. And it is thence to be inferred that the results of human exertion 
may be immensely increased by diversifying its objects. When all the different kinds 
of industry obtained in a community, each individual can find his proper element, and 
can call into activity the whole vigor of his nature.260  
For Hamilton, this was integrated into a general vision of government and sovereignty. If 
labour and commerce were to prosper, according to Hamilton, a strong federal government 
was needed:  
If we are in earnest about giving the union energy and duration, we must abandon the 
vain project of legislating upon the states in their collective capacities; we must extend 
the laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America.261 
It was important to Hamilton’s vision of national freedom that the federal government had 
complete power over certain things: 
The government of the union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all 
regulations which have relation to them … to commerce, and to every other matter to 
which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend.262  
The Hamiltonian vision was very much contested in the early national period. A quick visit to 
Jefferson can serve as a reminder of this. It can also indicate the general conflict line about the 
nature of federal sovereignty and of private property which was present from the beginning, 
and which became central for the formation of the second form of the nation.  
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d) Jefferson’s dinner party  
Although the Americans had adopted a national constitution, the nature of its sovereignty was 
very much federative, and the federal government was not in important matters “extended to 
the individual citizens of America” as Hamilton wished. And many shunned every attempt to 
make the national government stronger. This divide was in many ways a continuity from the 
Federalist/Anti-federalist debates around the constitution.263 But this time, the sides were 
divided in the Democratic-Republican Party on the one side, and the Federalist Party on the 
other. We could also call the former group Jeffersonian, as they were advocates of relatively 
more power to the states, less interested in commerce and industry, and in general propagated 
an agrarian model of society. The Federalists in many ways can be associated with 
Hameltonianism, a vision that propagated a strong federal government, and which encouraged 
commerce and industry.264 The central difference between these two groups when it came to 
national sovereignty might be summed up by an anecdote that Jefferson refers to in the so-
called Anas (an autobiographical work by Jefferson covering the time period from 1791-1806). 
Here, Jefferson explains the difference between himself (Republican-Democrat) and 
Alexander Hamilton (Federalist). The “real ground of the opposition,” wrote Jefferson, was 
whether to “restrain the administration to republican principles” or to allow “the constitution 
to be constructed into a monarchy, and to be warped into all the principles and pollutions of 
… the English model.” Hamilton, as Jefferson saw it, was undoubtedly an advocate for the 
latter position, while he himself was a protector of true republican principles. To give weight 
to this, Jefferson referred to a dinner party that he hosted, and where Hamilton was one of the 
guests. At this party, Hamilton revealed, according to Jefferson, that he was: 
Not only a monarchist, but for a monarchy bottomed on corruption. In proof of this I 
will relate an anecdote, for the truth of which I attest the God who made me. Before 
the President set out on his Southern tour in April 1791. he addressed a letter of the 
4th. of that month, from Mt. Vernon to the Secretaries of State, Treasury & War, 
desiring that, if any serious and important cases should arise during his absence, they 
would consult & act on them, and he requested that the Vice-president should also be 
consulted. This was the only occasion on which that officer was ever requested to take 
part in a cabinet question. Some occasion for consultation arising, I invited those 
gentlemen (and the Attorney genl. as well as I remember) to dine with me in order to 
confer on the subject. After the cloth was removed, and our question agreed & 
dismissed, conversation began on other matters and, by some circumstance, was led 
to the British constitution, on which Mr. Adams observed “purge that constitution of 
it’s corruption, and give to it’s popular branch equality of representation, and it would 
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be the most perfect constitution ever devised by the wit of man.” Hamilton paused 
and said, “purge it of it’s corruption, and give to it’s popular branch equality of 
representation, & it would become an impracticable government: as it stands at 
present, with all it’s supposed defects, it is the most perfect government which ever 
existed.” And this was assuredly the exact line which separated the political creeds of 
these two gentlemen. The one was for two hereditary branches and an honest elective 
one: the other for a hereditary king with a house of lords & commons, corrupted to his 
will, and standing between him and the people. Hamilton was indeed a singular 
character. Of acute understanding, disinterested, honest, and honorable in all private 
transactions, amiable in society, and duly valuing virtue in private life, yet so 
bewitched & perverted by the British example, as to be under thoro’ conviction that 
corruption was essential to the government of a nation.265 
Hamilton’s political views were complex, and it would be wrong to classify him as a 
Monarchist.266 But to Jefferson, Hamilton’s ideas of federal government represented 
monarchism and corruption from which the colonies had won independence less than a decade 
earlier; it represented arbitrary government that could and would interfere on the property of 
Americans, and which endangered the sovereignty of the people by encouraging commerce 
instead of securing landed property. 
 
During the course of the nineteenth century, the issue of federal sovereignty versus state 
sovereignty came to form a decisive antagonism between two possible forms of nation 
formation based on the right to property.  It were the Hamiltonian ideas (not in the exact same 
form of course) that were victorious, and which formed the nation in a new way with the 
conclusion of the American civil war. The new understanding of nationality accepted the fact 
that there would always be a difference in wealth, and abandoned the Jeffersonian notion that 
only “those who labour in the earth are the chosen people of God.” Yet, it stuck with the 
universalism of the Jeffersonian persuasion. There was, however, a decisive difference in the 
new universalism. While the Jeffersonian kind hoped for an expanding propertied democracy 
of small farmers, and saw wage labour as a danger to this, the new universalism was achieved 
precisely through wage labour – it was a transvaluation of property, a shift from land to labour. 
And contrary to the Jeffersonian vision, this new universalism became inseparable from a 
strong national sovereignty. The conflict between the antagonistic visions of sovereignty and 
property became manifest as one over slavery - in the first instance, due to the primary and 
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underlying propertied imperative of American nationalism; and in the second instance, due to 
the nature of American sovereignty as federative sovereignty. But the most fundamental and 
underlying factors were changes in the economic system of America during the nineteenth 
century, going from an agrarian to an industrial economy.  
 
The second form of the nation 
a) “Irrepressible conflict” 
By 1861, changes in the American economic structure led to what William Henry Seward (an 
anti-slavery Republican) in 1858 called “an irrepressible conflict between opposing and 
enduring forces”267 – to the civil war. The cause of the conflict, said Seward, was the existence 
of two different “systems” in America. They were “two radically different political systems—
the one resting on the basis of servile or slave labor, the other on the basis of voluntary labor 
of freemen.”268 The essence of the conflict was about the nature of national property rights, 
about different ways of understanding labour: free labour and slave labour. It could be seen as 
a class conflict between a slave-owning class (a slavocracy) on the one side and an alliance of 
bourgeoisie/petty bourgeoisie interests and small farmers on the other, as, for example, Charles 
Beard and Barrington Moore have suggested.269 Seward also sensed this. Seward was born in 
1801 to a prosperous farmer in Florida, New York. He became involved in politics as a Whig 
during the 1830s, and during the 1840s and 1850s came to mark himself as a strong anti-
slavery agitator. Seward was close to becoming the Republican candidate for president, but 
was considered too radical. However, when Lincoln was elected president, he did become 
Secretary of State.270 To Seward, slavery was a perversion of the national ideas of property 
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and freedom, it was “intolerable, unjust, and inhuman toward the laborer” and the whole 
principle of this kind of labour was wrong: 
The laborers who are enslaved are all negroes, or persons more or less purely of 
African derivation. But this is only accidental. The principle of the system is that labor 
in every society, by whomsoever performed, is necessarily unintellectual, groveling, 
and base; and that the laborer, equally for his own good and for the welfare of the 
State, ought to be enslaved. The white laboring man, whether native or foreigner, is 
not enslaved only because he can not as yet be reduced to bondage.271 
The system of slave labour did not honor labour as a good thing in itself. The free labour 
system, on the other hand, wrote Seward, “conforms to the divine law of equality which is 
written in the hearts and consciences of men, and therefore is always and everywhere 
beneficent.”272 This last assertion became the ruling idea, as it were, of American nationalism 
in its second form. The free labour system represents the transvaluation of property and it was 
incompatible with chattel slavery. This happened because the mode of production changed 
from being an agrarian economy to becoming increasingly industrialized and market-oriented.  
 
b) The new sociological frame and expression of nationalism: republicanism, slavery 
and abolitionism     
While America remained largely rural until the mid-nineteenth century, the country also 
experienced the fastest growing urbanization in its history over this period, and simultaneously 
more and more spheres of life became interwoven in a market economy. In 1800, 70% of 
people in the north had been agricultural labourers, many of them on farms that were only 
partly immersed in market relations; by 1860, the number of agricultural labourers had fallen 
to 40%. Urban dwellers had risen from 6% in 1810 to 21% in 1860, while the percentage of 
people engaged in non-agricultural labour rose from 21% to 45% in the same period.  But in 
the south, the number of agricultural labourers remained at 80%, and only one out of 10 people 
lived in urban areas. The new nation also grew enormously in the period from 1800 to 1860; 
population doubled and doubled again, the geographical size swelled and the economy 
boomed. In 1860 over 30 million people lived in the US. Growing wealth was not, however, 
equally distributed amongst this growing population. Four million people were slaves and had 
no, or at best very little, wealth, and the top 5% of free adult males owned over 50% of the 
wealth, while the bottom half of the population owned only 1%. The slave-driven southern 
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agrarian export constituted three-fifths of American exports, and cotton from this region made 
up three-fourths of the world supply of that commodity. The bulk of this was produced by 
slaves.273 However, it was the new form of mechanized production that sprawled across 
northern cities that came to be the dominant economic form by 1860.  
 
Already by the 1830s industry and manufacturing had changed the social structure 
considerably: wage labour was more common, and thus an increasing amount of people found 
themselves without the property needed for enfranchisement. Accordingly, by 1830 a 
nationwide movement for universal male suffrage had arisen, and indeed in the 1830s 
universal male suffrage had been introduced in many states. There happened democratic 
reforms in four waves:   
1) 1801- to the War of 1812. Reductions in property qualifications in Maryland, South 
Carolina and New Jersey. Defeat of similar efforts in Massachusetts, Rode Island, 
Connecticut and New York.  
2) 1815-1828. Reforms in Connecticut, Massachusetts and New York. Only Rode Island, 
Louisiana, Virginia maintained powerful property barriers. 
3) 1830-1840. Beginning with the Virginia convention in 1829, Mississippi, North 
Carolina, and Georgia expanded the suffrage. 
4) The Dorr War in Rode Island (1841-1842). This attempt at suffrage expansion failed 
initially, but in its aftermath property qualifications for enfranchisement were 
abandoned. 274 
However, suffrage was not a main issue in national politics, but it can be seen as a symptom 
of the transvaluation of property, or the shift from land to labour, that happened. The existence 
of chattel slavery created the conflict that most drastically changed the nation on the basis of 
the new (transvalued) understanding of property. We might say that both expanded franchise 
and the conflict over slavery were results of what Charles Sellers has called “The Market 
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Revolution” – the expansion of capitalist market relations,275but it was abolitionism that 
consolidated the new transvalued understanding of property.276 In one form, abolitionism was 
very much religiously based, and emerged partly out of what has been called the Second Great 
Awakening that happened during the 1830s.277 It was held that every man was equal under 
God, and that not even the constitution could justify slavery. Despite these religious 
foundations, I argue that the most important underlying idea was the transvaluation of 
property,278 and as pointed to above, that the conflict was essentially a class conflict brought 
forth by changing economic relations.279 The Republican Party became the most clear 
expression of the new class interests and the transvaluation of property, the shift from land to 
labour.  
 
It is Republicanism, as it emerged in the late 1850s, that represents the national ideology in its 
newborn second form. And the social basis of the Republicans was precisely the new middle 
class of wage earners. One contemporary asked rhetorically who supported the Republicans, 
and answered himself: 
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Precisely those who would most naturally be expected to – the great middling class – 
The highest class, aristocratically associated and affiliated, timid, afraid of change, 
and holding in their hands the sensitive cords of commerce, and the lowest class, 
ignorant, derived with name, fed by the rich man’s money, and lead by the rich mans 
finger,  - these are the forces arrayed against Republicanism, as a whole … those who 
work with their own hands, who live and act independently, who hold the stakes of 
home and family, of farm and workshop, of education and freedom, as a mass, are 
enrolled in the republican ranks.280 
The Republican Party stood for a vision in which slavery became unacceptable, although 
abolition was not directly or officially propagated by Republicans in office until after the Civil 
War had commenced. But at the time of the Civil War, the abolition of slavery became seen, 
at least by Republican President Abraham Lincoln, as a direct continuation and fulfillment of 
what had been initiated at the revolution. Lincoln believed, he said, that the Declaration of 
Independence was “thought to include all” – something which was not, at the present, the case. 
On the contrary, held Lincoln, it was used to “aid in making bondage of the negro universal 
and eternal.”281 The assertion in the Declaration of Independence, held Lincoln, was placed 
there “for future use,” to be a “stumbling block to all those who in after times might seem to 
turn a free people back into the hateful paths of despotism.”282  
 
c) The issue of federal sovereignty and slavery  
It was no easy task to triumph through the vision that the Declaration of Independence was 
thought to include all, including African Americans, as members of the free labour system. 
The constitution, as we saw, had since the beginning protected the system of slave property in 
the states where it already existed. Here lay one source of the “irrepressible conflict” of which 
Seward spoke; it was the nature of American sovereignty. It was this that had allowed the 
development of two “radically different political systems.” Seward wrote: 
The two systems have existed in different States, but side by side within the American 
Union. This has happened because the Union is a confederation of States. But in 
another aspect the United States constitute only one nation. Increase of population, 
which is filling the States out to their very borders, together with a new and extended 
network of railroads and other avenues, and an internal commerce which daily 
becomes more intimate, is rapidly bringing the States into a higher and more perfect 
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social unity or consolidation. Thus these antagonistic systems are continually coming 
into closer contact and collision results.283  
In this passage, the conflict over slavery is connected to the federative nature of the American 
state; to the fact that the US was, de facto, a confederacy – a union consistent of sovereign 
states – and yet in another “aspect,” considered “only one nation.”  One central issue in the 
matter of slavery became if the national government had the right to impose its will on the 
states and new territories on the issue of slave property. Several compromises and decisions 
were made on this during the first half of the nineteenth century (e.g. the Missouri debates, 
1819-1820, the nullification crisis of 1832, the Compromise of 1850, and the Kansas-Nebraska 
Act, 1854),284 but with the Supreme Court’s Dread Scott decision of 1857 (decided by Chief 
Judge Roger B. Taney, 1777-1864, from Maryland), the issue flared up again in a fire that 
could not be stopped. The Dread Scott decision decided three important questions:  
1) Could prolonged residence in a free state or territory make runaway slave Dread Scott 
free?   
2) Did Scott, as a black slave, have the right as a citizen to sue in a federal court?  
3) Was the Missouri Compromise (a 1820 decision that had prohibited slavery in certain 
new territories, including where Scott had resided) valid?  
All the answers which were given to these questions in the Court’s decision reinforced slavery: 
the Dread Scott decision stated that Scott was still a slave, that he was not, as a black and a 
slave, an American citizen, and that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional, meaning 
that Congress had no authority to exclude slavery in new territories.285 Southerners celebrated 
this decision as once and for all making slavery a principle of American nationality. One 
southern newspaper exclaimed: “Southern opinion upon the subject of southern slavery … is 
now the supreme law of the land … Opposition to southern opinion upon this subject is now 
opposition to the constitution, and morally treason against the Government.”286 This was 
brought forth by southern men, by a peculiar slavery ideology that had developed in the south 
of the American nation and which adhered to the property assumptions of the first form of the 
nation.  
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d) The southern antebellum vision: chattel slavery as national freedom  
The southern antebellum opinion on the subject of slavery was derived from an ideology of 
labour and sovereignty that can, in one sense, be traced back to certain Jeffersonian notions of 
sovereignty and property. This is in no way to say that Jefferson was a proto antebellum slave 
apologist. Indeed, central antebellum proslavery men outright rejected fundamental ideas on 
which Jefferson built his vision. But Jefferson, as we saw, had asserted that real independence 
was created through tilling the earth. Following from this, Jefferson believed, as we saw, that 
those who labored at “the work bench” or in “manufacture” suffered from a “depravity of 
morals, a dependence and corruption, which renders them an undesirable accession to a 
country whose morals are sound.” Such men were unfree because they were at the will of the 
masters who paid them. This is not so different from how the slaves were seen in the 
antebellum southern slave ideology, as we shall see below. But while Jefferson thought that 
the factory workers could “quit their trades and go to laboring the earth,” the slaves in the 
antebellum pro-slavery ideology had no such option. 
 
In the slave ideology, it was a central assertion that both the slave and the wage labourer were 
unfree, and that only by slavery could free society exist. Slavery was thus reasserted and firmly 
placed on the continuum of slavery and freedom. Jefferson also pointed to this connection; he 
knew that the labour of the slave was part of the reason why himself could be independent.287 
He said that, “ [I will not] willingly sell my slaves as long as there remains any prospect of 
paying my debt with their labour.”288 It was this notion that the pro-slavery ideology carried 
to its extreme. In the south, as George S. Alexander put it, chattel slavery became “the 
exclusionary response to the task of realizing the political task of property.”289 Many pro-
slavery men of the antebellum era, for example the plantation owner and attorney James H. 
Hammond of South Carolina, claimed that every society, in order to subsist in freedom, was 
dependent on a class of labourers, and held that the best way to maintain a state of 
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independence was through chattel slavery; only thus could private property and liberty exist.290 
He wrote:  
The idea that slavery is so necessary to the performance of the drudgery so essential 
for the sustenance of man, and the advance of civilization is undoubtedly the 
fundamental ground on which the reason of the institution rets.291 
Hammond (born 1807) was a slave-owner planter and lawyer who, during his career, was 
governor of South Carolina and a United States Senator. By the outbreak of the Civil War, he 
was one of the wealthiest men in the south, owning more than 300 slaves.  Hammond was a 
Democrat and outspoken pro-slavery ideologist, and held a variety of speeches on the 
matter.292 Many other men of the south agreed with Hammond. Slave labour was by many 
seen to be the best way to secure liberty from the corruption and dependence that free wage 
labour created. Some pro-slavery men held that labour in factories and manufacturing was in 
fact binding men in a form of slavery worse than that of chattel slavery, and if chattel slavery 
was to be abandoned, then all of society would fall into a position of dependence.  
 
George Fitzhugh, a lawyer from Virginia, self-appointed sociologist and devoted slave 
apologist, wrote about forms of enslavement and proclaimed that, “capital commands labour 
as master does slave.”293 Was it not better, then, to have slavery institutionalized? At least, it 
was asserted, the slave had a master who was obliged to feed him and house him, which was 
more than one could say of the masters of the industrial factory slaves of the north. “Capital 
is a cruel master,” wrote Fitzhugh, and the free capitalist economy was nothing less than a 
“free slave trade, the commonest, yet the cruelest form of trades.”294 Fitzhugh was born 1806 
and became a distinct advocate of slavery who has often seen as representing the essential 
slavery ideology. Fitzhugh operated his own law business from his mansion in Port Royal, 
Virginia, during the antebellum and Civil War eras (he was also treasurer for the Confederacy 
during the Civil War). He was not politically active, but he wrote extensively on the issue of 
slavery, notably his books Sociology for the south, or, the failure of free society (1854), and 
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Cannibals all!, or slaves without masters (1857).295 This ideology, propagated by Fitzhugh 
and the members of the slave aristocracy, as Eugene Genovise put it, “located the primary 
social manifestations of evil precisely in the system of wage labour and celebrated slavery as 
an alternative to it.”296 Just as the revolutionaries of the 1770s saw nationality as the realization 
of human nature, so too did the pro-slavery ideology see slavery as natural, as crucial in 
fulfilling nationality. Fitzhugh wrote:  
Nature has made them slaves; all that law and government can do is modify, and 
mitigate their slavery. The wise and vitreous, the brave, the strong, in mind and body 
are by nature born to command and protect, and law but follows nature in making 
them rulers, legislators, judges, captains, husbands, guardians, comittees, and 
masters.297 
But this vision built in many ways on a completely different social vision from that of the 
north and the one of the founding fathers. Slave owner Alexander Stephens (1812-1883) from 
Georgia, who became Vice-President of the Confederacy, was another typical advocate of 
slavery. He became a member of the Georgia legislature, and in the 1850s a prominent member 
of the Democratic party. He played a pivotal role in the passing of the Kansas-Nebraska Act 
(1854), but retired from politics (only temporarily it proved, however) in 1858, believing that 
the issue of slavery was settled and safe. But the formation of the Confederacy in 1861 saw 
the return of Stephens to politics.298 In his infamous “Cornerstone speech” held that year, he 
elaborated on southern values and said that southern society was:  
Founded upon exactly the opposite idea [from the founders]; its foundation are laid, 
its corner stone rests upon that great truth, that the negro is not equal to the white man; 
that slavery – subordination to the superior race – is his natural and normal 
condition.299 
In the end, the antebellum vision became a downright rejection of many founding values, and 
this was openly admitted: as Stephens explained about the Confederate constitution:  
The new constitution has put at rest, forever, all the agitating questions relating to our 
peculiar institution African slavery as it exists amongst us the – the proper status of 
the negro in our form of civilization. This was the immediate cause of the late rupture 
and present revolution. Jefferson in his forecast, had anticipated this, as the “rock upon 
which the old Union would split.” He was right. What was conjecture with him, is 
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now a realized fact. But whether he fully comprehended the great truth upon which 
that rock stood and stands, may be doubted. The prevailing ideas entertained by him 
and most of the leading statesmen at the time of the formation of the old constitution, 
were that the enslavement of the African was in violation of the laws of nature; that it 
was wrong in principle, socially, morally, and politically. It was an evil they knew not 
well how to deal with, but the general opinion of the men of that day was that, 
somehow or other in the order of Providence, the institution would be evanescent and 
pass away. This idea, though not incorporated in the constitution, was the prevailing 
idea at that time. The constitution, it is true, secured every essential guarantee to the 
institution while it should last, and hence no argument can be justly urged against the 
constitutional guarantees thus secured, because of the common sentiment of the day. 
Those ideas, however, were fundamentally wrong. They rested upon the assumption 
of the equality of races. This was an error.300  
But as Stephens also explained, the rejection of some values of the founders did not mean that 
the Confederate constitution did not protect the true and original liberty:  
It amply secures all our ancient rights, franchises, and liberties. All the great principles 
of Magna Charta are retained in it. No citizen is deprived of life, liberty, or property, 
but by the judgment of his peers under the laws of the land.301 
And it was not the southern system that was against the law of nature as northerners and the 
founders had held; on the contrary, it was the southern system that was in correspondence with 
the laws of nature:  
Many governments have been founded upon the principle of the subordination and 
serfdom of certain classes of the same race; such were and are in violation of the laws 
of nature. Our system commits no such violation of nature’s laws. With us, all of the 
white race, however high or low, rich or poor, are equal in the eye of the law. Not so 
with the negro. Subordination is his place. He, by nature, or by the curse against 
Canaan, is fitted for that condition which he occupies in our system.302 
The pro-slavery ideology stuck to the idea that it was crucial to organize property relations in 
a way so that some did not have to alienate their labour, while others (namely African 
Americans) were bound, as it were, to do so, in order to create freedom for society as a whole. 
In the words of Virginia lawyer, and from 1843 until his death in 1844, Secretary of State, 
Abel P. Upshur,303 for a free society to exist, it was necessary that “one portion of mankind 
shall live upon the labours of another person.”304 We might also invoke Hammond again, in 
the introduction to his “Cotton is King” speech (1858):  
                                                     
 
300 Cleveland, 1866: p. 721. 
301 Cleveland, 1866: p. 718 
302 Cleveland, 1866: p. 722. 
303 Carnes, C Mark and John A Garrtaty, (eds) American National biography (Vol, 22), New York and 
Oxford, Oxford university Press, (1999), p116-117. 
304 Quoted in Shore, 1986: p. 29.  
116 
 
In all social systems there must be a class to do the menial duties, to perform the 
drudgery of life. That is, a class requiring but a low order of intellect and but little 
skill. Its requisites are vigor, docility, fidelity. Such a class you must have, or you 
would not have that other class which leads progress, civilization, and refinement. It 
constitutes the very mud-sill of society and of political government; and you might as 
well attempt to build a house in the air, as to build either the one or the other, except 
on this mud-sill. Fortunately for the South, she found a race adapted to that purpose 
to her hand. A race inferior to her own, but eminently qualified in temper, in vigor, in 
docility, in capacity to stand the climate, to answer all her purposes. We use them for 
our purpose, and call them slaves. We found them slaves by the common “consent of 
mankind”…305 
It was this vision that the south hoped was safe after the Dread Scott decision, not only within 
the American nation as it was, but also in lands yet to be American.306  
 
e) Transvaluation of property and the republican ideology: Free labour, or to own 
oneself 
“We are men with rights of men … but we are poor men; obliged to labour for our dally bread, 
dependent on those who choose to employ us”307 complained the working men of Charlestown 
in the early 1840s.  We might contrast this complaint against the sentiment of the northern 
version of The Battle Cry of Freedom written about two decades later, which asserted that 
“although he may be poor, not man shall be a slave.”308 The working men of Charlestown saw 
themselves as unfree wage slaves, poor and thus dependent. But in the Republican ideology, 
wage was freedom. It did not matter if one was poor; every man was free if he owned the fruits 
of his labour. One Republican said, “the great idea and basis of the republican party as I 
understand it, is free labour.” The Republicans were, as another Republican put it: “not only 
… the anti slavery party but emphatically … the party of free labour.”309   
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Abraham Lincoln became the towering leader of the Republican Party in the lead up to the 
Civil War and remained so throughout the war years. Like Jefferson for revolutionary 
America, Lincoln looms over the Civil War era as an enormous giant. Born in 1809 in rural 
Kentucky on a small farm, and later rising to become a successful lawyer and President of the 
United States, he, in many ways, embodied the ideology of the self-made man and the 
American dream. Lincoln is remembered, of course, first and foremost as the president who 
abolished slavery and saved the union. His ideas about nationality and property are very much 
connected to this, and are displayed throughout his letters and speeches. Particularly useful are 
his debates over slavery and popular sovereignty with Stephen Douglas (1858).310 In a debate 
with Douglas, Lincoln said that the right to property for which the south fought (slave or real 
property) was for him only secondary. Republicans, he said, did not “hold the liberty of one 
man to be absolutely nothing, when in conflict with another mans right of property.” Rather, 
he said, the Republicans were for “both the dollar and the man, but in case of conflict, the man 
before the dollar.”311 Gradually a tranasvaluation of property happened, which saw all men as 
free if they had the right to the fruits of their labour in the form of wages. This was based on 
a fundamental universalism of equality. Lincoln wrote in 1854: 
Equality in society alike beats inequality, whether the latter be of the british 
aristocratic sort of the domestic slavery sort. We know southern men declare that their 
slaves are better off than hired labourers amongst us. How little they know whereof 
they speak … Twenty five years ago I was a hired labouer. The hired labourer of 
yesterday laboures on his own account today, and will hire others to labur for him 
tomorrow. Advancement – improvement in condition – is the order of things in a 
society of equals. As labour is the common burden of our race, so the effort of some 
to shift the burden on to the shoulders of others is the great durable curse of the race. 
Originally a curse for transgression upon the whole race, when as by slavery, it is 
concentrated on ta part only, it becomes the double-refined course of God upon his 
creatures. Free labour has the inspiration of hope; pure slavery no hope.312 
Labour might have been a course on mankind, but if shared equally in a system of free labour 
it could lead to “Advancement –improvement in condition” and have the “inspiration of hope.” 
What happened was that freedom through property came to mean first and foremost the right 
to the fruits of ones labour. Lincoln explained in an argument about slavery: 
That each man should do precisely as he pleases with all that which is exclusively his 
own, lies at the foundation of the sense of justice there is I me. I Extend the principle 
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to communities of men as well as to individuals … the doctrine of self government is 
right, - absolutely and internally right. Or perhaps I should rather say that whether it 
has any application here depends upon whether a negro is not or is a man. If he is not 
a man, in that case he who is a man may, as a matter of self government, do just what 
he please with him. But if the negro is as a man, is it not to that extent a total 
destruction of self-government to say that he, too, shall not govern himself. When the 
white man governs himself, that is self government; but when he governs himself and 
also governs another man, that is more than self government – that is despotism.313   
What distinguished the second form of the nation in notions of freedom was that the crucial 
thing was to be the proprietor of oneself, of ones labour. It was this ide that became tied up 
with self government, not ownership of land. Leading abolitionist Wendell Phillips asked 
rhetorically about the slave, “Does he not own himself?”314 And Frederick Douglas, the freed 
slave, wrote after becoming a freed man, an earner of wages through his labour: “I was now 
my own master.”315 To Lincoln, this universalism of self-ownership included also the slave, 
he was “a man” and had the same right to self- government as other men. Other men could not 
do “just what he please with him.” When Lincoln said that he put the “man before the dollar,” 
this is what he meant.  In Republican ideology, this came to be seen as the fulfillment of 
national freedom. There is a clear dichotomy between chattel slavery and freedom here: “I 
believe each individual is naturally entitled to do as he pleases with the fruit of his labour, so 
far as it in no wise with any other man’s rights and only by giving every man the right to the 
fruits of his labour,” Lincoln said against slavery.316 Slavery was wrong because it denied men 
this right; it denied slaves their humanity. The pro-slavery man “says that, upon the principle 
of equality, slaves should be allowed to get into a new territory like other property.” But this 
was to deny the slave his national right as a man, it was to define him as real property, which 
was wrong. Lincoln said: 
This is strictly logical if there is no difference between it and other property … but if 
you insists that one is wrong and the other is right, there is no use to institute a 
comparison between right and wrong … The democratic policy everywhere carefully 
excludes the idea that there is any wrong in it. That is the issue … it is the same 
principle in whatever shape it develops itself, it is the same spirit that says “you toil 
and work and earn bread, and I ll eat it” No matter in what shape it comes, whether 
from the mouth of a king, who seeks to bestride the people of his own nation and live 
by the fruit of their labour, or from one race of men as an apology for enslaving another 
race, - it is the same tyrannical principle.317 
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In this way, Lincoln, and much of the north, identified slavery with tyranny, retarding the 
rights of the nation to the slaves. But there was “no reason in the world” said Lincoln why: 
The negro is not entitled to all the natural rights enumerated in The Declaration of 
independence, the right to life liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I hold that he is as 
much entitled to this as the white man … in the right to eat the bread, without the leave 
of anybody else, which his own hands earns, he is my equal…”318 
 
f) Popular sovereignty  
Lincoln connected the right to the fruits of ones labour to the idea of popular sovereignty. 
When Democrat Stephen Douglas claimed slavery consistent with popular sovereignty, 
Lincoln protested.319 This became what is now known as the Lincoln-Douglas debates. 
Douglas was born in Vermont in 1813, and went on to be a lawyer and congressman. He 
married the daughter of a plantation owner in Mississippi, and later stared his own plantation 
in Greenville. From his entry into politics, Douglas was a staunch Democrat; however, on the 
issue of slavery, he stood for a middle position, believing that it should always be up to the 
people of a state to decide if a state should be a slave state or not. Douglas is famous for the 
Kansas-Nebraska Act (1854), which contained issues of popular sovereignty and the spread 
of slavery to new states.320 Douglas’s main point was that the people of each state should 
decide whether or not it was to be a slave state. For Douglas, popular sovereignty was, as he 
said, “the sacred right of self government.” But Lincoln saw through this, as he claimed that, 
as it was, popular sovereignty was nothing but “a mere deceitful pretense for the benefit of 
slavery.”321 In order to go see what real popular sovereignty was, one had to look to The 
Declaration of independence, held Lincoln: “I suppose that Judge Douglas will claim that he 
is the inventor of the idea that the people should govern themselves,” but one should not forget 
“that in that old Declaration of independence … there is the origin of popular sovereignty.”322 
The Declaration, according to Lincoln, made everyone in the US – whether slave or immigrant 
– connected to the founding fathers and part of the freedom that they had won, “as though they 
were blood of the blood, and flesh of the flesh, of the men who wrote that Declaration.”323 And 
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he asked: if one were “making exceptions” to the Declaration of Independence, “where will it 
stop?”324  Universality was the only right way to interpret the Declaration; it applied the whole 
American nation.  This universalism and the notion of property that was underlying its freedom 
were incompatible with southern ideology. Thus, when Lincoln was elected president in 1860, 
the southern slave states soon began seceding from the union, seeing their freedom and right 
to property threatened.  
 
g) “We all declare freedom”; the question of nationality in the Civil War era   
Both the northern and the southern visions claimed supremacy within the American nation, 
both claimed to represent freedom and the security of property. This was not lost on 
contemporaries. Eric Foner writes, and quotes from Lincoln:  
“We all declare freedom” Lincoln observed in 1864. “But in using the same word we 
do not all mean the same thing” To the North, freedom meant for “each man” to enjoy 
“the product of his labour”: to the southern whites, it conveyed mastership – the power 
to do “as they please with other men, and the product of other men’s labour.325 
Both parties referred to what they saw as a specific American national freedom. The South 
Carolina “Declaration of immediate causes which induce and justify the session of South 
Carolina from the Federal Union,” for example, begins by telling the story of the creation of 
the American nation by revolt from Britain, and states that “two great principles” were then 
asserted by the colonies: “namely; the right of a state to govern itself; and the right of a people 
to abolish a government when it becomes destructive of the ends of which it was instituted.”326  
It was accordingly asserted that: 
The Government thus established is subject to the two great principles asserted in 
the Declaration of Independence; and we hold further, that the mode of its formation 
subjects it to a third fundamental principle, namely: the law of compact. We maintain 
that in every compact between two or more parties, the obligation is mutual; that the 
failure of one of the contracting parties to perform a material part of the agreement, 
entirely releases the obligation of the other; and that where no arbiter is provided, each 
party is remitted to his own judgment to determine the fact of failure, with all its 
consequences.327 
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The writers of the South Carolina declaration felt, in 1860, that the federal government no 
longer respected these principles: “We affirm that these ends for which this Government was 
instituted have been defeated, and the Government itself has been made destructive of them 
by the action of the non-slaveholding States.” Because of this, South Carolina joined other 
southern states to form a confederacy to preserve liberty. The confederacy was created to 
preserve the original liberties asserted in the Declaration of Independence according to its 
penmen. President of the Confederacy, plantation owner and military man (colonel in the war 
with Mexico in 1848)  – Jefferson Davis328 wrote years after the Civil War that:  
The southern states had rightfully the power to withdraw from a Union into which 
they had, as sovereign communities, voluntarily entered; that the denial of that right 
was a violation of the letter and spirit of the compact between the states; and that the 
war waged by the Federal Government against the seceding states was in disregard of 
the limitations of the Constitution, and destructive of the principles of the Declaration 
of Independence.329  
Indeed, he wrote those that deemed the confederacy rebels or traitors were “ignorant of the 
nature of the union, and the powers of the states.” Like the anti-slavery Seward, Davis also 
pointed to sectionalism and different systems as the cause of the conflict. But the difference 
was that Davis did not see this as an “irrepressible” conflict: 
Sectional issues appear conspicuously in the debates of the Convention which framed 
the Federal Constitution, and its many compromises were designed to secure an 
equilibrium between the sections, and to preserve the interests as well as the liberties 
of the several states. African servitude at that time was not confined to a section, but 
was numerically greater in the South than in the North, with a tendency to its 
continuance in the former and cessation in the later. It therefore thus early presents 
itself as a disturbing element, and the provision of the Constitution, which were 
necessary for its adoption, bound all the States to recognize and protect that species 
of property.330 
For a long time, Davis wrote, those who wanted to abolish slavery – the peculiar “species of 
property” – were “Pseudo-philanthropists, and fanatics.” But in the lead up to the Civil War, 
this notion was “seized upon” by “political demagogues ... to acquire power.”331 This 
destroyed the equilibrium within the union. His vice president agreed with him: “Those at the 
North … we justly denominate fanatics.”332 However, it would be a misunderstanding, wrote 
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Davis, to think that the Confederacy was fighting for the extension of slavery or for 
enslavement of more people. No, it was simply the right of any free man, “to go, with his 
slaves, into territory (the common property of all) into which the non-slave holder could go 
with his property of any sort.”333 Many southerners believed that the north –and specifically 
the Lincoln administration – wanted to thwart the right to enjoy slave property, and saw this 
as an imposition of tyranny. John C. Calhoun wrote that “what was once a constitutional 
federal republic” was “converted in reality, into one as absolute as that of the Autocrat of 
Russia.”334 Interestingly, Lincoln too used the same image, but against the south:  
As a nation, we began by declaring that all men are created equal. We now practically 
read it, all men are created equal except negros … When it comes to this, I shall prefer 
emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty – to Russia, 
for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of 
hypocrisy.335 
This was the same freedom understood differently. The two different principles of property 
underlying the concept of freedom and sovereignty held in the north and the south were not 
reconcilable. Both claimed the other as its antithesis or a perversion, both claimed to represent 
the original American freedom. But whereas the south saw no contradiction in preserving 
American freedom without the existing federal union, the north saw the union as essential to 
the preservation of American freedom. As Frederick Douglas observed in 1862, after the Civil 
War had commenced, “Liberty and Union have become identical.”336 To Lincoln, issue was 
first and foremost about the preservation of the union:   
I would save it in the shortest way under the constitution … My paramount objective 
is to save the union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the 
union without freeing any slave, I would do it, and if I could save it by freeing all the 
slaves, I would do it … what I do about slavery and the colored race I do because I 
believe it helps to save the union.337   
However, that Lincoln said his goal was not “either to save or destroy slavery” should not be 
interpreted in a way that he was indifferent to slavery – he was not.338 As we have seen, his 
rhetoric was one of equality in the right to free labour. But he would not sacrifice the union 
                                                     
 
333 Davis, 1912: p 7. 
334 Quoted in Greenfeld, p. 475. 
335 Abraham Lincoln to Joshua Speed, August 21st, 1855 in Basler, 1953, Vol 2: P. 323. 
336 Foner, 2000: p. 99. 
337 Abraham Lincoln to Horace Greeley, August 22, 1862, in Basler, Roy, P (ed), The collected works 
of Abraham Lincoln: Volume 5, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, (1953), p. 
388. 
338 Foner writes that “there is no reason to doubt Lincoln´s empathic declaration” However one has to 
be aware that his attitudes towards slavery formed slowly and gradually. Foner, Eric, The fiery trail: 
Abraham Lincoln and American Slavery, W.W Norton and Company, New York, (2010), p 3. 
123 
 
for it, for the Americans freedom was too ingrained with it. Union was freedom, freedom was 
union, the freedom of the Americans could not be detached from the historical reality of its 
existence through the union; for “We are historically connected with it.”339 In the same way 
that many revolutionary Americans saw their freedoms inseparably connected with Britain, so 
too did republicans now see their freedoms inseparable from the union. In this sense it was in 
fact the confederates that most firmly stuck to the principles of 1776, both in that they initiated 
a break from the existing political body (as with the revolution of 1776) and in that they more 
strongly empathized landed freedom (again as in 1776).  
 
Lincoln saw the inevitability of a crisis due to the two different visions of freedom already in 
1858 “a house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this government cannot endure 
permanently half slave half free.”340 The issue would not be dissolved, he thought, before “a 
crisis have been reached and passed”341 In the northern vison the new property assumptions 
could only be fully realized within the union and in the whole union. A break was not an 
option. Seward too referred to this in his “irrepressible conflict” speech. There could be no 
liberty without union, and the union had to be completely based on the system of free labour, 
No half-way was possible. It was a matter of total liberty or total slavery: 
The United States must and will, sooner or later, become either entirely a slave-
holding nation or entirely a free-labor nation. Either the cotton and rice-fields of South 
Carolina and the sugar plantations of Louisiana will ultimately be tilled by free labor, 
and Charleston and New Orleans become marts for legitimate merchandise alone, or 
else the rye-fields and wheat-fields of Massachusetts and New York must again be 
surrendered by their farmers to slave culture and to the production of slaves, and 
Boston and New York become once more markets for trade in the bodies and souls of 
men. It is the failure to apprehend this great truth that induces so many unsuccessful 
attempts at final compromise between the slave and free States, and it is the existence 
of this great fact that renders all such pretended compromises, when made, vain and 
ephemeral.342  
The Civil War became the “crisis” that Lincoln foresaw, and it consolidated national unity and 
free labour ideology (i.e. the notion of a right to one’s labour as the essential property right 
necessary to liberty and sovereignty). Through the civil war, the economic system of the north 
was victorious over the agrarian slave system of the south; and this being so, republicans 
understood America finally to be a unified and thus a fully free nation. Republican Charles 
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Sumner put forth the question “Are we a nation?” after the northern victory in the Civil War 
in his pamphlet by the same title. Sumner was born in 1811 as the son of a lawyer in Boston, 
and went on to study law himself, and practiced for a short time. He was, however, more 
interested in learning and philosophy, and early on became a convinced antislavery man. His 
anti-slavery rhetoric sparked fury on the pro-slavery side, and in 1856 he was beaten up by 
pro-slavery Congressman Preston Brooks. The attack made him unable to participate in 
politics for three years. But by the start of the Civil War, he was back in to politics, and strongly 
urged Lincoln to make the Civil War a cause of abolition from the outset.343 Thus, Sumner 
saw preservation of liberty and preservation of the union as identical. He asked in his “Are we 
a nation?” pamphlet if the US after the war (in 1867) had “that essential indestructible unity 
which belongs to a nation … just government, to protect the citizens of all the rights of 
citizens.”344 His answer was positively affirmative. Sumner essentially told the political story 
of the early national period, emphasizing especially the Declaration of Independence and the 
constitution. From this he declared that “we are one nation… Side by side with the growth of 
national unity was a consistent dedication to human rights.”345 Being a nation meant having 
certain “responsibilities”, amongst the first of which was “equality the first of rights.”346 This 
was everything that the Confederacy had fought against he wrote: their cause was a “rebellion 
instigated by hostility to the sacred principles of the Declaration of independence.” Such 
rebellions could not be allowed to occur in the future if liberty was to be preserved. Thus, to 
secure the safety of liberty, “the national unity must be preserved.”347 Sumner’s wish was 
realized and enforced with the reconstruction amendments (the 13th, 14th and 15th amendments) 
which granted the federal government unprecedented powers over the states, freed the slaves 
and ensured their rights.348  
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Conclusion: The second coming of the spirit of nationalism   
This chapter first demonstrated the importance of landed property in the first phase of the 
American national ideology, for how the first form of the nation worked. We have seen also 
how a transvaluation of property, or a shift from land to labour, took place. This meant that 
the basis of popular sovereignty and individual freedom was now based on the labour power 
of an individual, and not on ownership of land. The transvaluation of property made it possible 
– indeed a logical necessity – to reconcile the principles of the Declaration of Independence 
with the propertied freedom of all individuals in the nation because the right to property 
became understood primarily as the right to the fruits of one’s labour. All men could thus be– 
and were by default – free. Slavery deprived the worker of the fruits of his labour, a practice 
that was compatible with the understanding of propertied freedom (as ownership of land) 
during the first form of the nation, but which became incompatible with the principles of 
freedom (the right to the fruits of one labour) in the second form of the nation. This happened 
due to a change in the mode of production as the bulk of the American nation became more 
industrialized and market-oriented. Essentially, it was a class conflict between an old slave-
owning landed aristocracy and a new middle class. For the new middle class that propagated 
the transvalued understanding of property, these principles were a fulfillment of the principles 
set down in the Declaration of Independence. We could say that, seen through the vision of 
the new Lincolnian nationalism, American society at the end of the Civil War represented a 
“new birth,” a second coming. The abolition of slavery based on every individual’s right to 
his labour was seen to exemplify the national notions of freedom and property carried out to 
its full extent and logical conclusion. But seen with the vision of the Sothern slavery ideologue, 
it was, as they said it for example in their “Battle Cry of Freedom,” a manifestation of 
tyranny349 because it denied the idea of real property as the pillar of freedom, and denied them 
their rightful property in slaves.  
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Chapter 6: The crystallization of a nation: the 
dialectics of property, people and sovereignty in 
Norway 
Outline of the argument350  
This chapter first lays down the historical context for the emergence of a national movement 
in Norway. The fundamental basic assumptions of the national ideology are then explained 
and explored, and the role of private landed property in the national ideology is explicated 
through examples from the writings of key members of the national movement.  
The argument of the chapter has as its basic structure a historical narrative, which covers 
primarily the period from 1770-1814. The argument is divided into two sections. The first 
section covers primarily the 1770s and 1780s. The central idea here was that the Norwegian 
self-owning farmers were freer than any other people in Europe, and that this was precisely 
due to a peculiar Norwegian history which resulted in wide landownership. I invoke the ideas 
of scholar Gerhard Schlning (1722-1780), priest Johan Nordahl Brun (1745-1816) and priest 
Jens Zetlitz (1761-1821). 
The second, shorter period of the national movement from January until 17 of May 1814 and 
shows how the idea of widespread landownership became connected to popular sovereignty. 
An introduction to Norway during the Napoleonic Wars will be given, because it was the 
course of these events that was the direct and immediate cause of the emergence of a national 
movement in Norway. I then focus on the initiator of the national movement of 1814, the 
Oldenborg Prince, Christian Fredrik (1786-1848), based on the notions of nationality found in 
his diary from the period. Christian Fredrik called together a constitutional assembly at 
Eidsvoll on 10 April 1814, where several constitutional proposals were produced. I focus 
especially on the constitutional draft written by Johan Gunder Adler (1784-1852) and 
Christian Magnus Falsen (1782-1830). The point is to show how, in a time of crisis, loyalty to 
the Oldenborg state became transformed into a belief that freedom must be built on historical 
local traditions, and that the most firm pillars of freedom were to be found within Norway, 
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specifically on the widespread distribution of landed property. Thus emerged again, like in 
America, a conceptual amalgamation of people, property and sovereignty.  
 
“A free constitution … was created by centuries of internal preparation” 
Since the eleventh century, there had been comparatively well-organized state apparatuses 
covering the area that would later constitute the Norwegian nation, and since the 1660s this 
kingdom was an integral part of one of the most consequential absolutist states in Europe, the 
Danish Oldenborg state. But despite this difference in historical conditions to the British North 
American colonies, landed property relations in Norway had become, by the time of its own 
national revolution, surprisingly similar to those of the US. In a way, this difference in 
historical conditions constitutes a similarity to the American case. If, in America, the 
foundation for the national ideology was the lack of historically-imbedded social structures, 
in Norway, it was precisely because the social structure was so historically imbedded that an 
ideology of nationalism was prone to emerge. And, like in America, the Norwegian property 
structure had resulted in widespread ownership of real property. This became one of the most 
decisive factors for the emergence of the ideology.  
 
Norwegian historians of all convictions have always noted the peculiar property structure and 
its effect on the development and formation of the Norwegian nation and its separation from 
the imperial Danish state of which it had been part since 1537. There had existed a kind of 
left-wing nationalist historiographical tradition going all the way back to the genesis of the 
national movement itself. But the writings of Ernest Sars, written in the last quarter of the 
nineteenth century, are normally taken to constitute the beginning of the modern 
historiographical debate. Sars held, and vigorously advocated, the opinion that the Norwegian 
national movement had indeed been prepared over centuries of inner development owing to 
its peculiar property structure. Sars wrote that “a free constitution … was created by centuries 
of internal preparation” and it was “the ancient personal freedom and property rights” of the 
Norwegian farmer – the odelsbonde351 – that was the most important precondition and cause 
for the creation of a nation-state.352 A generation later, Marxist historian Halvtan Koth 
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continued this same line of argument.353 But since then, the importance of the role of the 
odelsbonde and the peculiar property structure to the preparation of the national movement 
has largely been downplayed or even dismissed completely.354 In recent years, historians and 
sociologists have tended to give a more balanced account of the matter emphasizing both the 
importance of the property structure and other factors.355 There was, however, also a revival 
of the left/Marxist tradition from the mid 1990s initiated by Kåre Lunden.356 Lunden’s views, 
and the leftist tradition they represent, are the ones most congruent with my own in its 
emphasis on the propertied precondition for the national revival. I do not believe, as Sars, in 
the heroic and unique attributes of the Norwegian farmer, but his right to property, “created 
by centuries of internal preparation,” was decisive.357 
 
The seedbed of the Norwegian national ideology 
a) Economy and population in Norway and Denmark  
At the eve of the national revolution in Norway, the population had reached 884,000 people. 
Almost all of these belonged to Lutheran Christianity and almost all were ethnically 
Norwegians. 90% of the population lived in rural areas, and 80% of the working population 
was employed in farming, fishing or forestry. Only 6% of the population was engaged in 
manufacturing or industry, whereas 15% of the population was engaged in commerce or 
transport. Export of raw materials – of which fish and lumber were the most important – 
constituted the bulk of Norwegian export. Lumber went mainly to the British Isles and the 
Netherlands, whereas fish was exported to Southern Europe. There were also exports from 
mining and salt production which went mainly to Copenhagen due to the mercantile policies 
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of the Oldenbirg absolutist state. Export went by sea, and by the early nineteenth century a 
small Norwegian merchant class owned one of the most considerable trading fleets in Europe. 
However, it was farming and work related to the farm that dominated the relations of 
ownership and appropriation: about 260,000 people were employed in farm-related work in 
1801. Of these, 78,000 people were self-owning farmers, which means that about 60% of the 
land in Norway was farmed by self-owning farmers. The rest of the land was farmed by tenants 
called “husmenn,” some who were given land which they farmed and used as their own (about 
39,000 people) and some who were landless (about 40,000 people). In addition to these, there 
was also a large group of household servants which counted more than 100,000 people. It is 
worth noting that there was practically no landed/feudal aristocracy in Norway. There existed 
literally only two units in the whole country that came close to resemble a manor.358 But since 
the Norwegian kingdom was part of the absolutist Oldenborg state, there existed formal 
aristocratic titles or privileges given by the king, but which were not connected to the 
ownership of manors. Hence, there was no landed aristocracy. The ruling class of Norway 
included instead clergymen and state officials, and many of these became central members of 
the national movement. However although these were not primarily landed aristocrats, they 
often owned significant properties and were relatively wealthy. This was a small group and, 
indeed, only a small portion of the population of Norway became members of the national 
movement that created the revolution in 1814.359 The movement consisted mainly of a small 
group of state officials, which constituted no more than 1% of the population, and a small 
group of merchants, but there were also freeholding farmers amongst its members. It was the 
elite who led the movement, but it managed to secure the support also of the freeholding 
farmers and integrated them into the movement. At the basis for their common interest was 
the securing of private landed property.  
 
b) The state  
The Norwegian national movement grew within the womb of a strong absolutist state. It may 
be useful to define the state to which the Norwegian kingdom belonged after the Reformation 
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as 'den Oldenborgske heilstaten' (the dynastic Oldenorg state). This sets our focus on the fact 
that it was the Oldenborg dynasty which ruled over the Norwegian kingdom (and others), and 
that it was a state that ruled over several different linguistic and cultural areas where political 
power was legitimized and exercised by monarchical lineage. It was a state where sovereignty 
was theoretically vested solely in the Oldenborg monarch, thus making landed property in 
theory disconnected from political rights. But, in fact, even though the Norwegian kingdom 
was subject to the Oldenborg Crown – a province360 – it was still in many ways seen as a 
separate kingdom. The monarch often stressed his right to the kingdoms of Norway and 
Denmark, and Norwegian medieval law was kept intact.361 Nevertheless, despite this formal 
division of the two kingdoms, the Oldenborg state became, after 1660, one of the most 
consolidated and centralized monarchies in Europe.362 The state was highly patriarchal, and 
absolute loyalty and love was demanded of its subjects. There were systems of local rule and 
government in which the population participated, but in theory there were almost no political, 
civic or economic freedoms within the absolutist state. The monarch was, according to the 
law, “the first and highest authority on earth and over all human law.”363 On the other hand, 
during the eighteenth century, the king was more and more seen to have duties on behalf of 
his subjects, amongst other things to secure justice and bourgeoisie liberties364 (and in fact, 
also the bulk of the population, the farmers, saw the Oldenborg king as a protector of their 
rights against local officials365), and by the late eighteenth century the absolutist monarchy 
was held in a general high esteem; indeed, both in Norway and in Denmark, it was generally 
seen by the elite and the farmers as protecting the liberties and rights of its subjects.366 There 
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had developed a notion of loyalty and belonging to the monarchy as an entity with rituals and 
mythologies feeding of both Norwegian and Danish history and myth.367 There was also a 
pervasive intellectual environment inspired by the enlightenment that focused on freedoms 
and rights of the citizens within this state. This environment laid some important foundations 
for the national movement that emerged in Norway in 1814. 
 
The historical freedoms of the Norwegians  
a) The odelsrett and the odelsbonde 
 
The Norwegian elite of the late eighteenth century were deeply imbedded in a western tradition 
of political thought, including English, French, German and American writers – and both the 
American and the French revolution occurred within recent memory.368 Authors in both the 
Norwegian and the Danish part of the empire had, since the early eighteenth century, 
developed and investigated theories of natural rights,369 and by the late eighteenth century this 
was a major intellectual trend at the universities of the empire, especially in Copenhagen. But 
like in the British colonies, these ideas became adapted to local circumstances, and applied to 
a specific Norwegian tradition of rights related to the property structure. The Norwegian 
medieval state and the way in which the farmers participated in government through the “ting” 
based on their odelsrett was a pervasive element in this strand of thought. The odelsrett was 
an exclusive right that many farmers in Norway had to their land. It involved exclusive rights 
of use, and it was hereditary. In other words, it was an exclusive property right. The “ting” 
was connected to this right, and an early medieval form of government where the men with 
odelsrett met every year to form the laws of the country.370 This right to form laws through 
property rights implied in the odeslrett was, in the late eighteenth century, seen by many as 
the foundation of Nordic freedom. The odelsrett made men free because it was an exclusive 
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right to land which made the individual sovereign as a lawgiver. This vision of freedom tended 
to project upon the Norwegian self-owning farmer (the odelsbonde) of the present, the 
idealized image of the free Norwegian medieval farmer. There might also be some truth to the 
idea that the Norwegian farmer was freer than peasants in other countries at the time, and also 
had been in medieval times. Lunden draws on Mark Bloch’s description of free and unfree 
men in European medieval history, which held that a man who was under the subjugation of 
another private man (i.e. a man that had to work on the land of barons or lords) was unfree, 
whereas a man who was only subject to the king (i.e. a man that worked and owned his own 
land) was free. In this respect, many Norwegian farmers were free throughout the medieval 
ages until 1814, says Lunden.371 By 1814, reforms and land sales had been carried out that had 
made it possible for an increasingly larger group of farmers to fully and wholly own their own 
land.372 On can also trance a trend of increasing institutionalization and standardization in 
relation to land sales from the seventeenth century onwards, ordering land sales and property 
relations in strict economic forms.373  
 
b) Norwegian freedoms within the Oldenborg Empire  
One of the most famous advocates for the idea of Norwegian freedom in the late eighteenth 
century was the historian Gerhard Schøning (1722-1780). Educated in ancient Norse history 
and modern philosophy, he started working as a scholar in Trondheim where he stared the 
writing of a history of Norway.374 Here he emphasized the odelsrett and the “ting” as the 
ancient foundation of Norwegian freedom. The rule of King Håkon den gode (Håkon the 
Good) especially was seen as ideal by Schøning. He wrote about the King: “He had the most 
sincere concern for his subjects wellbeing, for their peace and their security.”375 This he did 
by making “laws and duties for the wellbeing of the people, making a frame for their life and 
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for their future that was both just and good.”376 Håkon the Good gave these laws on the “ting”, 
and it was this that made them good, because they were sanctioned by the free-propertied 
people of Norway. Such laws, asserted Schøning, were in fact the foundation of all the free 
states that had existed in Europe:  
The oldest and mightiest states of Europe are founded by people from the north; the 
laws, customs and statutes of these people are the foundation of the European 
constitutions; and the Nordic flame, freedom and courage liberated the southern 
nations from enslavement377  
Thus, Norwegian history should be seen not only as that of “a kingdom, but as an integral part 
of universal history.”378 But some wondered if the ancient Nordic freedom was not in too much 
of a slumber in Norway at the present. One of Schøning’s contemporaries, the priest Nordahl 
Brun (1745-1816), asked, borrowing a quote from the sixteenth century priest Peder Absalon 
Byer, “perhaps Norway could one day awaken from its sleep?”379 The language here is a 
classic example of nationalist revival ideology, and Brun connected this very much to the idea 
of the odelsrett. In his pamphlet “Tanker om Norges Odels-ret” (1788), he compared the 
odelsrett to the rights of the aristocracies in other countries. But this was not to say that he had 
much sympathy for the institution of an aristocracy – as such, he wrote: “This noble blood that 
supposedly flows through the veins of some men, I do not much care for.” Rather, it was the 
possibility that a secure right to landed property gave “the possibility to become a great 
man,”380 In Norway, precisely because of the odlesrett, there was no landed aristocracy, said 
Brun, and it was precisely therefore that the bulk of the population could be elevated to the 
position of aristocracy (i.e. to have material security and freedom – a right to property in 
land).381 The odelsbonde was thus free and noble: “Odelsmenn of old! Men of honor, you love 
freedom, and rights you have!”382 Freedom was here inseparably bound with landed property. 
But this freedom was not aristocratic in nature, it was natural and just: “The odelsrett, seems 
to me, equally natural as any other civic right,” wrote Brun, and it was connected to the kind 
of state in which Brun understood himself to be living in: “equality, independence and 
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fraternity are the treasures of nature, but the only just enforcer of any right is the civic state.”383 
The “civic state” that Brun refers to is the Oldneborg absolutist state. This might seem odd, 
but Brun points to the interconnectedness of these specific freedoms of property and the 
absolutist Oldenborg monarch. The odelsbonde was sometimes held and contrasted with the 
Danish farmer, which in this case was seen to be unfree.384 But Norwegian freedom was 
seldom during this phase contrasted with the absolutist monarchy as such. Shøning, for 
example, dedicated the first volume of his history of Norway to the Oldenborg monarch, and 
he was central in organizing the jubilee for the Oldenborg monarch in 1760. His dedication to 
the king reads:  
It is not because I have such high thoughts of my work that I dedicate it to your 
highness, but because of a sincere feeling of duty and gratefulness, on behalf of the 
people whose history I have written. You, your highness have, on so many occasions 
shown mercifulness and love towards this nation.385 
The reason why one could emphasize the peculiar Norwegian national character and at the 
same time be sincere in one’s dedication to the absolutist monarch was perhaps partly because 
a prevailing notion was, as Brun famously said, that in the Oldenborg state, one had two 
homelands: one natural, and one civic, and there was no antagonism between them.386 In fact, 
Norwegians and Danes were bound together by the Oldeborg monarch, and the people were, 
said Brun, the children of the monarch, “never his slaves”387 – they were free. That the subjects 
could be free and yet the “children” of the monarch was not a contradiction because the 
freedom of Norwegians was seen as protected by the absolutist king. Although the Odelsrett 
was originally Norwegian, Brun believed that the Danish Oldenborg king had since protected 
it. Brun wrote:  
The odlesrett was the right of Norway before Denmark and Norway, by the marriage 
of their respective royal families, became united. It has since been preserved by the 
Danish kings, and are by his laws now protected. 388 
The Norwegian farmer was seen as free under already-existing social and political conditions. 
Another contemporary writer, the priest Jens Zetlitz (1761-1821), also praised the freedom of 
                                                     
 
383 Brun, 1788: p 10-11. 
384 There had for centuries existed a semi-feudal system of manorial farming in Denmark alien to 
Norway where such systems never existed. Some literature on the Danish farming system: Olsen, 
Gunnar, Hovedgård og bondegård, studier over stordriftens udvikling I Danmark i tiden 1525-1774, 
Kiøbenhavn, (1957), Skrubbletrang, Fridlev, Det Danskelandbosamfund 1500-1800, Odense, (1978), 
Rasmussen, Carsten Porskrog, Det Danske godssystem. Udvikling og afvikling 1519-1919, Århus, 
(1987). 
385 Schøning, 1773: p. Preface  
386 Brun, Nordahl, Til Nordmænd: om troskab mod kongen og kiærlighed til fædrelandet, (1773). 
387 Brun, 1773: p 6. 
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the Norwegian farmer within the kingdom. The Norwegian farmer, he wrote, had “from time 
immemorial been held in high esteem, because from time immemorial he has been free,” and 
he was freer than any common man anywhere else. However the fact that they were now being 
ruled by the Oldenborg monarch was seen to be no problem at all; in fact, he was “the mildest 
monarch in all Europe.” And it was precisely because he was free that the farmer was loyal: 
“the large degree of freedom, that the farmer here enjoys, is, if not the only, then surely the 
strongest source of his patriotic love and his loyalty.”389 Industrialist and landowner Jacob Aall 
(1773-1844), member of the national movement of 1814, wrote in his history of the period 
almost half a century later about what he perceived as the free nature of Oldenborg rule in 
Norway at the time: 
Norway’s relation to Denmark had been of a peculiar nature; despotic laws had placed 
the country solely at the mercy of the king, yet, they were mildly carried out in 
Norway, and they took into account local circumstances. The internal laws were made 
in in accordance with the simplicity of nature, and with the natural rights of men.390 
This praise of the current monarchical situation as protector of unique liberties is, as we might 
remember, very similar to how Americans saw their liberties protected by the British king 
before 1776. And as in America, the change in discourse was brought forth largely by external 
factors. It was not till a crisis suddenly materialized – when the Napoleonic Wars cut the tie 
between the Norwegian people and its sovereign in 1814 –  that the idea of Norwegian freedom 
became connected to a nationalist ideology. Aall explained in his history how, due to the wars, 
already in 1809: “The rock-solid tie to the old order, and the loyal affection to the old royal 
family that ruled over Norway, started, in the beginning of this decade, if not to waver, at least 
it started to be tested.”391 But the actual break that came in 1814 was actually regrettable and 
unfortunate, wrote Aall. The Napoleonic Wars forced a new Swedish government (I explain 
this below) on the Norwegians, and Norwegians were thus forced to:  
Protest … against a form of government, where it could not be guaranteed that the 
local circumstances of the country would be taken into account, as had been the case 
with the old government.392   
It was the Treaty of Kiel, signed 14 January 1814 as part of the settlement of the Napoleonic 
Wars, that caused a national movement to emerge in Norway when the throne of Norway was 
                                                     
 
389 Zetlitz, Jens, Sange til den norske bondestand, (1795), Preface.  
390 All, 1844: p 359-360. 
391 All, Jacob, Erindringer som bidrag til Norges historie frå 1800-1815, Cappelen, Christiania, 
(1844), p 3. People started to consider a break with Denmark, wrote Aall, but when it happened, at 
least Aall considered it a “catastrophe” All, 1844: p. 6. He was not the only one, as we shall see 
below.  
392 Aall, 1844: p 360. 
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taken from the Oldenborg monarch and given to the king of Sweden.  Like in America, 
nationalism existed before this in Norway as a potentiality of an ideology only: it took the 
flames of the Napoleonic Wars to give the idea form in the world. And the nation became 
erected upon the Norwegian property structure of widespread landholding.  
 
Initiation of the national movement  
a) The Napoleonic Wars and the Treaty of Kiel  
The Oldenborg state became involved in the Napoleonic Wars in August 1807 when the 
British hijacked the Oldenborg imperial armada anchored in Copenhagen and bombarded the 
city. This practically forced the Oldenborg state into an alliance with Napoleon. When the 
Oldenborg state thus became officially allied with revolutionary France, the British mustered 
a naval blockade that effectively cut off the Norwegian part from the Danish part for the next 
seven years. For the Norwegian part of the empire, this had disastrous consequences as 
Norwegians were dependent on imported corn from Denmark. Thus, famine soon broke out in 
the Norwegian part of the empire. The consequences for the city merchants were also bad as 
most of their trade had been directed towards Britain or the Netherlands. Furthermore, 
involvement in the Napoleonic Wars brought battle to the eastern Norwegian borders (1808-
09) as Napoleon, for strategic reasons, demanded an attack on Sweden. This war stirred 
patriotic feelings in many people. Much of this patriotic sentiment was tied to Prince Christian 
August who led the southern division of the Norwegian army in successful raids against the 
Swedish. Christian August was the prince of the Oldenborg southern province of Slesvig-
Holstein. As he grew into adulthood he became a skilled military commander, learning many 
of his skills in the Austrian army where he had a position during the late 1790s. In 1803 he 
was sent to Norway as commander in chief of the southern army division, and when the war 
broke out he was appointed leader of the provisional government in Norway by the Oldenborg 
king. However, the Swedish elite also had an eye to him, and after unrest and revolution in 
Sweden in 1809 he was appointed and accepted the Swedish throne in 1810.393  When the 
prince departed from Norway, there was a great party for him, and at this party the initiative 
was taken to establish Det kongelige selsgab for Norges vel  (The Royal Society for the 
Wellbeing of Norway), which became the first countrywide civil society organization. The 
                                                     
 
393 Mykland, Knut. (Last Edited 13.03.2009) Christian August, in Norsk biografisk leksikon. 
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society became a platform for advancing Norwegian interests vis-à-vis the Oldenborg monarch 
during the war.  
 
One of the founders of Det kongelige selsgab for Norges vel was Count Herman Wedel 
Jarlsberg. Born in 1779 to a Danish/Norwegian diplomat and Count, Wedel Jarlsberg was one 
of the very few real aristocrats in Norway at the time. He spent most of his youth in continental 
Europe, visiting his barony with his family primarily during the summers. In 1801 he received 
a university degree in law at the University of Copenhagen, and spent the next years in the 
financial committee of the Oldenborg government. In 1806 he moved to Norway and became 
an administrator of a county in the southeast. When the Oldenborg state became involved in 
the Napoleonic Wars, Wedel was appointed by the government commission in Norway to 
provide corn. During the war years, Wedel became more and more discontent with Oldenborg 
rule, and saw it as incompatible with the existence of national freedom. Securing civic liberties 
was essential to Wedel, and they could not, he thought, be safe under Oldenborg absolutism. 
In 1809, when Swedish revolutionaries had started contemplating the idea of Christian August 
as Swedish king, Wedel saw an opportunity to realize an old dream of uniting Norway with 
Sweden under a liberal constitution. It was especially after the war of 1809 that Wedel gathered 
support for this plan, particularly amongst industrialist and merchants in the southeast of the 
country, whose loyalty to the Oldenborg monarchy, as Aall had written, had “started to be 
tested.”  Christian August, however, was reluctant to do this, and the plans stalled completely 
when he died unexpectedly of heart failure in the summer of 1810.394 Other than this attempt 
by Wedel and the group of merchants supporting him, there was little direct nationalist 
opposition to Oldenborg rule before the spring of 1814. The Treaty of Kiel, signed that winter, 
thus marked a decisive shift in the course of the national movement. The treaty in effect 
transferred the throne of Norway to Swedish King Karl Johan. However, Karl Johan was not 
able to claim the throne until August (the time it took to move his armies to the Norwegian 
border). It was in this vacuum, where the Kingdom of Norway was left without any sovereign, 
that the heir to the Oldenborg throne, Prince Christian Fredrik (1786-1848), animated the 
                                                     
 
394 Wedel was the spearhead of the group of merchants advocating a breakup with Denmark and a 
union with Sweden. On this and Wedel’s life and politics see Nielsen, Yngvar, Grev Herman Wedel 
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Norwegian national movement.395 In 1813, at the age of 26, disguised as a deckhand on a 
fishing boat, Prince Christian Fredrik had sailed from Denmark to Norway, navigating through 
enemy British warships, on a mission to preserve the integrity of the Oldenborg state. But 
when the Kiel treaty was signed, the prince took action to prevent Norway from falling into 
the hands of Swedish King Karl Johan – actions which resulted in the Norwegian declaration 
of independence.  
 
b) Prince Christian Fredrik and the national movement  
There is an endless and ongoing discussion about the true motives of Christian Fredrik: were 
his actions in 1814 motivated by an underlying wish to later reunite Norway with Denmark? 
Did he actually believe in the sovereignty of the people? Is he to be hailed as a hero or judged 
as a traitor396? I think that it is beyond any doubt that the prince was crucial in leading the 
national movement and making the writing of the constitution and the declaration of 
independence possible. In this way, the prince must surely be held as a key figure in securing 
Norwegian independence. And although his underlying motives for this can perhaps never be 
known, it is nevertheless a fact that he did agree to become King of Norway by consent of the 
people: he accepted that the people were vested with ultimate legislative power, that they 
                                                     
 
395 The background for the signing of this treaty was the following:  Sweden, under its new king, Karl 
Johan (king from August 1810) had joined Great Britain in the effort to defeat Napoleon and his 
allies. This was very much the work of Karl Johan. His name of birth was Jean Babtiste- Bernadotte, 
and he was a French nobleman who had served as general under Napoleon during several important 
and successful battles. In 1810, after the death of Christian August, he was approached by a Swedish 
agent in Paris who asked him to be candidate for the election of a new Swedish king. Bernadotte 
agreed, and was elected king 21 August 1810, taking the name of Karl Johan. The previous year 
Sweden had lost Finland to Russia, and as new king of Sweden, Karl Johan wanted to restore the pride 
and might of Sweden. His solution to this became, in the end, to join the allies against Napoleon by 
the promise that by the defeat of Napoleon and his allies (which still included the Oldenborg state), 
Norway would befall the crown of Sweden. As the Napoleonic Wars approached its finale in 1813, 
Karl Johan led the Swedish troops at the Battle of Leipzig and defeated his former emperor Napoleon 
who fled towards Paris. Karl Johan did not join the allies in pursuit towards Paris, but moved his army 
instead north to Denmark. Not trusting the promise of Britain to give him Norway, he took matters in 
his own hands. By January 1814, his huge and well-trained Swedish force stood ready to capture the 
Oldenborg capital of Copenhagen, forcing the Oldenborg king to bestow to Karl Johan the throne of 
Norway Bjørnskau, Erik. (Last edited 13.02.2009). Karl 3 Johan, in  Norsk biografisk leksikon. 
https://nbl.snl.no/Karl_3_Johan. Downloaded  26. 01. 2015   
396 Georg Sverdrup – prominent, member of the national movement –, for example accused the Prince 
of cowardice after the Prince had declared armistice with Sweden when Karl Johan had invaded with 
his army. The Prince expressed his regrets to Sverdrup that so much blood had been spilt on his 
account, but Sverdrup answered that the problem was rather that not enough blood had been spilt. The 
people of Norway, thought Sverdrup, had been betrayed by their leader not willing to lead them in a 
fight for freedom whatever its costs. This was the beginning of a long tradition of distrust and 
discredit of Christian Fredrik. This anecdote can be found in Langeland, 2014: footnote 1, p 346.  
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should exercise this sovereignty through their representatives, and that he himself was vested 
only with executive powers and was in fact not a king that ruled over subjects but one that 
ruled on behalf of citizens. One can of course wonder if he really wanted this, and one can 
point to the fact that when he later became king of Denmark, he long refused to give to the 
Danish people what he seemingly so ardently fought to give the Norwegians. But when in 
Norway, he seems to really have believed in the freedom of the Norwegian people and its 
connection to the propertied freedom of the farmers.397 Reading the entries in his notebook 
from 1814, one gets the impression of a man passionately caring for the freedom and right of 
the people, a man that fights for the natural right of a people to live in freedom and not under 
enslavement. He said he would “Rather die with weapon in hand than to be slaves of the 
Swedish.”398 He hoped in the long-term to make the Norwegian people happy, telling himself:  
God knows that my highest whish is to see this people happy. If only the power was 
bestowed upon me to grant this people all the happiness that I aim to give them, the 
happiness that they deserve.399  
The prince’s enthusiasm was at least partly based on his belief in the special characteristic of 
what he saw as the Norwegian people, the propertied farmers. During a journey to Trondheim 
in the winter of 1814, the prince met many local farmers, and he took note of “their awesome 
national sentiment.” The prince reflected: “one does not know such a people if one thinks that 
one can take away their freedom with the stroke of a pen.”400 It was also on the initiative of 
the prince that it was decided that at least one of the representatives to the later constitutional 
assembly from each county should be a farmer.401 The prince, according to his diary, believed 
in the freedom-loving spirit of these people: “the nation … will do everything for its freedom 
and independence, it would rather die than have a life in slavery.” And seeing this, he told 
himself: “there cannot be any doubt about what I have to do.” The answer was to fight the 
                                                     
 
397 The world views of the prince seems to have been deeply founded on a Christian Humanism 
though to him by childhood teacher. Here he had been familiar with the French revolution, and 
thinkers like Rousseau and Voltaire. Langslet, Lars Roar, Christian Frederik, Konge av Norge 
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cause of the Norwegians: “Even if all of Europe is against us, there is always the option to 
fight till the last man standing.”402 One interpretation of this is to see a man acting out of a 
powerful moral conviction of what he sees as naturally right, even at the risk of great personal 
costs.403 The prince was not, however, at first, prepared to accept the throne of Norway by the 
grace of a sovereign people: during the first weeks after the signing of the Treaty of Kiel, the 
prince assumed sovereignty in Norway on account of the hereditary rights he had as heir of 
the Oldenborg monarch. But in February of 1814, he changed his mind and decided to 
legitimize his right to rule Norway by the will of the people. According to his own diary, he 
decided to do this after a meeting at Edisvoll on 16 February 1814, when Professor Georg 
Sverdrup (1770-1850) pointed out to him that since sovereignty was ultimately vested in the 
people, the professor himself had a claim to the throne equally just and legitimate as that of 
the prince’s claim. Sverdrup had studied in Copenhagen and in Gottingen where he had been 
acquainted with German romanticism, and became one of the first professors of the University 
of Christiania (present day Oslo) (established 1811).404 He was an acquaintance of Christian 
Fredrik, and thus became involved in the Eidsvoll meeting where he told Christian Fredrik 
that he could only be a legitimate king if he appealed to the sovereignty of the people.405 
Sverdrup’s influence on Christian Frederick’s decision is arguable, but the Prince does 
mention this in his diary, and again in a way that makes him sound earnest in his belief: 
This is a day that I will never forget. I have listened to the speech that professor 
Sverdrup held for me with a joy that only one possessing a pure mind knows. He said 
that the rights that Fredrik 6 (King of the Oldenborg state) have given away will fall 
back to the hand of the people, and that it is from the hand of the people that I shall 
receive my crown.406 
Regardless of the motivation and cause of this decision, it was crucial for how the realization 
of nationality happened in Norway, as it marks the moment that opened up the possibility for 
that peculiar amalgamation of people, property and sovereignty which characterizes 
nationalism. Because of this decision, the prince was obliged to post an “Open letter from the 
regent of Norway” throughout the kingdom. In the letter, it was proclaimed that elections for 
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a national assembly to write a constitution were to take place at Eidsvoll as a reaction to Karl 
Johan’s plan to incorporate the kingdom into Sweden.407 
 
c) Impending chaos and the chains of slavery  
When the prince sent his open letter across the country, most of the answers he got back 
expressed regret of the break with the Oldenborg state and hostility towards Sweden. It was 
with “the deepest of sorrows” read one letter, that “we recognize that the bond which for so 
long have tied our two kingdoms together is now broken.”408 Indeed, stated another letter, “we 
feel as children bereft of our loving father … with anger we see that the ancient throne of 
Harald [Norwegian Viking king] now falls in the hand of the Swedish.”409 Another letter 
proclaimed that “We would never be slaves of the Swedish.”410 There was little doubt that 
with the Treaty of Kiel, the people had been “doomed to slavery”411 under the Swedish. This 
may indicate that loyalty to the prince and the monarchy was still prevalent in much of the 
population.412 And it was perhaps precisely because the prince represented the Oldenborg 
monarchy that so many came to support him in the endeavor to create an independent 
Norwegian state in opposition to the decision of the great powers and Sweden. The prince 
represented the principle to which people were loyal, and the institution which represented 
stability and freedom, the Oldenborg monarchy. There was a pervasive underlying assumption 
at the Eidsvoll assembly that the Norwegian kingdom was on the brink of chaos. The state of 
which Norwegians had been a part for over 400 years had been dissolved, and imperial 
sovereignty had disappeared – had fallen back to the people. It was up to the people now to 
                                                     
 
407 I am not saying that the prince did this purely out of idealistic reasons. No doubt there were 
pragmatic considerations of power involved as well. The point is that the fact that the prince chose 
this option made it possible for the national movement to emerge in the way in which it did. This is 
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of the prince.  
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secure balance and freedom. However, this freedom and security one had to fight for: “every 
thinking man in the state will realize,” it was claimed, that independence could not be achieved 
“without the most grave sacrifices and great struggle by all our citizens.”413 Another member 
of the convention said: “either the nation will have to bend its back under foreign yoke, or 
with ancient Nordic power, uphold its freedom.”414 The members of the national movement 
knew very well that they were in the midst of the Napoleonic Wars and the dire state in which 
it had left the Norwegian society and economy, and they knew that an invasion by Sweden 
was immanent. Christian Frederik was by many given – and, as we saw above, gave himself 
– the role as savior from both slavery and anarchy.  The Prince was seen by some as “the only 
one who could save the state from anarchy.”415 Hence, Christian Fredrik was to be elected king 
of the New Norwegian state, but “neither in form nor in action will he be a despot.”416   
 
Christian Frederik became an elected constitutional monarch as he himself had promised; he 
was king only by the will of the people and with restricted powers. It was felt that it was a 
decision of a sovereign people: in seeking to avoid “the misfortunes of anarchy,” said one 
member of the Eidsvoll convention, the best men of the nation had been called together “on 
behalf of the people to create a constitution that secures civic liberty and earthly happiness in 
the land of Norway.”417 It was for these causes and on such a foundation that Christian Frederik 
became king – chosen by the members of the Eidsvoll assembly who represented the will of 
the people. He was himself absent from the main negotiations of the constitutional assembly, 
but before the proceedings started the prince emphasized the national character of his rule. He 
knew that the people of Norway had a longing to freedom within them, he said, and he knew 
that “no longing could be as strong as that to liberty.” Indeed, a people that would willingly 
give up its liberty was worth “nothing but the chains of slavery.” The prince promised to help 
the Norwegians establish the wisest and best form of government, that which “secures civic 
liberties and makes the law sacred.”418Law was a central aspect of Norwegian nationalism; 
integrated into the conceptions of sovereignty of the people and security of property – and 
ultimately to national and individual freedom. Rule of law meant rule by the people, and rule 
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by the people secured freedom, that is, the right to property for the individual. This was to a 
large extent based on the widespread ownership of landed property in Norway. To elaborate 
on this, I shall first invoke one of the most influential constitutional drafts that was presented 
at the Eidsvoll Convention. This draft was written by Johan Gunder Adler and Christian 
Magnus Falsen. 
 
The Eidsvoll assembly: amalgamation of people, property and sovereignty  
a) The Alder/Falsen constitutional draft 
It is unclear who was the principal author of the Adler/Falsen constitutional draft. During the 
first century and a half after 1814, Falsen was given credit for writing the most of it. But doubt 
was raised in the late 1940s, and Johan Gunder Adler was held as the main author of the draft. 
I invoke the draft here as an example mainly of Falsen’s thought because Falsen became one 
of the most prominent members of the national movement in 1814 and after. Indeed, Falsen’s 
thought stands out as an ideal type of the national ideology in Norway.  
 
Christian Magnus Falsen (1782-1830) came from a long tradition of state officials serving in 
Norway for the Odlenborg monarchs. He grew up in Norway and studied in Copenhagen, 
where he became interested in history, especially history of democracy and the ancient 
Norwegian past. After his studies he got a position as a magistrate in Norway and he bought a 
farm that he also ran. Falsen was for a long time loyal to the Oldenborg monarchy and a 
personal friend of Prince Christian Fredrik. As late as 1813 he was a firm supporter of the 
monarchy and even agreed to spy on Wedel Jarlsberg and his plans for a Norwegian union 
with Sweden. After Christian Fredrik declared that he would be king of an independent 
Norwegian state based on the sovereignty of the people, Falsen became one of his most firm 
supporters. He was an active debater at the Eidsvoll proceedings and, together with Johan 
Gunder Adler, he put forth a constitutional draft which strongly influenced the final 
constitution. Falsen also sent the draft for revision to Christian Frederik, and kept him updated 
on the proceedings at Eidsvoll. Falsen’s worldviews were strongly influenced by the American 
Revolution, whose principles and heroes he greatly admired.419 In this he was strongly 
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influenced by his father, who was also widely-read on Greek philosophy and ideas of freedom, 
something which Falsen also took up. When Falsen studied in Copenhagen, he furthermore 
became familiar with central enlightenment thinkers including Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant, 
Montesquieu and Rousseau. After his studies, Falsen came to read much from authors 
concerned with ancient Nordic freedom and the Odelsrett, amongst others the previously-
mentioned Gerhard Schøning. Falsen also read and befriended Nordhal Brun.420  
 
The Adler/Falsen draft, as to accentuate Falsen’s American sympathies, opens with a line that 
is almost literally a copy of the American Declaration of Independence. The opening 
paragraph reads:  
All men are born free and equal: they have certain natural, essential and unchangeable 
rights. These are freedom, security and property.421  
Paragraph four states that “property is the right which every citizen has, to enjoy and decide 
over his lands, his income, over the fruits of his labour and diligence.”422  This was all bound 
to freedom because freedom meant “that a person, as long as he is not intruding on other 
persons, and let them enjoy the fruits of their labour, may himself enjoy the fruits of his labour 
and security of his person.”423 We thus see that freedom is inseparably bound with the right to 
property, that is to enjoy the fruits of one’s labour. This was furthermore connected to popular 
sovereignty. Paragraph seven states that, “Sovereignty is the sum of all those rights which men 
acquire when entering into society. This sovereignty is vested in the people (or the nation).”424 
In other words, property may be interpreted as one of “all those rights which men acquire 
when entering into society.” In this right all the members of the nation were equal: “all the 
members of society, regardless of, birth, wealth, or rank are equal in their rights to enjoy the 
benefits of society.”425 No man was to have privileges, because the people as a whole were 
sovereign: “Having established that all power flows from the people, all statesmen are their 
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servants, and are accountable to them.”426 Falsen was a living example to this ideology. 
Belonging to an aristocratic family of the Oldenborg state himself, he officially resigned his 
title at the Eidsvoll assembly. “I am not amongst the men,” he said, “who believe that birth 
should bestow privileges on a man, which he otherwise would not have had.” He did not intend 
by this to be seen as a man making a “sacrifice,” it was rather that he wanted to be “on an 
equal footing with my fellow citizens.”427 The important point was that all the members of the 
nation were equal in their rights, of which the most important was the right to property.  
 
Like in America the ideas about property and sovereignty were informed by the relative 
widespread distribution of land in Norway. Falsen saw the creation of the nation state as a 
return to ancient Nordic freedom; an important point and underlying assumption in Falsen’s 
thinking was that although the right to property was natural, it was also historically conditioned 
by the Norwegian property structure. In the same way as Jefferson can be seen as a sage of 
American nationality, Falsin can be seen as one for Norway, placing the Norwegian farmer 
and his freedom in Benjaminian empty homogeneous time. In Norway, said Falsen, there had 
since time immoral existed free propertied farmers (the odelsbonde) which “knew now lord 
but that of God above and the king bound by law.”428 In the old times of Nordic freedom, 
wrote Falsen, it was always the men of landed property that constituted the nation, and 
represented the voice of the people: “sovereignty was vested in the people, which had reserved 
for themselves legislative power,” and the people were constituted by the “men of landed 
property.”429 Property (or the Odelsrett) was indeed “the most secure protection of liberty,” 
and liberty the ancient Norwegians had. Behold, wrote Falsen, the vision of the past, “the great 
cliffs of Norway, on whose edges and in whose valleys beneath, the sons of Norway walked 
free and unbound.”430 Falsen wrote that he could not ever read the Sagas of old without feeling 
his soul empowered by the vision of “the Odeslmend [the propertied farmer] of Norway, in 
alliance with the king, deciding the laws of the land. The odelsmend of Norway … free … 
masters of their own land.”431 This situation of free propertied men was ancient and natural, 
said Falsen: 
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The natural idea of the division of the lands amongst the citizens has been so common 
throughout history that one can prove its existence even since the time of Moses, and 
one can assume that this idea was brought to our north, or even that it is grounded in 
nature.432 
It was in any case certain that Norway had never been feudal: “all our ancient history proves 
that no hereditary aristocracy existed in our north.”433 A landed aristocracy was indeed a 
disaster for any nation wanting to be free: Aristocracy, wrote Falsen, had: 
Dismantled all equality between the citizens of Europe. What then do we see in these 
states? Nothing but aristocracy and slaves, great landowners and unfree peasants, 
bound to the soil that they were obliged to plow for their masters.434 
But such a terrible situation of subjugation and slavery did not exist in Norway, and with the 
framing of the new constitution, one had “by the providence of God almighty, retrieved those 
rights, that for several centuries made our forefathers a mighty, honorable and famous 
people.”435 In other words, the new constitution, according to Falsen, ensured, as he had said, 
a sovereignty based on “The natural idea of the division of the lands amongst the citizens.” If 
the bulk of the people owned land, and represented the will of the people, then one had popular 
sovereignty. The law, when expressed in this way, was the expression of the will of the people 
and protected property. The Adler/Falsen draft’s § 15 stated that:  
The law, which is a free and sacred expression of the general will, or the will of the 
whole association, expressed by the majority of its citizens or their representatives, 
must be the same for all, whether it protects or punishes. It can not command anything 
that is not useful for the state … it has to be a secure bulwark against all individuals 
persons, property and honor. It concerns only action, not opinion.436 
It was the people themselves that made the laws, and this made them secure in their property: 
The people can not be bound by any law that they have not themselves given through 
their representatives. This means that no individual can be bereft of even the smallest 
amount of property without his own consent or that of the representative assembly.437 
 
b) Division and unity at the Eidsvoll assembly  
This connection between rule of law (popular sovereignty), the security of property and the 
ancient landed freedom of the people may also be derived from the records of the Eidsvoll 
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convention, although it must be emphasized that there was a myriad of opinions voiced at 
Eidsvoll; many conservative in the direction of absolutism, some only partially congruent with 
the ideal. But the final constitution ended up very similar to Falsen’s ideal.438 That the 
constitution came to represent Falsen’s ideal to high degree is not surprising if we consider 
that of the 112 representatives at the convention, 25 were, like Falsen, relatively wealthy 
lawyers, and furthermore, 15 were theologians who had all studied in Copenhagen under the 
same intellectual milieu as Falsen. Moreover, fourteen out of fifteen member of the 
constitutional committee were state officials like Falsen, five of them lawyers, and all of them 
owned property either landed or real estate. Wedel – Falsen’s main opponent – had also studied 
in Copenhagen. Wedel, however, was a merchant, of which there where eighteen at the 
Eidsvoll assembly. But it was state officials, the category to which Falsen belonged, who 
constituted the largest group: 57 in total.439   
 
It is common when discussing the negotiations at the Eidvoll National Assembly to divide the 
assembly into two major groups: one which advocated for an independent Norwegian state 
within a loose union with Sweden, and one which advocated full and complete independence. 
The first group was led by Count Wedel, who had not abandoned his plans of a Norwegian 
free constitution within a union with Sweden. This group of men, of course, did not conflate 
Sweden with slavery; for them, it was in everything Danish, and particularly in Prince 
Christian Frederick himself that one saw the spectre of absolutism and subjugation. This group 
was in the minority and at the Eidsvoll convention, and was, for the most part, constituted by 
merchants and represented commercial and trading interests. This group was labeled by the 
majority as suspicious at best, as traitors at worst. Christian Fredrik, for one, observed the 
proceedings form outside and was sure, as he wrote in his diary, that they were “plotting evil 
plans.”440 The second group had Falsen as a main figure, and was working towards a 
completely independent Norwegian state. Most of the state officials belonged to this group, as 
well as most of the 37 representatives who were farmers. This group naturally had the support 
of Prince Christian Fredrik, who they envisioned as king of the new state. It was therefore 
perhaps easy for them to conjure up a picture of the Swedish-friendly party as traitors to 
nationality. The disagreement between these two groups however, is not as important as what 
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the two groups agreed upon: they were actually both equally nationalist. Much like the 
infamous dichotomy between the Federalists and the Anti-federalists in early national 
America, these two camps agreed on the goal, but differed in means. What should be 
emphasized is not the difference between the unionist party and the independence party, but 
their similarities – they were both national. Although it is true that many of the constitutions 
drafted at Eidsvoll by the independence party advocated absolutist or semi-absolutist types of 
government, I think what matters the most is what was agreed upon in the end: that the new 
government should be national, that exclusive right to property be absolute and secure through 
the sovereignty of the people - here was an amalgamation of the people, sovereignty and 
property.  
 
During the course of the negotiations at Eidsvoll, the members of the national movement came 
to believe or at least accept Falsen’s idea that within the nation there stood the most robust 
pillars of liberty (the property of the people) – one could see this now in a new light. It was as 
if these notions now emerged out of the twilight dusk of absolutism and were presented in the 
broad day of light under the sun of liberty. The new light made it possible to see distinct people 
with natural rights, a country and a culture uniquely well suited to safeguard such rights. Flasen 
wrote that during the age of absolutism, those who had emphasized the propertied freedom of 
the Norwegian farmer had done so in “a time when one could not speak of the true nature of 
this right, without attacking the fundamental principles of the state”.441 But now that 
absolutism was anyway gone from Norway this right could be realized and serve as the basis 
of sovereignty because: 
While the nations of Europe have carried their chains moaning and groaning, and lost 
all their national worth being, like an animal, treated as a commodity bound to the 
land which they themselves have fertilized with their sweat, the sons of the North have 
been practically the only people bestowed with human rights and civic liberties.442 
To reiterate, the “sons of the north” enjoyed “human rights civic liberties”, because of the land 
rights they had; the Norwegians were not “bound to the land” like serfs, they were self-owners, 
and thus free. It were these rights and liberties that the new constitution drafted at Eidsvoll 
was to protect. The committee tasked with writing the constitution at Eidsvoll insured the 
assembly when its preliminary work was done that, “the committee have, during its work, 
continuously taken into account civic liberty, the security of property and an equal distribution 
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of all rights.”443 This sums up the essence of the national ideology. Or, as one member of the 
convention put it, “no obstacles must now or in the future be allowed to obstruct the protection 
of the right to property, unless it is against the general interest of the state.”444 In Norway, as 
in America, the rights of the individual became based on what was seen as the individual’s 
natural right to the fruits of his labour; “Nature itself,” it was said, “proclaims and demands 
the right of freedom from subjugation for he who by the toil of his hands and the sweat of his 
brows makes the earth yield fruits.” Again we see the centrality of land, “the earth,” to have 
the right to the fruits it yields. This right was “the most natural and fundamental of human 
rights,” and it was therefore, “the most sacred of rights amongst citizens … and a vital pillar 
of any just constitution.”445  
 
Conclusion  
We have seen in this chapter how the Norwegian national movement emerged as a response 
to the fact that the Norwegian kingdom was cut off from its sovereign head in Copenhagen as 
a result of the Napoleonic Wars (1814). But we have also seen that the ideas that came to 
dominate the national movement was formed in the decades before 1814. The most central 
idea was that of the free smallholding Norwegian farmer (the odelsbonde). There were 
relatively many of these farmers in 1814 (60% of the farmers) and this reality, and the idea of 
landed property as the basis of individual freedom, became central elements of the national 
ideology and formed the way in which the state became constituted. The reality and the idea 
of smallholding farmers came to form the basis for what I have called a conceptual 
amalgamation between people, property and sovereignty. This was the core of the national 
ideology and it meant that sovereignty of the people was based on the people’s ownership of 
property, and that such sovereignty was seen as the only legitimate sovereignty – that is a 
sovereignty that could protect the property rights of the individuals. Because of this we can, 
in Norway like in America, talk about the nation as a propertied community. And in Norway, 
as in America, there developed different understandings of how to best secure the right of 
property within the nation that built upon different understandings of property.  It is to this 
that we turn in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Sovereignty from property to people In 
Norway: Fulfillment of the general will     
Outline of the argument  
This chapter explores and explains more deeply the logic of the national ideology as it was 
after a Norwegian nation-state had been created. I look at various ways in which the property 
rights of the individual and national freedom were seen to be fulfilled as the nation went from 
an agrarian to an industrial society. As with the American case, I apply the term the first form 
of the nation and the second form of the nation, which will be discussed in turn.  
Discussion of the first form of the nation covers primarily the time period between 1814 and 
1815. This section shows how the amalgamation of property, people and sovereignty was 
constituted in a way where sovereignty of the people, the right to property and the rule of law 
were seen as secured through a propertied democracy based on landed or real property. There 
will also be discussion of the idea of division of powers as central to the maintenance of 
national freedom. I rely mostly on the journal of the Eidsvoll proceedings in this, but I also 
invoke the first scholarly commentary on the constitution (1815) by lawyer Henrik Steenbuch. 
Falsen’s commentary on the constitution with regards to the odelsrett is also a central 
document (1815). The vindication of the odelsrett at Eidsvoll will be used as a primary 
example. This first section will also show how the division of sovereignty into a popular-based 
legislative branch and a hereditary executive branch was integrated into the vision of national 
freedom. 
The second form of the nation might be said to have formed with the implementation of 
parliamentary democracy in 1884, but it was based on changes in the social and economic 
structure of the nation as it became increasingly more industrialized and market-oriented. The 
timeframe of this section is 1830-1884, and the section explicates how the amalgamation of 
property, people and sovereignty became constituted in a way where the right to property 
became more abstract and separated from real property, and connected instead to the 
individual as the owner of his or her labour power. This is explored primarily through the 
unification of national sovereignty resulting from the implementation of parliamentary 
democracy. I trace this development to the first years of the nation’s existence, when it was 
normally the elite (Falsen, for example) who wanted to unify the two branches of government 
in order to create more efficient rule, while the mass of the people, particularly the farmers, 
were against it. I look briefly at the farmers’ opposition to this during the 1830s, and on an 
opposing elite ideology from the “intelegentz” group.  
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Then I move to the 1860s, when the social basis of the conflict changed, and became so the 
mass wanted to unify sovereignty, making the parliament, in effect, the only medium of 
sovereignty, by implementing parliamentary democracy. I connect this to increasing 
industrialization and urbanization during this period. 
During the 1870s, farmer and solicitor Johan Sverdrup became the unequivocal leader of the 
coalition (known as the Venstre movement) that propagated parliamentary democracy, and it 
is mostly through his speeches that this section builds its argument. As with the Republicans 
in America, Sverdrup’s fight for parliamentary democracy was connected to a changed 
conception of property that can be traced at least from the 1850s as meaning primarily the 
right to the fruits of one’s labour, and which went hand-in-hand with the vindication of 
expanded franchisee. I start this section by looking at the suffrage debate, and then move to 
the debate about unification of sovereignty. I will also look at some counter-arguments in 
regards to both suffrage expansion and parliamentary democracy, primarily through the 
writings of lawyer, professor and Member of Parliament Anton Martin Schweigaard (1808-
1870), and his friend, lawyer and Prime Minister Frederik Stang (1808-1884).      
 
The first form of the nation: ancient liberties and new freedoms   
a) The union with Sweden  
At the end of the Eidsvoll proceedings, Professor Georg Sverdrup exaltedly exclaimed: 
Restored is the ancient throne of Norway …  May the wisdom and power that was 
bestowed upon our kings of old, be bestowed also upon he the first, which we, the 
freemen of Norway, have chosen today out of thankfulness, and as uniformly with the 
wish of the whole people, to be our king...446 
The king that the “freemen of Norway” had chosen was Christian Frederik, but he was soon 
forced to abdicate the throne. The new Norwegian state was not able to maintain its 
independence very long. During the summer of 1814, Karl Johan moved his army from the 
continent to the eastern borders of Norway to claim what had been promised him by the Treaty 
of Kiel. After a short war in early August, the Norwegian forces surrendered, and Christian 
Fredrik signed a treaty with Karl Johan effectively forcing Christian Fredrik to abdicate and 
leave the country. The Norwegian Parliament was thus forced to accept Karl Johan as king 
and enter in a union with Sweden. The Norwegian constitution of 17 May was allowed to be 
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kept largely in the form that it was, but with the necessary amendments to make it compatible 
with a union with Sweden, in which Norway was not to be an independent kingdom.  Because 
of the union with Sweden, the first form of the Norwegian nation was not realized in pure 
form, as sovereignty was not unitary within the nation; one of the branches of sovereignty – 
the executive branch – was not connected back inwards to the nation as a whole, but outwards 
to an external element. Still, as Sverdrup put it, “the freemen of Norway” were vested with 
legislative power in Norway, and they were seen to represent “the wish of the whole people” 
of Norway.  These freemen were largely the men of property, and it was they who came to 
secure rule of law and the sovereignty of the people in the first form of the nation.  
 
b) Free men, dependent men, and the happiness of the whole  
Under the first form of the nation, it was mostly acknowledged that there were dependent and 
independent men. Here, dependent men could not be trusted with enfranchisement. Lawyer 
Henrik Steenbuch (1774-1839) wrote in his commentary to the 1815 constitution that:  
Only a small part of the inhabitants of our state are sufficiently independent and 
enlightened so as to be suited for enfranchisement. The wellbeing of the whole 
demands that the people be divided into enfranchised and disenfranchised.447 
Steenbuch had studied law in Copenhagen, and his interpretation of the constitution was the 
first academic work on the constitution. Later he taught law at the University of Christiania, 
were he was an advocate of natural rights theories. He was a defender of the position of the 
sovereign people in the constitution, and he was an active patriot, publishing works on 
Norwegian history and law.448 We can see in Steenbuch’s interpretation of the constitution the 
notion that the “wellbeing of the whole” (or “the will of the whole people” as Sverdrup put it 
in the quote provided in the introduction) is maintained by rule of the few: independent men, 
the men of landed property. Only such men could rule because they were free. Steenbuch 
wrote that, “Free is he who subsists by himself; independent, he who does not subsist by the 
will of another.” Moreover, wrote Steenbuch, “he who is more or less dependent upon others” 
could not be granted the right to vote.449 In 1814, the line between dependent and independent 
had been relatively clearly drawn in the constitution. Unlike in the American case, the 
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Norwegian national constitution stated specifically who was to be vested with legislative 
power in the new nation; it was first and foremost men of real property. Paragraph 50 stated 
that: 
Enfranchisement is to be given only to those Norwegian citizens that are 25 years or older, 
and have been living in the country for five years, and have either:  
a) a state office 
b)  Landed property or have leased land for at least five years 
c) Is a bourgeois, or have property in a city worth at least 300 rigsbankdallaer450  
Although the state officials were given the right to vote regardless of property ownership, 
property – and especially real landed property – was held as particularly important to the 
preservation of liberty. Carl Fredrik Erhenvard – a Swedish political refugee to Denmark after 
his involvement in the murder of Swedish King Gustav 3 in 1792, and friend of Falsen – had 
sent by request of Falsen a pamphlet that was read at the Eidsvoll convention. After 
systematically discussing various constitutions and forms of government, the pamphlet 
concluded that, “It seems to me that ownership of a certain value of real property is a suitable 
measurement of enfranchisement.” This was an axiom Erhnvard held: “we all agree that the 
enfranchised must own landed property of a certain value.” 451  The Adler/Falen constitutional 
draft stated that an individual was independent if he owned property or a certain amount of 
capital, and that in order to have the right to vote, “one must own property or earn a certain 
income.”452 The purpose of such restrictions was not exclusion as such; indeed, as it was 
written in the constitutional draft: “the purpose of the foundation of any state is the happiness 
of the whole.”453 Steenbuch noted the importance of rule of law in his commentary to the 
constitution: “all agree, that the laws are to govern, and not the men.”454 This was to secure 
individual property rights through rule by propertied men. Man, wrote Steenbuch, has “a right 
to support himself, a right he has received not as a gift from his fellow men but from the hand 
of nature.”455 One could theorize this in the following way, explained Steenbuch: “1) 
appropriation of property, 2) infringement on this, 3) the creation of an association, and 4) the 
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establishment of a state.”456 This meant that, in actuality, the right to support oneself was 
maintained by establishing a state which gave the individual certain acquired rights, the first 
of which was “the right to property.”457 Steenbuch explained: 
To enjoy his natural and acquired rights, the individual enters into a state. By a state 
or a civic constitution one means a union begun between a certain number of people 
to secure their natural rights by laws. The main purpose for the establishing of any 
state must thus be to secure to each individual his external freedom. External freedom 
the citizen have when his natural and acquired rights knows no other restriction that 
what is necessary for the existence of the state. This freedom of the citizen rests on 
two foundations, first, that no laws are given that are not strictly necessary for the 
existence of the state, and second, that the citizen may do anything that is not against 
any law of this nature. Different from civic freedom is political freedom. The latter is 
sustained by the participation of the citizens in the legislative power. The citizen is 
politically free when he obeys no other law than that to which he has given his consent 
(directly or by a representative); he has civic liberty when he obeys no other law than 
that which is expressed by the general will... the one may exist without the other, the 
main purpose of the state is thus only a negative happiness.458    
Steenbuch here explains a central point about freedom in the first form of the nation. It was 
men who were politically free (the men of landed property) that were to govern and make laws 
that expressed “the general will.” And, like in America, we see that individuals seen to have a 
natural right to property decide to give up some of this natural freedom in order to secure their 
right to property. Property could be secured only by establishing a civic state where rule by 
men with property ensured the right to property and the wellbeing of the whole.  
 
Poet, writer and historian Henrik Wergeland (1808-1845), a generation after the constitution 
was written, expressed very well how the right to property and rule of law were connected to 
the happiness of the whole and the rule of law. Wergeland was chronically opposed to the 
establishment. He was an ardent romantic nationalist and notorious for his drinking habits, lust 
for women and his stubbornness, which on several occasions led him into fist fights with those 
who disagreed with him. This was a behavior somewhat unsuitable to a man of his position: 
he was the son of a priest and founding father, and he was himself educated to be a priest. But 
naturally his radicalism and behavior caused him considerable trouble finding a position as a 
priest. Instead, he spent his time writing poems, prose, and pamphlets/magazines for the 
public’s enlightenment. His literary production is enormous and impressive (for example, in 
                                                     
 
456 Steenbuch, 1815: P. VII. 
457 Steenbuch, 1815: p. VII. 
458 Steenbuch, 1815: p. VIII. 
158 
 
1830, he published a deep and profound philosophical poem, which was the most voluminous 
work published in any Nordic language at the time). Wergeland’s worldview was built on a 
personal and romantic/enlightenment Christianity that, for example, rejected the doctrine of 
hell and that of Jesus as a holy man or god. The central theme of his philosophy was love and 
enlightenment built on a fundamental spiritualism. He saw history as a God-directed story of 
progress and love, and held love of the nation and individual rights as especially important.459  
Wergeland’s national vision is expressed for example in his poem “Normandens katechisme” 
(The catechism of the Norwegian, 1832). Here, he asked rhetorically, “is the right to property 
sacred?”, and answered:  
Do not desire what belongs to thy neighbor, but protect his life and property with your 
own! Only by the security of thy neighbor can your own security be firm. Violate thy 
neighbor’s right, and violate thus your own.460  
The security of property for the propertied man was also that of he who did not have property. 
For as Wergeland explained, the nation gave everyone this right: the fatherland was the source 
of all the power a citizen had, it gave him freedom of religion and of speech, and  
The right to enjoy the fruits which groweth form his sweat, to be secure in his goods 
and his person, to stand up against he that which subdues right, even if he wears a 
crown.461  
The Norwegian had the right to be “secure in his goods and in his person” – the Norwegian 
was, in other words, free under his constitution; toward the end of the poem, Wergeland asked 
the Norwegian, “What are you?”, and he answered, “Freeborn northman … slavery I hate more 
than the pest … my father placed my cradle under the sun of liberty.”462 Freedom from slavery 
meant to live in a state where the right to property was sacred. And this being so in Norway, 
“the working man” was bestowed with “civic honor,” and he was “equal to his master in right 
and rank” to acquire property, a right which was maintained through “reverence to the law – 
the highest authority, king of the Norwegians.”463 
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In Wergeland’s romantic vision, there was perhaps no material restrictions for who could be a 
lawmaker (“I believe that to the parliament, elections should not be by rank, but decided by 
the degree of enlightenment of a man,” he wrote in his Catechism),464 but, as we saw, real 
property was set as a central qualification to participate in legislation by the 1814 generation. 
Wergeland also hinted to the importance of landed property for the existence of freedom. In 
his history of the constitution (1841), he referred to the odelsrett and the odelsbonde and 
contrasted the freedom that this right conferred on men against the subjugation of despotic 
rule.  The Norwegians, wrote Wergeland in the first volume of his history, were a “people of 
Odelsmænd, with such a simple and patriotic fear and unwillingness against the corrupting 
forces of the Danish despotic rule.”465 For such people, the constitution as it was given at 
Eidsvoll (with its property rights qualifications for the vote) in 1814 was in perfect 
correspondence with their nature, because it represented their ancient propertied freedom: 
“The Norwegian people did not see the constitution as something new and strange; but rather 
as a restoration, as a restitio in intergum, of the old internal state, of its ancient freedom.”466 
The emphasis and importance placed on landed property must be understood in relation to the 
agrarian landed context in which the national movement worked, and indeed for almost half a 
century there was a consensus in the national movement that the constitution of 1814, with its 
property qualifications for enfranchisement, was the best way to secure freedom. It was this 
that constituted popular sovereignty. Indeed, from 1814 till 1869, no attempts were made by 
the parliament to fundamentally alter the franchise.467  
 
c) The odelsrett, the farmer, and national freedom  
The debates surrounding the odelsrett in 1814 give an indication on the importance of landed 
property, and how popular sovereignty was understood in relation to this. Falsen was one of 
the strongest advocates of the odelsrett and its importance for national freedom in the 1814 
generation. One year after the constitutional convention, he published a book whose sole 
purpose was to show the importance of this right in regards to the constitution. He concluded 
in the book that the odelsrett was to the Norwegian “the most sacred of rights which have 
given him his freedom,” and it was a “necessary precondition for its persistence into the future 
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and for future generations.”468 The odelsrett, wrote Falsen was not simply a right to property, 
it was “a right that made him (the farmer) free both from the state and from taxes.”469 Falsen 
pointed to the ancient Norwegian kingdom to demonstrate the usefulness and common sense 
of the odelsrett:  
It was the men of landed property or the Odelsmend that exercised legislative power. 
The right to represent the nation at the Ting, and to take part in the legislation, was as 
our history and the old laws demonstrate, not personal; it was attached to the land, and 
so it had to be, as those that owned land were the only ones that were fit to do military 
service, and to decide on taxes … that several small landholdings is a safe way and 
necessary precondition for the securing of the liberty of the people, and a 
constitutional monarchy’s longevity, is a truth on which the politicians and 
philosophers of recent times all agree.470   
The right to legislative power (sovereignty) was “attached to the land” and “several small 
landholdings” were “a safe and necessary precondition for the securing of the liberty of the 
people.” The odelsrett secured equality and happiness because it kept the land equally 
distributed amongst the farmers:  
As long as the farms are small, divided between many, we can see that the customs 
are being respected, that the laws are being respected, in short, that the states remain, 
perhaps not powerful, but at least they remain happy.471 
Another supporter of the Odelsrett asked rhetorically at the Eidvoll assembly:  
What is the reason that, amongst the nations, only the Norwegian farmer owns his 
land, and thus enjoys that great right, that nature itself defends, that is, that he who 
with his labour and the sweat of his brows makes the earth yield fruits, has the right 
to the fruits of this work, and not be in the position of those that are merely servants 
of others; 
To which he proposed an answer himself: 
has not the odlesrett always been the guardian angel that have preserved the 
Norwegian farmer from that evil, that in all other lands – to larger or lesser extent – 
subdues this honorable class?472 
What was this “evil”? What made men “servants of others”? In the past it had been 
“hierarchical feudal aristocracy that destroyed all equality between citizens.”473 But in the 
present, it was the moneyed interest. Proponents of the odelsret said that if this right was 
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abandoned, it could easily happen that a few rich men would buy up all the land. Another 
member of the constitutional convention asserted that the odelsrett: 
Stops certain rich citizens from acquiring whole areas of land … and thus domination, 
which would turn the mass of the citizens, those that work hard and well, into slaves 
and weaken the power of the state.474 
The odlesrett was “the true pillar of Norway, a bulwark against aristocracy and a security of 
the wellbeing of the farmer and his noble spirit,” and if this pillar were to be removed then:  
All the land will be in the hands of a few rich men – and behold! Our now noble 
farmers will sink into the slavery of Europe’s past peoples or to that of the Russian 
slaves of today and inherit their Slavic spirit – I would then look in tears upon my 
fatherland!475 
Falsen agreed with this. Without the odelsrett, he wrote:  
More people would have to subsist by fewer means, and the mass of the people will 
become miserable … the rich would become hard and unjust; and what could be more 
natural? They have no right, and this they must surely know for themselves.476 
The odelsrett was to secure the property of the Norwegian from men “who have no right,” 
guaranteeing widespread ownership of land and thus popular sovereignty. In short, the 
odelsrett made the farmer free because it protected his property and capital from aristocrats, 
merchants and the authorities alike.  It ultimately secured the Norwegian his freedom to 
legislate and decide over his property and to tax himself, thus making him sovereign, just as 
he had done in ancient times. Steenbuch also noted in his commentary on the constitution that, 
“ Odel, in ancient times, meant property free of any taxes,” and he noted that in his own day, 
many saw this as a way in which “ the people, by their own right, consented to the taxes they 
would pay, and thus, by this right, it is almost as if the ancient freedom and Odlesrett is 
restored.”477 This point goes straight to the core of the national ideology in the first form of 
the nation: in order to be free, the legislative power must in the hands of propertied men, so 
that they themselves can decide over their property and ensure the rule of law. The advocates 
of the odelsrett may be seen as representing how this ideology was manifested in the first form 
of the nation: as a propertied democracy.  
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d) Division of powers and elite fear of farmer rule  
It is, however, important to note that, as such, the odesrett was debated before 1814 and 
continued to be so also in the new nation.478 Moreover, the glorification of the farmer by the 
elite was neither universal nor persistent, and it even waned in Falsen himself when he met 
farmers that did not live up to his expectations. Falsen’s friend, the priest Nordahl Brun, who 
was himself, as we saw in the previous chapter, very much a supporter of the odelsrett and the 
farmer during the last decades of the eighteenth century, wrote in a letter to fellow priest Claus 
Pavels in 1815 that stated, “I am now worried about the plurality of farmers [in the parliament] 
… if this class is to organize our state, then God help us.”479 Pavels himself was also not 
convinced of the ability of the class of farmers to rule, as they would:  
Bring upon our country a thousand misfortunes … most people in the higher classes 
fear a farmers domination, that would with its majority be able, through legislation, to 
realize the most unreasonable and damaging projects.480  
It would take time, thought Pavels, before “our citizens, our proprietors and our farmers will 
be sufficiently cultivated so as to place the wellbeing of the nation in their hands.”481 Count 
Wedel felt the immaturity of the farmer, too. In the first ordinary parliamentary session of the 
new nation, he participated in a debate with a farmer who Wedel thought was so rudely spoken 
that he suggested having the farmer in question expelled from the parliament.482 The propertied 
farmer and his possibility to partake in legislation represented the ideal of the new nation’s 
ideas about sovereignty and property, but in practice, thought many, they could not alone 
uphold the vision that they were supposed to represent.483 However, in the national ideology, 
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there was in fact a safety mechanism against “farmers domination”; this safety was a division 
of powers which would secure balance. It was this function that the monarch was to have, and 
this is one reason why monarchism was pervasive at Eidsvoll. As we saw, this was integrated 
in Falsen’s vision of the propertied farmer when he pointed to the fact that the odelsbonde, in 
ancient times, ruled in cooperation with the king. Just as it had supposedly been in the medieval 
ages, so too was it today. Falsen had written that in the medieval ages, “all sovereignty was 
vested in the people, which thus kept in their hands legislative power, and gave the king 
accordingly the executive power.” The new constitution mirrored this. The final constitution 
stated that, “The king is vested with the executive power” (§3), while “the people holds the 
right of legislation” (§49).484 The king also had a suspensory veto in matters of legislation, and 
a monarchy was seen as central for the happiness of the nation: 
The monarchy should be hereditary under our noble prince Christian Frederik, which 
is offered the crown of Norway for him and his descendants – Because the history of 
the world have never provided us with an example where states with an elected 
executive have remained happy – countries with an elective executive are always prey 
to discord, the influence of foreign powers, and the most unhappy inner and external 
disagreements.485 
Perhaps republics could be happy in their infant years, it was said, but “rarely does this last – 
it is turned into an aristocracy or an oligarchy.”486 We can see also in the Adler/Falsen 
constitutional draft the important role that the division of powers and the monarch were given. 
It did not help simply to respect the universal right to property, as the draft stated: 
Be the foundation of the state ever so strong, it cannot be safe from falling apart if not 
the various parts of the structure are in balance. Many states have struggled to find 
such a balance, and the paths through which it has been attempted has varied a lot. 
But it seems that this balance has been best secured in those states where the citizens 
themselves decide on the rules by which they are to be governed, and where they have 
subjected themselves to an executive power that, although it does not stand above law, 
is vested with the appropriate means to secure against external or internal usurpation. 
The separation of the legislative power from the executive power must thus be the 
main point in any constitution seeking balance…487   
Balance was a central point. At the Eidsvoll assembly, delegate Army Captain Peter Motzfeldt 
(1777-1854) worried that “one single class may be over powered.”488 And he continued: 
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The convention have already agreed that the people shall exercise the legislative 
power through their representatives. But how this is best done without chaos or 
without danger of the legislative right of the people being violated … is a big 
problem.489 
His answer was that: “the legislative power of the people is circumscribed - which is a 
fundamental component – and a security for the freedom of the people.”490 The power of the 
farmers had to be restricted. This was also pointed to in Erhenvard’s pamphlet: even though 
the pamphlet stated that the farmer was “the only class where the member’s personal interest 
coincides with that of the country,” it also had to be admitted that: 
These do not normally have the appropriate knowledge (to rule a state), and taking 
into consideration that only farmers are members of this class, then one realizes how 
much ignorance that rules there.491 
Therefore: 
The executive power should be in the hands of the king through his ministers which 
are to insure that all that is decided, is in correspondence with the laws. Banking, 
taxation and general legislation on the other hand, should belong solely to the 
representatives of the nation.492 
As Steenbuch similarly noted in his commentary, if the laws were to govern, then one had to 
“thwart the possibility that the lawgivers act out of passion.”493 The fear that farmers and other 
groups unfit for rule would acquire too much power proved itself to be true as the nineteenth 
century progressed. By 1884, a large group of farmers, in alliance with the newly emergent 
middle class, took the power of the whole state and changed the form of the nation. Like in 
America, coming industrialization and expansion of market relations ushered in a 
transvaluation of property and the second form of the nation. 
 
The second form of the nation: the transference of sovereignty and the 
trasnvaluation of property  
a) The socio economic foundations  
The second form of the nation in Norway must be seen against the background of the general 
social and economical development during the nineteenth century. Up until 1884 it was still a 
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small elite of state officials (practically the same in number as in 1814) and the bourgeoisie, 
along with the self-owning farmers, that ruled the country.494 Indeed, while the propertied 
precondition for the suffrage in 1814 made Norway one of the most democratic countries in 
Europe at the time (7% of the population), these same qualifications had actually slightly 
decreased the number of enfranchised by 1891, making Norway one of the least democratic 
countries in Europe.495 Amongst the disenfranchised were landless tenants and a new group of 
different kinds of wage labourers that had emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Norway had seen a rapid population growth, urbanization and industrialization in the century 
that unfolded after 1814. There was a great emigration from Norway during this century – 
primarily to the US – and the number of people that emigrated from Norway in the course of 
the century was almost equal to the number of people living in Norway in 1801; however, 
despite this, the population in Norway had gone from 884,000 to almost two million by the 
end of the nineteenth century. Most of these people still lived in rural areas, and farming 
remained a dominant livelihood; the number of farms actually expanded, and self-owning 
remained dominant, but an increasing group of landless tenants, functionaries and industrial 
and skilled workers set a firm mark on relations of property and appropriation by the closing 
of the century. During the 1840s, large factories started emerging, especially around Oslo, but 
also in the other big cities such as Bergen and in Trondheim. In 1850 there were still no more 
than 12,000 industrial workers in Norway, but by 1875 the number had risen to 44,000 while 
the number of skilled artisans and functionaries had reached 35,000. In 1870 there were also 
53,000 “husmen” 496 – independent tenants which can be classified along with wage workers 
in opposition to the self-owning farmers.497 The number of people living in cities was also 
growing; by 1875, 25% of the population lived in cities and there was an especially intense 
period of industrialization from 1860-1875 in which the number of industrial workers 
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quadrupled.498 One way of understanding this is in relation to what has been called “det store 
hamskiftet” (the great transformation) in the agricultural sector.499 This refers to a change in 
the economics from a predominantly self-sufficiency economy to a more capitalist market 
economy. It has been contested whether or not the Norwegian agrarian sector was not also 
integrated into a market economy way before the 1860s, but this is not the place to engage in 
debates about this. There was, in any case, an expansion or intensification of capitalist market 
relations in the nation as a whole in the years after the 1860s, and the term “det store 
hamskiftet” is covering for society as a whole as a change from a pre-industrial to an industrial 
society. Jørn Sandnes writes:  
Det store hamskiftet is an umbrella term covering social, economic and cultural 
changes in rural Norway in a time when the changes were no longer slow and 
occasional, but fast and pervasive, tending strongly towards a market economy.500      
It might be useful also to invoke Edvard Bull’s term kapitalismens frigjørende fase (the 
liberating phase of capitalism), by which he meant that the time between 1860 and 1920 was 
one where wage labour relations opened up possibilities for the class of people under the self-
owning farmers, and where the farmers became customers for manufactures producing tools 
and providers of raw materials for food production.501 The changes of a bourgeoning industrial 
society brought economic and social crisis; after a general growth from the 1840s to the 1860s, 
the 1870s and 1880s were marked by economic depression, stagnation and massive 
emigration.502 It is also significant, as Østerud writes, that these changes “made the rural 
population as a whole more similar to the urban bourgeoisie, the middle class.”503 The changes 
in socioeconomic relations (the base) brought forth different ideas about property and freedom 
and thus of political rule – it brought forth a transvaluation of property.  
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b) Transvaluation – or the shift from land to labour  
There had been changes in the way in which people thought about property and freedom 
already in the first form of the nation.  For example, in 1850, members of the newly-emerged 
radical labour movement wrote in their newspaper that it was the right to labour that was the 
central right. This was “the new right that knocks on the door of the constitution,” and “the 
claim is that work shall be organized in such a way so that every human being can make a 
living.”504 Marchus Thrane, the leader of the radical labour movement, said that right to make 
a living was opposed to the prevalent claim that “property is sacred” – the right that was really 
sacred, according to Thrane, was that of labour. These notions became the foundation on which 
the second form of the nation was built, and universal male suffrage was a logical conclusion 
of these notions. The labour movement demanded this as the means by which the people could 
secure their property rights to labour. But their demands were met with firm conformism to 
the existing property regime and the rules of enfranchisement. The labour movement soon lost 
its unity and dissolved. However, similar notions, when adopted by the mass of the national 
movement in the decades after 1850, became a powerful force that changed the form of the 
nation.  
 
Like in America, the inner meaning of property and the freedom associated with it changed: it 
was still the same words applied and still the same fundamental meaning, but the content of 
the concept became subject to a transvaluation. Freedom increasingly became understood as 
having the right to the fruits of one’s labour, not just to own real property. We might remember 
that Falsen, for example, had included in his concept of property from 1814 this right, which 
“every citizen have, to enjoy and decide over his lands, his income, over the fruits of his labour 
and diligence.” And Wergeland had written similarly that freedom for the individual meant 
“the right to enjoy the fruits which groweth form his sweat, to be secure in his goods and his 
person.” Indeed, Falsen had also included income from labour as property qualifying for 
enfranchisement in his constitutional draft: “one must own property or earn a certain income.” 
Because of the change in the mode of production to a more industrialized or wage-based 
society, a shift gradually happened from land to labour as the focal point of freedom. This can 
be seen in the debates about suffrage reform.  
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c) Suffrage reform: Johan Sverdrup vs A. M. Schweigaard   
It was what came to be known as the Venstre coalition that drove the change from land to 
labor. This was a broad and diverse coalition that was constituted of small farmers, rural 
religious conservatives, city radical and intellectuals, teachers, and a large group of 
functionaries.505 The Venstre coalition was not a party in the modern sense of the word until 
the early 1880s, but it is possible to detect a continuum from the 1850s until the 1880s, which 
may be exemplified by Johan Sverdrup (not to be confused with professor Georg Sverdrup 
from the early stages of the national movement).  
 
Sverdrup was born in 1816 and was the son of a farmer. In 1841 he graduated in law, and 
worked as a solicitor from 1851, until he bought a farm in the late 1860s. His career in national 
politics started in the early 1850s when he became a Member of Parliament, distinguishing 
himself as an idealistic radical akin to the French revolutionary tradition. One of his first 
suggestions was universal suffrage in local government; it was not sanctioned, but the debate 
came up again on a national level in the 1860s and 1870s.506 In 1869, 21 suggestions were 
present in parliament as how to modify the franchise, all of which suggested broadening 
suffrage based on income or taxes.507 1869 may thus mark an important point in the formation 
of the Norwegian nation, as it marks a point in which a majority of the members of the national 
movement came to accept a change in the power structure of the nation – from a propertied 
democracy to a national democracy. The idea of transvaluation was implicit in this – none of 
the parliamentary drafts suggested universal male suffrage, but because they were based on 
income or tax-payment, they set, in theory, no limits to enfranchisement and thus abandoned 
the idea that only real property could confer independence on an individual. Contemporary 
critics saw this as well, commenting that if “the floodgates of democracy were opened”, it 
would be impossible to stop it again, and it would go further than anyone would want, ending 
“at its opposite, at its counter point, after absolute democracy, follows absolute domination, 
Caesarism.”508 Johan Sverdrup, however, had no fear of this and said that “the greatest capital 
                                                     
 
505 Mjeldheim, Leiv, Folkerørsla som vart parti: Venstre frå 1880 åra til 1905, Universitetsforlaget, 
Bergen, (1984), p 101-105. 
506For information on Sverdrup I have relied on Halvdan Koth`s three volume biography. 
507 Danielsen, Rolf, Det Norske storting gjennom 150 år, Bind 2: tidsrommet 1870-1908, Gyldendal, 
Oslo, (1964), p. 25-26.  
508 Quoted in, Danielsen, 1964: p. 29-30. 
169 
 
a country can have, is its people, with this no amount of landed property can compete.”509 Even 
the wording is interesting here; the fact that he compares the people to capital, and directly 
confronts the rule of landed property. But Sverdrup saw no conflict between the wage 
labourers and the old propertied voters. It was not the case, he said, as some thought, that “the 
high and the low are at war with each other.” On the contrary, “they are bound to each other 
by tradition, work, property and family.”510 The matter in the issue of enfranchisement, said 
Sverdrup, was: 
A question of common sense in our time. About new industries, new wealth, new 
interests, new developments and new social formations. It is in regards to the new 
economical, moral and intellectual forces in our society. It is a matter about newly 
sprung antagonisms that demand equality. It is new and old that demand 
amalgamation, or if one wants to call it so, the idea of unification … a state system 
more fitted to the future with demands of people’s representation…511  
Sverdrup here quite directly says that the expansion of suffrage is an adaption to a new proto-
industrial reality with its new forms of wealth and capital. This implied different conceptions 
of property and freedom that did not see the wage worker as dependent and dangerous to the 
nation’s freedom; it was now possible to combine wage earners and propertied farmers in the 
same understanding of freedom. Like in Lincolnian America, wage labour was seen as a 
freedom in itself, a way to raise one’s position. Another debater agreed with Sverdrup that to 
include a new class of voters would not be dangerous, and he pointed to the possibility of the 
wage labourer to improve his position: “the new classes will feel a natural affinity to the older 
voters and groups and will share their interests … the wage worker has as his goal to one day 
become a farmer.”512 Indeed, expanded suffrage was, said farmer and Member of Parliament 
Ole Gabriel Ueland (1799-1870), a “fulfillment of the principles of the constitution” – this is 
exactly the same rhetoric that Lincoln used in America, when he claimed his principles as a 
fulfillment of the Declaration of Independence. Others in Norway invoked the “liberal 
tradition upon which our constitution is built.”513 There was no contradiction now in including 
wage labourers in politics and preserving the freedom of the constitution. On the contrary, 
including the wage labourers would be a realization of the principles of the freedom set down 
in the constitution. But not everyone thought so, and Sverdrup’s movement met powerful 
ideological resistance from people who claimed to also represent the principles of the 
                                                     
 
509 Johan Sverdrup, April 29th, 1873, in Havstad, Lars, Johan Sverdrup: taler i stortinget, 1851-1880, 
Græbes bogtrykkeri, København, (1882), p 354. 
510 Danielsen, 1964: p. 31. 
511 Johan Sverdrup, April 29th, 1873, in Havstad, 1882: p. 342. 
512 Quoted in Danielsen, 1964: p. 30. 
513 Quoted in Kaartvedt, 1964: p. 65. 
170 
 
constitution and the unity of the nation. A considerable proponent to Sverdrup during the first 
decades of his career as an MP was A.M. Schweigaard – a conservative professor of law and 
economy and one of the most distinguished politicians and intellectuals in Norway during the 
nineteenth century.  
 
In recent years, Schweigaard has been recognized as one of the most important nation builders 
in the nineteenth century, having a consistent and pervasive nationalist worldview. He 
exemplifies well the principles of the first form of the nation. He distinguished himself already 
in his primary school as the best student of his class, and in 1828 he graduated with the best 
results ever produced in Norway up until that time. At the age of 25 he was proclaimed by his 
friend as “the greatest son that Norway had produced.” When he was 27, he travelled to 
Germany and France where he wrote a polemical critique in German of Hegelian idealist 
philosophy and of German law, published in French and Danish academic journals. In 1840 
he became professor of law, political economy and statistics at the University of Christiania 
(the city of Oslo held this name during the whole nineteenth century), where he became an 
advocate of an empiricist and utilitarian approach to science, greatly influencing the study of 
these subjects. From the mid-1830s until 1870, he applied his academic principles in a long 
career as a Member of Parliament, where he marked himself as the most distinguished 
conservative. 514 This is clear in his ideas about suffrage. Schweigaard pointed to the absurdity 
of universal democracy as opposed to a propertied democracy; for example, said Schweigaard, 
suppose that the people decided that landed property was to be equally distributed amongst 
the propertyless? It was clear to him that this would not work; “the foundations of the state 
will burst asunder.”515 A majority did not make rights and could not alone make law. There 
had to be a rule by the men who were truly independent. Schweigaard believed that the main 
issue in expansion of suffrage “was to draw a line which could prevent the person who paid 
one shilling in taxes from getting an influence equal to the person paying 19/20.”516 
Schweigaard here continues the line of argument from 1814: the distinction between 
dependent and independent individuals based on ownership of wealth.  
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Schweigaard based his argument on what we might call a realist position. He defended the 
existing propertied conditions for the vote because it was based on actual and tangible things; 
he had little sympathy for his opponents’ “general arguments, which could be applied to 
anything and nothing.” If something was to be done for the masses, he said, it should be to 
give them corn or potatoes. It was not the franchisee itself that did good, but material security 
– this had to come first. “Did not the propertyless hold a grant to land as the fundamental thing, 
more so than merely to be granted the right to vote,”517 Schweigaard asked rhetorically. But 
apparently, they did not think so, at least not according to Johan Sverdrup. Discussing the 
nature of the propertied qualifications for voting, Sverdrup asked the parliament:  
Imagine that each of us are asked to propose, what we deem to be land of such value 
that it may confer enfranchisement. How many different opinions  would we get? I 
think it would be about as may different answers as there are representatives in this 
hall.518 
One had to realize the consequences of dividing men into enfranchised and disenfranchised 
on account of the size of the property, said Sverdrup: “Is half a shilling to distinguish a 
dependent man from an independent man, a self-sustained man, sufficiently enlightened to be 
an empowered man in our society?”519 Sverdrup further pointed to what he saw as the absurdity 
and the inconsequence of confining the franchise to men of landed property. He asked: “is it 
reasonable that a house worth 150 spd is compared to the capital which is found in the skill 
and labour of a man? Show me he who can honestly say; no, a laboring man is not worth 150 
spd…”520 Instead, Sverdrup suggested basing enfranchisement on taxes, and by doing so, 
“securing the intellectual and economic independence which had been the purpose of the 
constitution.” This proposition was “an expression of an acknowledgement and respect for the 
worker.” We can see clearly from this that Sverdrup invokes the language of labour in order 
to expand the national political community, just as Republicans and abolitionists did in 
American a few decades before in the abolition of slavery. The right to property became 
interwoven with popular sovereignty and linked to property through the right to the fruits of 
ones labour. Property and sovereignty understood in this way implied full democracy said 
Sverdrup. The constitution, he held:  
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Rests on the acknowledgement, that the rights of the people, specifically the right to 
legislation through their sovereignty. Though this system is still in its first stages; what 
has happened so far is only the temporary step of our culture and experience towards 
the realization of the natural sate form, democracy, cleansed through its fight for 
existence.521  
But the idea that democracy (understood as universal male suffrage) was “the natural state 
form” could not be realized without first dealing with the overreaching issues of the 
government ministers accountability. The historian Rolf Danielsen writes:  
The majority required [for expansion of the franchise] in the parliament could only be 
achieved when the issue of expanded franchise became intimately interwoven with 
the issue of the government members responsibility to the parliament, when expansion 
of the franchise had become an integrated part of the complex conflict that in the end 
was to split the representatives in two clearly divided groups.522     
It was when this conflict over government minister’s accountability to the parliament 
intensified in the 1880s that the Venstre movement gathered behind Johan Sverdrup against 
the conservatives in a potent social movement. This conflict was the outer expression of the 
transvaluation of property, in the same way that abolition of chattel slavery became so in the 
US. In what follows, I will spend some time on the debates relating to the ministers 
accountability to the parliament – what has become known as the issue of parliamentary 
democracy. The debates relating to this issue were not directly concerned with the shift from 
land to labour, it was more about good government and the role of the sovereignty of the 
people versus the king. It is nevertheless important to give an overview of this issue because 
this issue and suffrage reform were interconnected and both were carried through in the name 
of the sovereignty of the people. It was only suffrage reform that invoked the shift from land 
to labour, but parliamentary democracy was instrumental in making suffrage reform come 
about. The debates over parliamentary democracy were made within the already-existing 
system of suffrage, by the men who already had the vote and who understood themselves to 
represent the people. Because of this, the shift from land to labour was not invoked in this 
instance, but instead the sovereignty of the people versus the government or the king. Suffrage 
reform and parliamentary democracy were expansions of the sovereignty of the people in 
different directions: suffrage reform downwards, including more people (hence the language 
of land to labour); and parliamentary democracy upwards, inferring on the power of the 
government by the representatives of the people.   
                                                     
 
521 Johan Sverdrup quoted in Koth, Halvdan, Johan Sverdrup I, 1816-1869, Aschehough, Kristiania, 
(1918), 117. 




The issue of access and responsibility of the government ministers to the 
parliament 
a) Parliamentary democracy   
The proponents of parliamentary democracy presented the issue in the form of a bill that gave 
government ministers access and accountability to the parliament. From 1872 to 1880, 
propositions that the ministers of the king (the government) should meet in the parliament and 
be held responsible for their policy were put forth and passed several times by the parliament. 
This required a change in the constitution and, in theory, such a change would mean that the 
parliament would be vested with complete sovereignty within the nation (i.e. parliamentary 
democracy). This proposal was, however, always denied sanction by the king, who assumed 
the right to veto in constitutional matters. When the proposal was denied sanction for the third 
time in 1880, the parliament put forth an impeachment act against the (king’s) government.523 
It had come to be seen by a majority of the then-national movement as unacceptable that the 
king should be able to veto the decisions of the parliament. As one member of the national 
movement put it in 1880, to grant the king an absolute and unchecked executive power meant 
in practice to “turn over the odelsrett that the nation had to the kingdom of Norway, to give it 
away, and replace it with a bond of serfdom.”524  
 
b) Early debates 
This issue of closer integration between the legislative and the executive branch had been 
present since the founding of the new Norwegian state in 1814. During the first years after 
1814, Falsen had put forth suggestions that would give the ministers access to the parliament. 
Falsen wanted to create an efficient and balanced state by unifying sovereignty – that is, by 
creating closer bonds between the legislative and the executive branch. At first quite firm on 
the importance of a strict division of powers, he later held that this was not as important as 
“unity and order,”525 which was to be created by giving more sovereignty to the executive 
branch. There was a dangerous “great abyss,”526 Flasen had said, between the legislative 
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branch and the executive branch, and it was imperative that there be built a bridge over it. 
Faslen’s suggestion was never realized due to protest from the parliament, but others took up 
the idea. Lawyer and statesman Frederik Stang (1808-1884)527 also emphasized the unity of 
the nation and its will, and was for a reform that gave government members admission to the 
parliament. His interpretation of the constitution from 1833 stressed this, and his underlying 
idea may be summed up by his following famous statement:   
The primary principle of a constitutional monarchy is undoubtedly that, that the 
general will, cleansed and moderated by the forms through which it must work 
towards its goal, must be the animating force of all state organisms.528     
The point was to create a functioning coordination between the state powers through which 
the general will could be expressed, but also “cleansed and moderated.” From the 1830s to the 
1870s, Stang, along with Schweigaard, became the leading statesmen and nation builders in 
Norway, both stressing the centrality, activity and unity of the state and its important purpose 
for nation building.529 In their studying days, Stang and Schweigaard had been members of the 
“intelegentz” group – a group of gifted students with Count Wedel530 as their patron. The 
centralized, interventionist liberalism that this group stood for became a ruling ideology during 
the 1830s and 1840s. But the idea of a strong, unified state apparatus was promoted by the 
conservatives only as long as they felt that they would be controlling the state, and could keep 
the farmers at a safe distance.  
 
c) The early farmers’ opposition  
The ideology of Stang, Schweigaard and the Intelegentz was antagonistic to many of the 
interests of the farmers in the parliament during the 1830s and 1840s who wanted the state to 
spend as little money as possible and keep the government members separated from the 
parliament. Farmer Ole Gabriel Ueland became, from 1833, at the first so-called “farmers 
parliament,” a main opponent, especially to Schweigaard in the parliament. Mainly, the 
farmers in the parliament in the 1830s and 1840s feared a closer relationship between the 
legislative and the executive branch because they feared it would make the government 
                                                     
 
527 For biographical information about Stang, see: Svare, Bjarne, Frederik, Stang (2 vols), Aschehoug, 
Oslo, (1939-1950), and Thyness, Paul. (2009, 13. februar). Frederik Stang. I Norsk biografisk 
leksikon. Hentet 27. januar 2015 fra https://nbl.snl.no/Frederik_Stang.  
528Quoted in Kaartevdt, 1964: p. 441. 
529 Seip,1974, Slagstad, 1998.  




stronger and able to impose more taxes and measures on them.531 Farmer Hans Barlien (1772-
1842) wrote in his interpretation of the constitution from 1836 about who had the ultimate 
power in the nation, “here, in our country, the people have the absolute veto,” which meant 
that the parliament was absolutely “unrestricted” in its power.532 Its powers should not be 
interfered with from the government, and it was clear that this was according to the spirit of 
the constitution, according to Barlien:  
If the parliament stay true to the spirit of the constitution; the will of the people, then 
the laws will be just … thus, the Norwegian people have secured for themselves a 
larger part of the powers of the state than any other country in Europe.533  
Barlien here proposes an antagonism between the power that the people “have reserved for 
themselves” and the government. The government was dangerous, and sovereignty was vested 
solely in the people: “all of the power of the state befalls the people, the people are masters in 
their house, in the people lies the sovereignty.”534 To maintain this, it was important that power 
was divided. Indeed, wrote Barlien, “only in the North American states does the people have 
all the power of the state. And who knows for how long that will work?”535 The point about 
keeping the powers of the state separated was to avoid infringements from state officials, to 
avoid, as Farmer John Nergaad (1795-1885) wrote, “taxes and expenses … in the 15 or 16 
years that now have passed [since independence], the expenses of the state have continued to 
grow, and has now reached the double of the original.”536 It was for this reason that the farmers 
should elect their own men to the parliament, and not state officials or other elites, wrote 
Nergaard. And it was exactly this that happened: the parliamentary session of 1833 had more 
farmer MPs than ever before (hence the “farmers parliament”). The thinkers of the Intelegentz 
group regarded this with suspicion; it was a result of the unfortunate “demagogical element” 
of the constitution, wrote one member of the Intelegentz.537 The farmers, with their anti-
centralization and anti-tax policies, did not understand the essentials of running a nation-state: 
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“If one looks at the actual skill and knowledge that the farmer representatives bring to the 
parliament,” he continued: 
Then one sees without doubt that not a single one of them fulfill the requirements that 
one would generally expect  of a representative to the national assembly. Only 
superficial knowledge the of laws of the country, a little historical reading, a bit more 
of religious reading. And their practical knowledge of economy is restricted to the 
workings of the fields where they live, and the ways of live hood there … some idea 
of what in matters of economics and politics concerns our country; that is what is 
missing in the farmers representatives, and will be missing for some time.538 
But the farmers remained relatively strong in the parliament in the coming decades, and as a 
new middle class of wage earners grew from the 1850s, they were also joined by increasing 
numbers from this group. Together they acquired considerable strength in the parliament, and 
started to propose themselves a closer unification between the parliament and the government 
in order to strengthen their own position.    
 
d) The final debates  
The new initiatives for unification of sovereignty came not from the classical farmer’s 
opposition at first, but from Johan Sverdrup, who represented primarily the new classes of 
officials, functionaries and clerks.539 In 1869 (this was, as we remember also the year in which 
suffrage reforms started to be seriously debated), Sverdrup and his followers managed to get 
a bill proposing annual parliamentary meetings sanctioned (before, the parliament had met 
only every three years). Annual parliamentary sessions strengthened the position of the 
parliament, and thus changed the initiative in the issue about closer cooperation between the 
legislative and the executive branch. The conservatives now came to fear that integration 
between the two state powers would give the parliament too much power. 
 
During the 1860s and 1870s, Sverdrup gathered both Ueland and the farmers’ opposition 
behind him, in addition to the new farmers’ opposition from the late 1860s led by farmer Søren 
Jaabæk. Seeing this broad coalition gathered in the parliament every year, the conservatives 
came to believe that it was imperative to keep the government (the executive branch) separate 
from the legislative branch. They saw with unease the populist and demagogical developments 
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in Europe (the revolutions of 1848, and the rule of Napoleon the III in France), and believed 
that the monarchical aspect of the Norwegian constitution was the only bulwark against this.540 
Fredrik Stang for instance, as Prime Minister from 1873 to 1880, actively opposed bills that 
suggested the ministers be responsible to the parliament. Indeed, Stang’s ministry became the 
most powerful bulwark against such attempts.541 Schweigaard perhaps summed up the fear of 
the conservatives when he said that parliamentary reform would be as if “in a way we have 
two governments.”542 It was not, however, a situation of two governments within the nation 
that Sverdrup wanted; rather it was, as he famously said in the Parliamentary Hall, “all power 
and force united here in this hall.”543 And it was precisely this that the conservatives feared; 
that the parliament assumed powers of government. In the conservatives’ minds, there could 
be only one executive, and it should be the King’s government. Division was crucial for the 
conservatives in the 1870s and 1880s. Professor of law T. H. Aschehough, who wrote a three-
volume interpretation of the constitution (written 1875-1885), said that “it is nothing that I fear 
more than absolute and overwhelming power in one hand. The power must be divided if the 
state is to be free.”544 The main conservative newspaper, supporting the idea of a strict division 
of powers, wrote in 1871 that the central issue at stake was whether the people:  
Wanted to keep our constitution as passed on to us, the constitutional monarchy, 
liberty safeguarded through division of powers, and security against abuse and 
inference, and on the other hand, whether they adhered to the principle that ‘division 
of powers is nonsense’, that power should be located only in one place, namely in 
those men, that it is declared represents the will of the people … which have been the 
end of republics of old and new alike, tyranny.545 
The conservative position here is basically a continuation of the prevalent policy in 1814: 
power must be divided, the people cannot be granted unlimited power. However, this 
conservative assertion was founded on a misconception, said Sverdrup. Discussing the matter 
off annual parliamentary sessions, Sverdrup said that it may have been true that the purpose 
of the constitution in 1814 had been “to secure against arbitrary inference, rather than the 
possibility for the people to self-government.”546 However: 
When the constitution had been working for some time, and the circumstances had 
changed and developed … it became clear, after much discord and work, that the 
decisions of the constitution did not correspond to its purpose. The government had 
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power enough, but the power of the people did not have its rightful influence on 
matters.547  
 
e) The will of the people  
It was natural to Sverdrup that the sovereignty of the people should have absolute expression 
through expanded democracy. He asked, when discussing the bill of annual parliamentary 
sessions:  
If, in a society there are forces that know what they want, and have the will to carry it 
through based on our current constitutional frame, if here is agreement amongst the 
electorate, then I cannot for the life of me understand, why anyone should have the 
right to stop them?548  
What was needed, said Sverdrup, was parliamentary democracy; to make the ministers of the 
government accountable to the parliament, to the people:  
That the cause of prolongation [of the parliamentary meetings], this one cause, have 
been so strongly discussed, points to another important matter that is even less 
satisfactory, that of the access and accountability of the ministers to the parliament.549 
But seeing as the king always vetoed this suggestion, the veto that the king had assumed in 
matters of constitutional change became a great obstruction to this cause. Sverdrup said, “if 
one wants to grant the king and absolute veto in matter of constitutional change, then one has 
violated the will of the people. One has wounded the tree of liberty at its roots.”550 To Sverdrup, 
the cause of parliamentary democracy was part of a broader critique of the whole system of 
the state:  
The relationship between a government and the people’s representatives cannot be 
reduced to one single cause which happens to surface from everyday politics … it is 
about the whole system.551 
Here, Sverdrup himself suggests exactly what the quote from Danielsen above suggested, and 
what I have suggested with him: that suffrage reform and parliamentary democracy were 
interconnected in a broader critique of the first form of the nation – a critique of “the whole 
system” by the new middle class. It was the issue of the access and accountability of the 
ministers to parliament that became the tipping point of the system, because it was connected 
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to the Veto power of the king. When the bill was passed for the third time by parliament but 
denied sanction by the king, Sverdrup said again: 
Is the king to have an absolute veto in matters of the constitution? Should the people 
then not have legislative power on this important matter, in the very matter of popular 
sovereignty, its power over their own faith and that of coming generations?552 
It was clear to Sverdrup that by the king’s veto in this matter, and by its unwillingness to 
cooperate, “the government have not shown respect for the general will, nothing is more 
certain.”553 To mend this, Sverdrup and his followers proposed an impeachment act against 
the government (although it was the king that put forth the veto, it was his government that 
was formally responsible for his policy according to the constitution). 1882 was to be an 
election year for the parliament, and Sverdrup waited until after the election to propose the 
impeachment act. This was due to tactical reasons: in the lead up to the campaign, Sverdrup 
campaigned fiercely in order to raise the support needed for the impeachment act. In the end 
Sverdrup got more than 60% of the vote, and it was after this that the Venstre coalition 
emerged as a political party.554 Sverdrup now felt ready for the impeachment trial. But 
although Venstre had a parliamentary majority, it was uncertain how the impeachment would 
end: it was not a given that the judges would judge in favor; the conservatives were discussing 
plans of a coup d’état; and local Venstre parties all over the country trained for war. In the 
end, however, the trial ended peacefully and in favor of Sverdrup and Venstre: the government 
resigned, and on 26 July 1884, Sverdrup was appointed prime minister on a parliamentary 
basis. After this parliamentary praxis became the norm in political life and suffrage reforms 
were carried through gradually during the next decades, with universal male suffrage in 1898 
and female suffrage in 1913. Indeed, already in 1881, Sverdrup and his followers managed to 
carry through a suffrage reform based on income, and the very first issue that Sverdrup dealt 
when he became prime minister was a further expansion of the suffrage.  I do not mean to say, 
however, that the expansion of universal enfranchisement was an inevitable outcome of 
Sverdrup and Venstre’s rule and the coming of parliamentary democracy. There were tensions 
and conflicts about this, and Venstre was split in many fractions soon after it acquired power. 
Pressure from the newly-formed labour party was probably important in the coming of 
universal suffrage. And important factor why the franchise was expanded relatively easily in 
the 1880s was that there was a new economic crisis that made less people wealthy enough to 
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benefit from an expansion based on income.555 But in any case, it was the Venstre movement 
that opened “the floodgates of democracy”, as their critics had pointed out. Without the victory 
of Venstre, suffrage expansion would most probably have been delayed.  
  
Conclusion: “The great cause of freedom”? 
This chapter first demonstrated the importance of landed property in the first form of the nation 
in Norway. But we have seen also, how, in Norway like in America, a transvaluation of 
property occurred – a shift from land to labour that defined sovereignty on the basis of the 
labour power of an individual instead of on ownership of real property. This happened because 
the country became more industrialized, market-oriented and urbanized. The transvaluation 
became part of a larger conflict about the nature of national sovereignty and got its external 
expression in the impeachment act of 1884, which in practice meant an end to the division 
between the legislative and the executive branches of government, and which made it possible 
to carry through suffrage reforms that abandoned landed property qualifications. Both sides in 
the conflict claimed to represent the principles of the constitution and its original ideas. Both 
parts believed that their liberties and freedoms had been granted to them by the past, and that 
only within a continuum of these historical rights – reaffirmed and re-secured in 1814 – could 
the national rights be maintained. The issue was still to defend the rights of the people against 
tyranny and despotism. One leading member of Sverdrup’s Venstre movement, for example, 
sung, in an election song before the decisive battle about parliamentary democracy: “the great 
cause of freedom is at stake, the heritage from our great fathers.” The opponents of the Venstre 
coalition, he continued, shunned “the bright light of liberty,” they were the shadows of 
absolutism: “the ghost of absolutism shrieks merely by the though of liberty.”556 The tradition 
of 1814 is invoked here by reference to liberation from arbitrary absolutism and the “heritage 
of our fathers.” And it was the same freedom that was spoken of, but with different meaning 
and content. Because the movement now was driven forth by people immersed in a 
bourgeoning industrializing market society, the idea of landed property as a precondition for 
freedom was abandoned. It this that the conservatives could not accept. Schweigaard perhaps 
summed up something essential about this change when he said, as we saw above, that the 
principles of the Venstre coalition were “general arguments, which could be applied to 
anything and nothing.” Freedom and property had become abstract in the second form of the 
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nation. Søren Jaabæk (the leader of the farmers’ opposition during the 1870s) also referred to 
this when he offered Sverdrup his partnership in the cause of parliamentary democracy: 
Sverdrup was not concerned with piecemeal and tangible economic issues, as Jaabæk wrote: 
“it is the great political and civic rights that you hold the highest.”557 This might exemplify the 
general change from the first form of the nation to the second: in the beginning, actual material 
security was seen as crucial to securing national freedom, but in the second form of the nation, 
freedom and property were connected to the people in a more abstract or general way, so that 
the theoretical right to property in labour was seen as sufficient in making the individual free 
and fit for political rule. To those holding these transvalued values of property, these values 
represented a more perfect realization of nationality: the coming of parliamentary democracy 
and expanded franchise represented a glorious moment of freedom.  However, to its 
opponents, it represented the most “cynical and brutal violation of just law in the history of 
the Norwegian nation.”558  
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Chapter 8: Comparison and conclusion  
This chapter begins with a juxtaposition of the emergence and development of nationalism in 
the US and Norway by framing this development in Miroslav Hroch´s model of nation 
formation.  I shall then state some of the key points about national ideologies in the US and 
Norway: how the notions of freedom and slavery changed from their emergence to the coming 
of industrial society, how this affected actual distribution of wealth and ideas of political rule, 
and how the ideas of slavery and freedom in the second form of the nation came to legitimate 
capitalist labor relations. I will link and contrast my findings to Ernest Gellner’s theory of 
nationalism, and I will reflect on the relationship between nationalism as it was in my cases 
and its relationship to Marxism as understood by Karl Marx. Finally, I will offer some 
reflections on how the comparison between my cases suggests trends and developments that 
might also be relevant to other places.   
 
The emergence and development of nationalism in the US and Norway  
The US and Norway are countries far apart in geographical distance. Indeed, we might say 
that, at least in the early nineteenth century, they existed in different worlds: the US in a new 
world free from the bonds of tradition and poverty,559 and Norway in an old world of scarcity, 
traditions and ancient institutions. At the outset of the nineteenth century, these two countries 
also differed enormously in size, both population-wise and geographically – a difference 
which got even bigger as the US swelled during the course of the nineteenth century. Yet, 
despite these differences, these two nations have provided fruitful ground for comparative 
purposes. In the most broad sense, the US and Norway display the disintegration of old 
structures of sovereignty, and the emergence of a historically novel type of sovereignty – 
national popular sovereignty based on widespread ownership of land. This happened in similar 
ways and for similar reasons in these two nations.  In chapter 3, I invoked Miroslav Hoch’s 
three phase model of nation formation. It will be useful to use this model here again to frame 
the initial comparison of the US and Norway. The three phases in Hoch’s model are phase A, 
B and C. Phase A is the phase of burgeoning interest in the national culture amongst the elite. 
No political claims of nationality are made during this phase. Phase B is the phase of agitation, 
                                                     
 
559 This, of course, is a gross oversimplification and glorification of America. I write it like this only 
as a “poetical” way of bringing out the differences in conception that was between the “old world” 
and the “New world”.   
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where national sentiment turns political, but still only within a relative small elite. In phase C, 
the national movement becomes a popular mass movement.   
 
a) Phase A and B in America  
In the US, I have placed phase A in the period between 1762 and 1775. It might initially seem 
a bit odd to speak of a phase A for the US. Hroch’s model was originally based on what he 
called European small nations – similar to ethnic groups existing within larger imperial states, 
or to stateless nations, in the more modern sense – in Europe during the nineteenth century. 
Phase A was described as a national revival within such groups, a revival where intellectuals 
became interested in language, traditions and history of the small nation, primarily out of 
scholarly or intellectual interest. This is not exactly what happened in colonial America. It is 
useful, however, to speak of phase A in colonial America as the pre-political/pre-agitation 
phase – that is, a phase of the national movement where independent nationhood was not 
advocated. In colonial America, this distinction is particularly important because the very idea 
of nationhood, of America as a potential nation meant to be independent, was not really 
conceived of until the end of phase A – before this, the nationality (or more correctly, the pre-
national equivalent of national identity) of Americans was British or English. The period 
between 1762 and 1775 (phase A) therefore is important because it gradually lay the 
foundations – through various debates and scrutiny of the relationship between the colonies 
and the imperial center – for the idea of America as a distinct, independent nation. It was in 
this period that the set of ideas that came to constitute nationality were formed for the first 
time in human history.  
 
The feature of phase A in America which most strongly resonates with phase A as described 
by Hroch is the exploration of the distant past of the colonists. This feature became a 
fundamental component to the national ideology. One central theme in the exploration of the 
American past was a mythologized or idealized vision of ancient Anglo-Saxon freedoms, 
based on the right to hold land (property). It was held that the American colonists inherited 
this freedom and right to hold land exclusively for themselves, and American history since the 
first colonization was seen as an escape from despotic princes, subversive popes and feudal 
institutions. It was understood that, in America, there had been established free institutions 
based both on the achievements of the colonists, and on rights inherited from Britain. The most 
important right was the right to property, and phase A in America was about asserting this 
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right vis-à-vis the British Crown and Parliament. The parliament was seen as infringing on the 
rights of the colonists by taxing them, which was seen as an infringement on the right to 
property. Ultimately this led to assertions of independence from Britain, based on the 
assumption that the colonies constituted a unique nation. The people who came to most 
strongly assert independence were almost all rich, large landholders (many owned slaves), 
often also educated as lawyers.  
 
b) Phase A and B in Norway  
This course of events is comparable, very similar in fact, to what happened in Norway in the 
time period roughly between 1770 and 1813, which is the period I have labeled as phase A in 
this case. The Norwegian phase A corresponds exactly to Hroch’s definition, no doubt because 
of the obvious reason that Norway was one of the cases on which Hroch based his model. In 
Norway, from the 1770s onwards, scholars and intellectuals started to explore the history and 
traditions of the Norwegians, and, like in America, a central theme became ancient freedom 
based on ownership of land. In Norway, it was not derived from Anglo-Saxon themes, but 
from an idealized version of ancient Nordic freedom. In the same way as American history 
was presented as an escape from feudalism and despotic princes, so too was Norwegian history 
presented as one in which such subjugations had been avoided. At this phase, like in America, 
the national movement did not pose a logical necessity between the existence of a unique 
Norwegian past and the political organization of Norway into an independent nation-state. But 
as the year 1814 commenced (marking the initiation of phase B), the idea that Norway must 
be an independent nation became a strong assertion amongst the elite. Different from the 
American case was that very few of the members of the national movement of phase A came 
to actively advocate for national independence in phase B, for the simple reason that they were 
no longer alive or were too old. Different also was the social composition of the national 
movement. Most of the members of the movement were substantial landholders, and indeed 
many also had a legal education, but this group was distinguished from the American 
counterpart in that some of the most prominent members of the movement held privileged 
titles and or were state officials of the old imperial state. Lastly, an important difference is that 
the Norwegian movement, when it entered phase B, unlike the American movement, did not 
rise primarily out of discontent with the imperial sovereignty of which it was part. Rather, 
phase B emerged in Norway because the kingdom was forcefully divorced from the imperial 
sovereignty of which it had been part, and the national movement entered phase B as an almost 
ad-hoc way of recreating sovereignty where suddenly there was none. Phase B of the national 
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movement was led by the Danish prince, and was very much about avoiding incorporation of 
the Norwegian kingdom into the Swedish kingdom.  
 
c) The first form of the nation 
Despite these differences in the course of phase A and B, the ideological and political result 
of these phases was the same in both cases. In both cases, a political and ideological form 
emerged which I have called the first form of the nation. There were, of course, local 
circumstances and peculiarities to each of the cases, one of the most obvious ones being that 
Norway became a constitutional monarchy and that the US became a republic. This difference, 
however, is not as great as it may sound: in both cases a legislative branch was established 
with powers directly derived from the people in the form of representative democracy. And in 
both cases, this representative democracy was restricted, in high degree, to those owning 
landed or real property. Furthermore, the fact that the executive branch was, in Norway, 
reserved for the monarch, whereas it was more directly derived from the people in the US, 
actually represents two sides of the same principle: balance of power. There were rigorous 
debates in both nations about how to achieve balance of power, and practically nobody thought 
that all power should be in the hands of all the people. The republican and the monarchical 
principles were different ways of balancing power that were based on the sovereignty of the 
people through legislation. Furthermore, both were based on popular sovereignty through a 
property-based democracy in which the national sovereignty was understood to be derived 
from the property of the members of the community. Both the US and Norway became 
propertied communities, nations.  
 
One important reason for why the first form of the nation took similar shape in the US and 
Norway despite their differences was the existence of widespread private landholding. More 
than anything else, it was this that shaped the national ideology and the new national 
institutions. For one, wide landownership corresponded to the historical myths invoked about 
a free, landed people. But wide landownership was also what made it realistic to invoke 
popular sovereignty, because sovereignty was tied to ownership of land. When many people 
thus owned land, it was natural that sovereignty was popular; it was not derived from the 
ownership of a few landholders or kings. It was for the same reason that popular sovereignty 
took the form of a property-based democracy: only landed property could be the basis of 
sovereignty. For this reason, it was also important that property became duly protected through 
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the rule of law. This meant that property, in theory, was set down as a universal right for all 
the members of the nation. It is important to note that this notion was not unanimously seen to 
be incompatible with the existence of chattel slavery (an institution that specifically denied 
some people the right to property). This was largely because slaves were not clearly defined 
as free agents, but were in many regards understood to be a form of property to be protected.  
 
d) Phase C and the second form of the nation in America  
The coming of phase C in America may, in one sense, be understood as starting with the 
Revolutionary War and continuing through the Federalist/Anti-federalist and the Democratic-
Republican/Federalist debates of the 1780s and 1790s. It certainly makes sense to speak of the 
national movement as a mass popular movement from this moment, as large portions of the 
people were already at this point involved in what one scholar has termed “the great national 
discussion.”560 However, from the 1830s onward, movement towards universal male suffrage 
and abolition of chattel slavery came to involve even larger parts of the people directly in 
national formation – it is therefore that I have looked at the coming of universal male suffrage 
and the abolition of chattel slavery in order to explore changes in the national ideology during 
phase C. But more importantly, these two movements quite explicitly challenged the 
assumptions made about property and sovereignty in the first form of the nation. By 
challenging these assumptions, these movements helped bring forth the second form of the 
nation. I theorized this as a transvaluation of property – or more simply, as a shift from land 
to labour. Most important for this was the abandoning of the idea that it was only real, landed 
property that could be the basis of sovereignty and individual freedom. The right to property 
was still held as a crucial, fundamental right, but the right to property was more and more 
understood dually, to mean also the right to the fruits of one’s labour. In this way, the freedom 
of the individual, and the sovereignty of the nation, could be derived from, and belong to, all 
laboring individuals. In such a vision, it did not make sense to confine sovereignty only to the 
men of landed property, and the right to property understood in this way also demanded the 
abolition of chattel slavery, so that the slaves too could have the right to the fruits of their 
labour. In this dissertation I have explored this change in understanding primarily through the 
abolition, and the defense, of chattel slavery. By the late 1850s, large forces within the 
American nation had been mobilized on both fronts of this divide. The south, led by a 
                                                     
 
560 Karmnick, Isaak, “The great national discussion: the discourse of politics in 1787”, The William 
and Mary Qyarterly, Vol.45, no.1, (1988). 
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Democratic Party backed by large landholders and slave owners, defended the property 
assumptions of the first form of the nation. The north, driven by the Republican Party and a 
broad alliance of intellectuals, wage earners and farmers, propagated the new vision of 
transvaluation. An important factor that contributed to the shift from land to labour in the 
north was the decline in the importance of smallholding farming, although it did remain a 
relatively prominent feature of life also in the north. Smallholding farming nevertheless 
gradually fell in the shadow of emerging industry and artisan work in the mushrooming cities 
and towns of the north. This meant that the total proportion of people that lived off the land 
decreased, and that an increasing amount of people earned their livelihoods from waged work. 
This was different from the south, which remained largely agricultural – and slave driven. In 
the end, it was the northern vision that became victorious, and in the same way that the first 
emergence of nationalism was strongly connected with the emergent smallholding property 
structure during the seventeenth and eighteenth century, so too was the transvaluation of 
property, or the shift from land to labour, strongly connected with the demise of this kind of 
property structure and the emergence of industrial forms of property capital.  
 
e) Phase C and the second form of the nation in Norway 
Phase C in Norway started around the same time as its intensification in the US, in the 1830s. 
At first, phases C was marked by a farmers’ opposition in the parliament, constituted of those 
men who already had the vote based on landed property, and the main concern was over issues 
of taxation of the farmers by the elite. But from the 1850s onward, the more overreaching idea 
of the power of the people, versus the power of the king, became the overreaching, dominant 
issue of phase C. Chattel slavery, due the banal fact that it did not exist in Norway, was 
naturally not an issue during Phase C in Norway. The big rallying issue in Norway became 
the cause of parliamentary democracy, and it was through this cause that the suffrage issue 
had to be realized. The suffrage question, like the abolition of slavery in the US, was grounded 
in the transvaluation of property – the shift from land to labour.  
 
An important reason why parliamentary democracy became the main issue through which the 
transvaluation became carried out in Norway was the monarchical structure of the Norwegian 
state. This meant, amongst other things, that the government was appointed by the King and 
was clearly separate from the parliament. It also meant that the King could veto parliamentary 
bills. Radical reforms thus became efficiently blocked by conservative forces constituted by 
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relatively wealthy intellectuals and state officials within the government and the monarchy. It 
was for this reason that radical forces within the parliament needed to thwart the power of the 
government and the king in order to carry through any reform. Like in America, the 
impediment to reform in Norway was also strongly related to the gradual decline in importance 
of smallholding farming. It is true that Norway, even more so than the US, remained very 
much an agricultural economy during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. But Norway 
saw growth in cities and industries as well, and experienced a huge population growth during 
the course of the nineteenth century. Many of these people could not be smallholding farmers 
due to the scarcity of suitable land. Thus, the proportion of tenants increased, as did 
employment in artisan professions, as well as employment in occupations such as clerks and 
teachers. Like in America, an increasing number of people became dependent on wages for 
their living. The social movement that finally carried through parliamentary reform (and which 
carried with it the transvalued notion of property) in 1884 was, however, a complex and 
diverse movement with various interests, ranging from large farmers to small farmers to 
tenants, to city intellectuals to clerks and teachers.  
 
f) Nationalism: agrarian origins, industrial futures  
As we have seen, in the historical time period to which I confined my investigation, the two 
cases investigated went from being agrarian societies to becoming bourgeoning industrial 
societies. To understand nationalism in the later form (industrial), it is important to grasp it in 
its first form:  nationalism emerged and formed in agrarian societies – that is, in societies 
where the main source of wealth was land, and where a large majority of people lived off the 
land. This landed, agrarian form of nationalism is in effect a ‘missing link’ between pre- or 
proto-national forms of society (feudal, absolutist, mercantilist, etc.), and the fully modern 
industrial form identified by Ernest Gellner. Nationalism, in my cases, emerged in a crucial 
transitional period within in the development of modernity, on the brink of industrialization.  
Nationalism in my cases was therefore both a product of, and a reaction to an agrarian political 
model and the material relations that supported it: 
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1) Nationalism was a product of agrarian relations in the ways in which sovereignty, 
freedom and property were understood. These concepts were derived from, and 
understood in, an agrarian absolutist context.561  
2) In the sense that nationalism was a reaction to the existing agrarian frame, it was in 
the way meanings of sovereignty, property and freedom became modified and adopted 
to the material relations of each of my cases. In this reaction, these agrarian concepts 
became the foundations for further capitalist, democratic and industrial development.  
In essence, nationalism emerged out of changes in agrarian landed property structures that had 
made land rights a purely economic right, detached from feudal privileges and structures, and 
which also made land rights more widespread. It was out of such a situation that popular 
sovereignty based on propertied freedom emerged, and became, in effect, nationalism in its 
first form. 562 One important point to note about this agrarian aspect of nationalism is that the 
core concepts of nationalism (popular sovereignty, property and freedom) were all formed and 
adjusted to an agrarian social structure, contrary to the Gellnerian point that nationalism was 
a product of industrial society.563 However, despite (or indeed, perhaps precisely because of) 
the agrarian origins of nationalism and its property assumptions, its assumptions were also 
compatible, and particularly favorable to, industrial society as this new base or mode of 
production led to an inner alteration – transvaluation – of the basic property ideas of 
nationalism. So, nationalism, although agrarian and landed in its origins, is also ideologically 
functional to industrial society (I discuss this in some more detail below, under the sub-
heading, Nationalism and perpetual growth). In this sense there is no antagonism between 
Gellner’s approach and my own. The difference is that the focus on the agrarian origins of 
nationalism allows us to see more clearly the property rights aspect of nationalism – an aspect 
which I believe is fundamental to the understanding of nationalism in both its agrarian and 
industrial form. But again, although Gellner tends to stress primarily the importance of 
universal literacy and mass education in industrial nationalism, this does not mean that there 
                                                     
 
561 In the case of the US, these ideas and notions were the “rights of Englishmen” inherited from 
Britain, see American chapters. In Norway, the notions and ideas also came from the imperial state of 
which it was part, but also from ideological currents stressing the peculiarity of Norwegian property 
relations, see chapters on Norway. In both cases the ideas were formed by the agrarian capitalist 
character of their societies.  
562 For other perspectives on how the class relations of my cases affected the idea of popular 
sovereignty, see Koth, Halvdan, “Trongen til demokrati I 1814”, in Historisk tidsskrift, no 38, (1947) 
(Norwegian case), and Morgan, Edmund S, Inventing the people: the rise of popular sovereignty in 
England and America, Northon, New York, (1988). It is argued here that the elite constructed popular 
sovereignty and included the farmers purely out of instrumental reasons.   
563 Gellner, 2006. 
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is no room for property rights. And indeed as I have indicated in chapters 1 and 2, I share many 
of the same assumptions that Gellner does about the structural preconditions for the emergence 
of nationalism, as well as some of his more general assertions about nationalism as political 
principle. Nationalism may well be both about creating a universal high culture, and about 
creating a situation of universal property ownership; both are aspects of modern industrial 
society. Furthermore literacy can also be seen as an important factor for the emergence of the 
propertied nationalism in my cases. Most of the key members of the national movements in 
the US and Norway were exceptionally literate and educated, and reading and writing was 
central both for the formation of the national ideology (since it was based on reading of old 
histories and pamphlets) as well as for its spread. One could argue from this that what I have 
called the agrarian first form of the nation, in addition to fostering the property assumptions 
that became central to nationalism, was also the incubator of the literacy that Gellner 
emphasizes for industrial society.564 Hence, my own understanding and Gellner’s can in fact 
be complimentary to each other, allowing for a deeper and more complex understanding of 
nationalism – not least because my own approach adds an ideological and political element to 
Gellner’s more structural approach. In the following I will indicate some aspects and issues 
on nationalism in which a property rights perspective expands our understanding of both 
agrarian and industrial nationalism. 
 
Slavery and freedom: agrarian and industrial visions  
The language of slavery was central in the national ideology and its vision of freedom when it 
emerged, and the property rights perspective helps us understand this. The property relations 
at the time of the national revolution in both states make the language of slavery conspicuous 
in both cases:  
1) In the case of the US, the language of slavery as the opposite of freedom is 
conspicuous because of the all too evident fact that a large proportion of people in 
America were actually chattel slaves – i.e. for most practical purposes, property. It is 
difficult not to be immediately perplexed when one sees that many of those who most 
strongly asserted the right to freedom did own slaves. As Samuel Johnson said, “Why 
                                                     
 
564 This is similar to Mann’s argument that mass literacy, education and communication (the 
preconditions for nationalism in Gellner’s view) actually emerged before industrialization. Mann, 
Michael, “The rise of modern European nationalism”, in Hall, John and I.C Jarvie, Transition to 
Modernity: essays on power, wealth and belief, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, (1992). 
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do we hear the loudest yelps of liberty amongst the drivers of Negros?” But looking 
more closely into the issue, this actually makes sense (which is of course not to say 
that it was or is acceptable). Chattel slavery was compatible with the assertion of 
national freedom because the slave was not clearly defined as a human being, but was 
instead treated partly as an object, as a form of property and thus as a medium that 
could make men free. Thus, in addition to wide distribution of landed property that 
was seen as making the nation free, there were also slaves that could give men 
propertied freedom. The fear of slavery might also have been reinforced by the very 
presence of chattel slavery – it was perhaps all too clear what it meant to be a slave to 
those who were free. 
 
2) In Norway, it is so because of the historical absence of an institution of slavery, except 
for in the early Middle Ages (800-1000, but this was hardly mentioned at all by 
members of the national movement). It is thus fascinating to observe such a powerful 
presence of the language of slavery, and the fear and resentment it sparked. One reason 
for this was that slavery was understood very widely, and the strong presence of 
notions of slavery might have been caused by the existence of what was seen as its 
opposite: the relative wide distribution of land which stood as the very bulwark against 
national slavery. The presence of this language of slavery might also indicate the 
universality of the language of nationalism in this period, that the idea of an individual 
without the right to property was unfree, a slave. 
In addition to the above, we must remember that the language of slavery in national ideology 
belongs to a long tradition of political thought going back to Aristotle, and which became 
especially prominent in English and western political thought from the seventeenth century 
onwards. The bible was an important inspiration for this, but other historical examples, such 
as Roman slavery, were also invoked. It is of course also significant that chattel slavery existed 
(and was rebelled against) in large parts of the world in the time period that the national 
movement emerged in our cases.565 Thus, from the initial, seemingly conspicuous use of the 
language of slavery, we understand the idea of slavery was integrated into the broader 
language of property and freedom as an idea of “the other,” so to speak – what a Norwegian 
and an American were not. In our cases specifically, we must see the language of slavery in 
                                                     
 
565 Buck -Morss, Susan, “Hegel and Haiti”, Critical inquiry, Vol.26. No.4, (Summer,2000), Davis, 
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relation to their actual property relations, which, with its peculiarities, framed the notions of 
freedom and slavery, so that in the US it was compatible with chattel slavery, and both cases 
came to hold landed property as essential to freedom in the first form of the nation.  
 
a) Slavery and freedom in the first form of the nation 
The form of rule in the first form of the nation was that of a sovereign people who made laws, 
but political power was in actuality confined to men of real property. This was because national 
propertied freedom was at the time constructed on a historical narrative, where freedom 
through property was understood primarily as landed property, and freedom came to be 
defined primarily against feudalism and ancient slavery. These negations of freedom were 
understood both in economic and political terms: both political and economical freedom were 
held to be necessary components of freedom: the one could not exist without the other. In both 
cases, feudalism, slavery and subjugation were seen as something that belonged to the distant 
past and or to other places, so that the members of the national movement saw themselves as 
unique and free. Freedom was historical: the freedom that the members of the national 
movement claimed was claimed on account of belonging to a tradition of freedom. The 
national identity implied here was first and foremost a historical construction, based on ideals 
and characteristic of the distant past. In this vision, not to be free was defined as any person 
not in possession or control of his own landed property and thus subject to arbitrary rule (that 
is a situation in which the individual had no say in political decisions which affected him and 
thus his right to property). In other words, it was believed that in order for individuals to enjoy 
the economic freedom to property, it was vital that the individual also had political freedom – 
that is, that they made the laws to which they were themselves subjects; that they were 
sovereign. 
 
Because it was landed property that was seen to make individuals free in the first form of the 
nation,566 landless wage labourers, for example, were considered more or less unfree, in a 
                                                     
 
566 We have seen in the chapters on America that there was no necessary contradiction between 
asserting landed freedom and having slaves. In Norway, this issue has not been explored because 
there was no chattel slavery in Norway. Yet I have indicated that the idea was the same in Norway, 
and a comment from Christian Magnus Falsen, central member of the national movement, may 
reinforce this. A point had been made against Falsen´s argument about the special propertied freedom 
of the Norwegian farmer, saying that in ancient times, the odelsrett (see chapter 7) coexisted with the 
institution of slavery. To this Falsen replied that slavery had existed in both Rome and Greece, even 
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similar situation to that of the chattel slave: none of the two had real property, and none of the 
two were therefore free. The difference was of course that the slave was himself seen as a form 
of property. But there is a conceptual similarity here: neither the slave nor the wage labourer 
had the right to the fruits of their labour exclusive to themselves. The slave was forced to yield 
all the fruits of his labour to his master, and was thus dependent on him completely. The wage 
labourer was dependent on his employer for his wage, and was therefore not completely free.  
 
b) Slavery dismantled: the second form of the nation    
In the second form of the nation, the language of slavery started disappearing from the main 
political discourse of our cases as industrial capitalism, and mass politics started to 
consolidate. But there were people who still maintained the original meaning of slavery and 
thus posed a critique of capitalist labour relations that is worth taking note of because the core 
of the critique was in many ways Marxian (and before Marx). Most important in this 
conservative critique was that only real property could confer freedom on men and nations. It 
was held that freedom was based on rights to real material wealth, that it was not enough to 
have a right to vote or to one’s labour if this was not based on actual wealth. The men who 
held this view were mostly conservatives and have been deemed backward-looking and anti-
progressive, mostly because they wanted to deny the masses the right to vote. But as William 
Scott observed:  
If nothing else the defenders of property qualifications [for the vote] had understood 
the implications of contemporary changes [the coming of industrial society]. The 
reformers, however, denied the importance of widespread property holding and 
concerned themselves with abstract liberty and equality for all men.567 
Scott was writing about the franchise debates in the US, but his general argument covers both 
my cases in the transition from the first to the second form of the nation: that the prevailing 
meaning of freedom became more abstract. Property now meant the abstract right to the fruits 
of one’s labour: this made men free. On this logic, it was possible to assert that all men were 
                                                     
 
among the ancient Jews. Were these societies thus not worthy of being called free societies? 
Obviously they were. Falsen, Christian Magnus, Som man raaber I skoven faar man svar, Dhal, Enke 
og Søn, Bergen (1815), p 10-11. While this is not to say that Falsen supported chattel slavery, it points 
to the general understanding of property, freedom and slavery, where freedom was primarily landed 
freedom and with which chattel slavery could co-exist.  
567 Scott, William, In pursuit of happiness: American conceptions of property from the seventeenth to 
the twentieth century, Indiana University Press. Bloomington and London, (1977), p 77. The text in 
brackets are my insertions.  
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independent and thus give all men the right to vote. Membership to the political community 
was now based on putting labour into the system, not on the ownership of physical property. 
Yet the conservatives saw something lost here. The question from Norwegian conservative A. 
M. Schweigaard in relation to the suffrage expansion as quoted in chapter seven is telling. He 
had asked: “Did not the proprtyless hold a grant to land as the fundamental thing, more so than 
merely to be granted the right to vote.” It was real wealth that mattered, not some abstract right 
to labour, or as Shweigaard had put it, it was not enough to appeal to “general arguments which 
could be applied to anything and nothing.”  
 
There is something to be said here for the conservative (and in the US, pro-slavery) position 
on property (which is in no way to say that I agree with the slavery ideology): they did see or 
admit more clearly than others that freedom in capitalist society is based on real economical 
wealth, on ownership of the means of production and of capital. Norwegian historian Nils 
Rune Langeland has made an apposite reflection on this. Writing about the Norwegian 
founding fathers of 1814, he reflects:  
[Real] Property is freedom. It is the only true form of freedom in a capitalist society 
... The founding fathers of 1814 knew this well, only he who owned or administered 
real property could be a free sovereign citizen.568 
This is also what was implicit in Morris Cohen’s assertion that property is sovereignty, as 
referred to in chapter two: to have a property right to something gives an individual freedom 
and power to dispose over the wealth and resources that the property right covers, and thus the 
right to limit and control those who do not have such rights. The right to property is exclusive; 
a right to property is thus sovereignty. But if this right is alienated as it is in a wage labour 
relation, there is no real sovereignty, no freedom in the positive sense. The pro-slavery men, 
for example, critiqued capitalist labour relations because it created an unfree society, cold and 
merciless, ruled by capital – a society that gave individuals no rights at all, that guaranteed 
them not even a minimum of subsistence and, least of all, freedom. In short, the wage labourers 
were in fact wage slaves in the conservative view. George Fitzhugh’s assertion quoted in 
chapter six, that “Capital commands labour as master does slave,” may serve as a summary 
statement here. This point was completely dismissed by the majority of the members of the 
national movement during this phase – it was in fact seen to be a complete and utter perversion 
of what freedom really meant. Freedom came to mean to own one’s labour, and it came to be 
                                                     
 
568 Langeland, Nils Rune, Kveldsseta: historiske essay, N.w. Damm & Søn AS (2003), p. 21. 
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seen as rigorously egalitarian – it was no longer accepted that a society could be free if only 
some of its members had the right to property that made individuals free (which was now 
understood as the right to one’s labour). 
 
The people who ushered in the second form of the nation with the transvalued notion of 
property/freedom may be considered capitalist revolutionaries or reformers in the sense that 
the political changes they advocated fully accepted all the implications of an industrial 
capitalist ideology: private ownership, and all individuals as free alienators of their labour. 
The transvaluation of property thus became a way of legitimizing industrial capitalist labour 
and property relations: the fact that fewer and fewer people owned real property, and that the 
economical system was in increasing degree founded on ownership of the means of production 
by the few. This is not to say that the members of the national movement of the second form 
of the nation were consistent and conscious capitalist apologists. The main concern of these 
people was to realize national propertied freedom in what was seen as a logical and necessary 
conclusion of the national ideal. Thus both these reformers and the conservatives were 
advocating for the same fundamental freedom, but with different understandings of what 
distribution of property was the most essential to freedom. But only the conservatives retained 
the original idea of slavery/freedom.  
 
With the transvalued notion of property, there was no space for the language of slavery, apart 
from those critiquing capitalism, because such language completely undermined the 
foundations of freedom in the second form of the nation – if the wage labourers were seen as 
unfree slaves, then the nations would be nations of slaves. There was, in short, no one left to 
be slaves. Nationalism created a society of free men (as claimed by its proponents) under 
conditions which Marxists (and the national conservatives) would see as an unfree society.  
 
Property, wealth and democracy in industrial society 
a) Nationalism and perpetual growth  
For Ernest Gellner, one of the fundamental characteristics of modern industrial society is that 
it is founded on perpetual growth: “Industrial society is the only society ever to live by and 
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rely on sustained and perpetual growth.”569 It is the imperative of perpetual growth, and the 
constant remobilization of labour, that nationalism, as described by Gellner, sustains. My 
research also supports this conclusion, but for different reasons: nationalism sustains a society 
of perpetual growth because it legitimizes industrial labour/property relations. That is, 
nationalism, in its industrial form, propagates a vision of freedom that sees all individuals as 
free proprietors of their own alienable labour power, because the right to private property is 
held as a fundamental right and connected to popular sovereignty. Nationalism is thus not only 
practically, but also ideologically functional to industrial society. Because the right to property 
was based on the idea of the right to the fruits of one’s labour, property could mean both to 
have real property and, more simply, not to be denied the right to the fruits of one’s labour. 
Because property was understood dually in this way, the national vision could, without 
violating the universal right to property, result in the creation of industrial societies where 
ownership of the means of production and capital could be confined to a minority, while the 
majority are confined to alienate their labour. Thus, by seeing all men as free and unlimited 
proprietors of their labour power when connected to a sovereign people, nationalism lays the 
foundation of free and unlimited growth and accumulation. In this light, we might juxtapose 
nationalism with Protestantism as Max Weber saw it: in a similar fashion as Weber saw the 
Protestant notion of the calling as a precondition for capitalist growth, we might say that the 
nationalist conception of property and sovereignty was a precondition for industrial growth.570 
 
We can also go back to C.B. Macpherson’s theory of possessive individualism here. 
Nationalism in my cases was, or at least ended up being, in its industrial manifestation, a form 
of possessive individualism. John Locke exemplifies, for Macpherson, the core of possessive 
individualism. And it is indeed interesting to note how well Locke’s ideas correspond with 
industrial nationalism in my cases, where labour and self-ownership were the core concepts of 
property, and where every individual is a free alienator of his or her labour. Indeed from the 
very beginning, during the first form of the nation, many members of the national movements 
of the US and Norway spoke of labour as the basis for the right to property, yet it was not until 
these societies started becoming industrialized that the labour and self-ownership aspects 
(which in a way, we might say, lay dormant), awakened and took on a defining role in the 
national ideologies.  
                                                     
 
569 Gellner, 2006: p 22. 




b) The relationship between democracy and property  
It is implicit in what has been said above that the way in which the sovereignty of the people 
was understood was different in the first and the second form of the nation: the sovereignty of 
the people in the first form of the nation was understood as a restricted representative 
democracy, and this was because the understanding of freedom was tied up to real landed 
property. In the second form of the nation, the sovereignty of the people became understood 
as a universal democracy, and again this was related to how property freedom was understood. 
Universal democracy became a potent idea when propertied freedom became understood 
primarily as the right to the fruits of one’s labour. Hence, property and forms of representative 
rule (democracy) were always interconnected in the national ideologies of the US and Norway. 
This suggests an answer to Therbron’s paradox referred to in the first chapter:571 in the early 
nineteenth century (the first form of the nation), property and democracy were incompatible 
due to the underlying definition of freedom as landed property. The propertyless were thus 
unfree and a danger to the preservation of property. Later (the second form of the nation), 
freedom became understood as self-ownership of one’s labour. Thus all who labored were 
free, and would have an interest in the preservation of property rights and the political system. 
Again, we can invoke the theory of possessive individualism, because the situation of the 
second form of the nation is essentially a possessive individualist one: it is based on the 
assumptions that all individuals are equal in their subjection to and possibilities under a market 
society. This might have been a plausible theory at the end of the nineteenth century, as 
Macpherson notes. However, when, in the twentieth century, the working class started to assert 
that all individuals did in fact not have the same possibilities under a market society, the theory 
of political obligation to protect property and orderly relations between proprietors starts to 
crack. It becomes more and more apparent that gross inequalities are created under these 
conditions.572 
                                                     
 
571 The questions were as follows: “How has it come about that, in the major and most advanced 
capitalist countries, a tiny majority class—the bourgeoisie—rules by means of democratic forms?” 
and “In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as both political practice and constitutional 
debate clearly demonstrate, prevailing bourgeois opinion held that democracy and capitalism (or 
private property) were incompatible … In modern times, however, since at least the outbreak of the 
Cold War, bourgeois ideologists have maintained that only capitalism is compatible with democracy.” 
Therborn, 1977. 
 




c) The national property ideals and the distribution of wealth  
One of the central claims in Thomas Piketty’s recent and acclaimed study Capital in the 
Twenty-first Century, is that inequality of wealth will grow in the twenty-first century because 
the rate of return on capital will significantly exceed the growth rate of the economy. Piketty 
claims that unequal distribution of wealth today is partly legitimized and driven by what he 
calls “meritocratic extremism.”573 This means that excessive wealth is to a high degree 
justified as being the rightful product of the labour and skill of an individual which is rightfully 
his or her own. But the major cause of increasing inequality will be due to what Piketty calls 
“patrimonial capitalism”574 – a system where wealth is accumulated and concentrated in few 
hands, and where the primary way to secure wealth is thus through inheritance or marriage 
because wages for the majority stay low.  
 
As I have shown in this dissertation, the idea that all individuals have a property right to their 
labour, which is a foundation for their freedom, was an essential feature of nationalism. This 
is foundational to the idea of the “meritocratic extremism” of which Piketty speaks. This might 
be an indication of the continued prevalence of the fundamental ideas of nationalism today, 
and it shows how nationalism might legitimate such accumulation of wealth because it 
promotes the right of all individuals to enjoy the fruits of their labour. Nationalism might also 
be seen as connected to Piketty’s thesis because nationalism had as its foundation the private 
property regime which makes possible the accumulation of private wealth in “patrimonial 
capitalism.” Indeed, nationalism sees the right to such accumulation as one of the most 
fundamental of all rights, as the basis for the organization of the political community. 
 
d) Metamorphosis and split of capital 
Two things are important to keep in mind when discussing nationalism, its property 
assumptions and the distribution of wealth in industrial society. One is what Piketty has called 
                                                     
 
573 Piketty, 2014: p. 334. 
574 Piketty, 2014: p. 173. 
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the metamorphosis of capital,575 and the other is what we might call the capital-labour split.576 
The two are related. 
1) The metamorphosis of capital indicates that capital went from being primarily landed 
property (in agrarian societies) to being real estate or financial capital or assets (in 
industrial societies), but that its nature stayed the same.  
2) The capital-labour split indicates the separation of wealth from the labour power it 
was created by  - e.g. the creation of surplus for a company by giving the workers 
wages but where some of the profit stays in the company/with the owner. After the 
metamorphosis of capital, the capital-labour split becomes more decisive and affects 
the understanding of property.  
These two changes also correspond with the changing understanding of property in agrarian 
and industrial nationalism. In agrarian society, the right to property was understood to mean 
land, and the labour element of property was understood in a large degree as the right to the 
potential wealth in land, and land was the main source of wealth. In industrial society, the right 
to property is more complexly understood: it can mean the right to land or real estate, but also 
the right to financial capital/wealth and labour. In other words, there is a more decisive and 
clear split between the various elements of the right to property. This means that, for example, 
the right to labor can be a property right on its own (as in the national ideologies of our cases), 
disconnected from ownership of land or wealth. But it also means that wealth or land is not 
necessarily understood as part of a universal property right. With these assumptions, as 
explained above, the right to property does not have to mean the right to actual wealth (as in 
the first form of the nation), but can simply mean the right to labour freely and to a wage. 
Because the first form of the nation was established before the “metamorphosis of capital” and 
the intensification of the capital-labour split, it would seem, paradoxically, that the 
assumptions of the first form of the nation are more favorable to egalitarian distribution of 
wealth than the second form.  
 
 
Forms of nationalism   
                                                     
 
575 Piketty, 2014: p. 113-116. 
576 I have also relied on Piketty for description of the capital-labour split. Piketty, 2014: p 39-41. 
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a) Nationalism vs. communism  
In the introduction I noted a Marxist and a liberal paradox in the way in which property rights 
and national democracies developed. The liberal paradox was briefly discussed above. In the 
following I shall discuss the Marxist one in more detail, and imply that one reason why 
Marxism has not been successful is because it shares some of its fundamental property 
assumptions with nationalism – Marxism appeared as a form of transvalued nationalism. This 
comparison of Marxism and nationalism might seem slightly odd, appearing suddenly at the 
end of this thesis, but considering the preoccupation with property, wealth and labour in both 
world views, as well as the interesting similarities between them in these matters, a brief 
juxtaposition seems justified and relevant at this point.   
 
Marxism emerged and formed roughly in the same time period in which the transvaluation of 
property happened: like the transvaluation of property in the national ideology, Marxist 
communism emerged as a reaction to the emergence of industrial society. Karl Marx himself 
was first a liberal who supported gradual reform, private property and legal constitutional 
states in the form that they had emerged in my cases as the first form of the nation.577 Thus, 
he might have been coming from the same place ideologically as the members of the national 
movements of my cases.  The similarity between these two worldviews lies in the wish of both 
views to realize freedom for the individual by giving him or her the right to the property of his 
or her labour. That this idea was so central to both worldviews must, at least partly, be 
contributed to the fact that both came out of the same intellectual milieu – the Enlightenment 
and the early Romantic period. As we saw in chapter two, both Jean Jacques Rousseau and 
especially John Locke and Adam Smith had developed labour theories of value and property. 
Adam Smith, in fact, was to Marx “the Luther of political economy.”578 Such theories were at 
first applied by the members of the national movement in the US and Norway, and were 
understood in relation to the specific material relations there.  Marxist communism could be 
understood as on a continuum with nationalism; it was an extension of it, and Marx posed his 
                                                     
 
577 There are many accounts of Marx`s life and views. I have found Francis Wheen`s biography of 
Marx illuminating and interesting. Wheen, Francis, Karl Marx, A life, W.W Norton & Company, 
London, (2001). 
578 Giddens, Anthony, Capitalism and modern social theory: an analysis of the writings of Marx, 
Durkheim and Max Weber, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, (2014)[1971], p 35. 
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own transvaluation of the national ideals.579 But, perhaps because Marx was not so strongly 
tied to one specific national tradition and because he was already imbedded in an industrial 
world, his ideas of property were different from the national ones. The Marxian transvaluation 
of property transformed the inner and the outer meaning of both property and of freedom. 
Hence, Marx fundamentally challenged the idea that having the right to the fruits of one’s 
labour made individuals free within the existence of the current private property system. Marx 
wrote in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts: 
The antithesis between lack of property and property, so long as it is not 
comprehended as the antithesis of labour and capital, still remains an indifferent 
antithesis, not grasped in its active connection, in its internal relation, not yet grasped 
as a contradiction. It can find expression in this first form even without the advanced 
development of private property (as in ancient Rome, Turkey, etc.). It does not 
yet appear as having been established by private property itself. But labour, the 
subjective essence of private property as exclusion of property, and capital, objective 
labour as exclusion of labour, constitute private property as its developed state of 
contradiction...580 
For Marx there was a contradiction between the labour of an individual and capital 
accumulated on private property. For this reason, private property had to be terminated and 
substituted with a positive form of property: “communism is the positive expression of 
annulled private property – at first as universal private property.”581 Marx elaborated:  
Communism is the positive transcendence of private property as human self-
estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence by and for 
man; communism therefore as the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., 
human) being – a return accomplished consciously and embracing the entire wealth 
of previous development. This communism … is the genuine resolution of the conflict 
between man and nature and between man and man – the true resolution of the strife 
between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, 
between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the species. Communism 
is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution.582 
Communism, like nationalism promised to give the individual freedom through property, and 
saw itself to be the fulfillment of a long historical process (“the riddle of history solved”). But 
instead of private property as the end goal, Marx saw communal property as the fulfillment of 
                                                     
 
579 I am not the first to point to the fundamental similarity between Marxism and nationalism. Two 
forceful statements of this are Greenfeld 1993, and Szporluk, Roman, Communism and nationalism: 
Karl Marx versus Frederich List, Oxford university Press, Oxford, (1991).  
580 Marx, Karl, Economic and Philosophic manuscripts, Progress Publishers, Moscow, (1959)[1844]. 
P 42. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Economic-Philosophic-
Manuscripts-1844.pdf  Downloaded 19.08.2015.  
581 Marx, 1959: 42. 
582 Marx, 1959: p 43. 
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history. Communism and nationalism can thus be seen as two distinct, yet related, answers to 
the same question: how to organize property in order to maintain freedom for the individual.583 
 
Nationalism and communism were related, but the organizing principles of each may be seen 
as a perversion of the other. In the national ideology, individual private property was sacred 
and the source of freedom; in communism, it was the root of all evil (e.g. “private property is 
but the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating 
products that is based on class antagonism, on the exploitation of the many by the few”584). In 
theory, the difference was smaller between nationalism and communism during the first form 
of nationalism, when, although individual property was the core of the ideology, at least it was 
postulated that one had to have a right to property over actual wealth to be free. But in the 
second form of the nation, an irreconcilable antagonism emerged between nationalism and 
what became Marxian communism. This conflict was, as indicated earlier, based on the 
understanding of labour and its relation to propertied freedom. Marx asked in the Manifesto of 
the Communist Party: 
Does wage labour create any property for the labourer? Not a bit. It creates capital i.e 
that kind of property that exploits wage labour … property in its present form is based 
on the antagonism between capital and wage-labour.585  
It was because labour produced capital for the owners of the means of production that Marx 
saw private property, as it was in his time, as an evil. This assertion is in total opposition to 
the transvalued notion of property in nationalism, where it was claimed that every man was 
free by virtue of having the property he or she has in his or her labour. To Marx, this is only 
half the truth, because: 
Capital is a collective product and only by the united action of many members, nay, 
in the last resort, only by the united resort of all the members of society can it be set 
in motion. Capital is therefore not a personal, it is a social power … in bourgeoisie 
society capital is independent and has no personality, while the living person is 
dependent and has no personality.586  
                                                     
 
583 Marx wrote, like the nationalists of my cases, that the right to property in the fruits of one’s labour 
was essential: “ We by no means intend to abolish this personal appropriation of the product of labour, 
an appropriation that is made for the maintenance and reproduction of human life, and that leaves no 
surplus wherewith to command the labour of others. All that we want to  do away with is the 
miserable character of this appropriation, under which the labourer lives merely to increase capital.” 
Marx and Engels, 1908: p 33.  
584 Marx and Engels: 1911: p25. 
585 Marx and Engels, 1911: p 25. 
586 Marx and Engels, 1911: p 26. 
204 
 
In short, to only have the right to one’s labour made one “dependent,” not free, according to 
Marx. Though this highlights the difference between the property assumptions of communism 
and nationalism, it also highlights the similarity between the two. This above quote from Marx 
resonates both with the prevalent ideology of the first form of the nation (although the 
assertions about capital were not so theoretically sophisticated, but rather played more on 
analogies to feudalism) in which it was held that an individual was not free if subject to a 
labour relation – and with the pro-slavery ideology of the US. Fitzhug’s assertion that “capital 
commands labour as master does slave” is striking when compared with the passage from 
Marx.587 This brief juxtaposition of Marxist communism and nationalism in my cases may 
highlight the fact that the property assumptions in nationalism may take a variety of political 
and social forms. In this research I have explored only two (the first and the second form of 
the nation) – the communist alternative might be a third form. 
 
b) The specificity of national propertied society vis-à-vis communist society   
It must be specified that although the property assumptions of nationalism might have the 
potentiality of many forms in it (including a communist one), it is also dependent on certain 
specific characteristics without which it would not have made sense to call it nationalism. And 
these characteristics are naturally thus absent from Marxist communism. The property 
assertions of nationalism as it appears in my cases were distinguished from Marxist 
communism in the sense that freedom and its property assertions were seen to be historically 
anchored to a specific tradition – nationalism connects its assertions to a specific sovereign 
people. It was also this specificity that formed the property assumptions of the ideology – it 
was because of widespread landownership and lack of feudal institutions that the property 
assumptions of nationalism became what they were. Marxian freedom is historical only insofar 
as it is to be realized in historical time, and is seen as a product of universal historical 
developments. National freedom not only was seen as a product of historical developments, 
but of historical development in specific places, to be realized only through the sovereignty of 
a chosen people. When national freedom became understood by its advocates as reality, all 
subsequent notions of freedom became tied up with that moment and that specific freedom. 
                                                     
 
587 That Marx`s views sprung from a soil fertilized by nationalism should not be a surprising statement 
considering that he came of intellectual age during the springtime of the peoples. Greenfeld, for 
example, has asserted quite forcefully the original and fundamentally nationalist foundations of 
Marx`s vision (Greenfeld, 1993:p 387-395). Greenfeld again builds her assertion on Krieger, Leonard, 
The German idea of freedom: History of a political tradition, University of Chicago Press, (1972). 
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This is opposite to Marx’s understanding. Marx wrote in the Manifesto about the labourer and 
national character: “Modern industrial labour, modern subjection to capital, the same in 
England as in France, in America as in Germany has stripped him of every trace of national 
character.”588  Marx saw an overreaching homogeneity from which a new form of freedom 
could be created. It may have been true on one level for my cases that those living there were 
subject to the same forces of capital, and thus had no national uniqueness, but, on another 
level, this was not true – the labourers of my cases had a national character: it was to be free 
and to have property, understood as a freedom inherent in their specific history. In the second, 
industrial form of the nation, the members of the nation were seen as free precisely because 
they were imbedded in capitalist labour/property relations, and connected to national 
sovereignty through a labour/property relation. There are thus two things that distinguish 
national freedom as understood in my cases from communist freedom as understood by Marx: 
the emphasis on private individual property in the former, and its specificity in regards to 
sovereignty. 
 
c) Perspectives from a property rights approach to the study of nationalism 
The national ideology of my cases represented a specific national way of organizing property 
and sovereignty. Other nationalisms (ethnic, collectivistic, etc.) may have organized and 
legitimized property in different ways, but in one form or the other, most, if not all, nation-
states have maintained a private property system akin to that which was established in my 
cases. Even though my cases were geographically far apart, and even though the national 
revolution in Norway happened almost 40 years after the American Revolution was initiated, 
these cases reflect a common spirit that became pervasive in the western world. The American 
case was an obvious case to look at to explore this spirit, given all its peculiarities as a “new 
world” and the fact that it was the first revolution of its kind. It proved, however, that Norway 
was not so different from the US, despite the fact that it was situated in what would appear to 
be a very different historical context (the “old world”). The fact that landownership was also 
widespread in Norway (like in America) at the time of the national revolution, combined with 
the lack of traditional feudal institutions in both places, contributed to the development of a 
similar ideology. That these cases were far apart and imbedded in quite different historical 
contexts, and still produced similar institutions and ideologies (liberal democracy, private 
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property, popular sovereignty etc.) which now seem to be pervasive all over the western world, 
might indicate that the main trends (i.e. the first and the second form of the nation with the 
centrality of property and the shift from land to labour) might also apply to other cases. 
Naturally, the account of nationalism given here is not an exhaustive account of all 
nationalisms, but the property rights perspective might also be applicable to other cases and 
times. The model is probably particularly applicable to other cases in the same geographical 
and historical time period to which I have confined my investigation. It seems reasonable that 
the model developed here could be a general theory of the emergence of nationalism in the 
west, seen in relation to the demise of feudalism, absolutism, etc., and the rise of industrial 
societies. The French Revolution would, for example, be an interesting case to look at in this 
regard. In fact, in most of the western world between 1776 and 1884, feudal land-ownership 
disappeared, giving rise to private property regimes, and it is probably not a coincidence that 
this time period is also generally seen as a the heyday of nationalism in this region.  It would 
require further research, of course, to investigate how property rights and sovereignty of the 
people were understood by different forms of nationalism, emerging at different times and 
under other class (property) relations than in the cases investigated here. It would require 
further research also to be able to determine how various historical and social conditions 
affected this consolidation and development of property and sovereignty in the long run. There 
are clearly many different trajectories: one can mention the Fascist regimes of interwar Italy 
and Germany, or the communist interlude in Eastern Europe, while western Europe will 
probably be similar to the US and Norway. The Latin American developments, that in a way 
must be considered a type of western nationalism, are also interesting cases where property 
relations and national development became both dramatic and, for a time, different from the 
North American and western European developments, but where land rights and reform have 
also been a key issue. It could be very interesting to research further how different 
understandings and assertions of national property rights led to different political 
manifestations under different conditions, and how the property rights of individuals were 
legitimized. Finally, it must be said that to fully understand the development of nationalism in 
the US and Norway, one would need to investigate also the subsequent phase of national 
development there; the coming of the welfare state and its retrenchment in the twentieth 
century. But that is for another occasion.  
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